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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this thesis is to test whether the financial regulation put in 
place in Portugal with the aim of bringing stability to the banking system has 
contributed to that aim. 
This question is examined not by considering the incidence of failures before and 
after the regulations were put in place for, as will be set out, that approach would be 
inappropriate in the particular case of Portugal. Rather what is examined is whether 
the regulations have contributed to stability by reducing the volatility of profits or by 
increasing their level. 
Financial regulatory reform is usually characterised as a move from macroeconomic, 
allocation and structural controls to prudential, protective and organisational 
controls. The history of these changes in Portugal is set out, and their effects on 
profitability then ex.::mined. 
The following questions on the behaviuur of profitability were addressed. What 
happened to profitability? How did it change as between before and after the 
reforms, and were the changes, if any, significant? 
Next the effect of regulation on profitability in a model of profitability, which also 
allows for the effects of real and nominal macroeconomic stability, interest rates, 
management, market structure, and ownership, is examined. 
Finally, the evolution of risk in the course of financial regulatory reform is examined. 
The main findings from the econometric tests are as follows. They show that profits, 
the RO.A. and RO.E. behave differently with financial regulation changes. Average 
profitability measured by profits increased but became more volatile, while average 
profitability measured by return on assets (RO.A.) and return on equity (R.D.E.) fell. 
It is also found that regulation is statistically significant in explaining profits and 
R.O.A. behaviour but the influence of regulation on R.O.E. is statistically not 
significant. Output from these models is used to build a Regime Switching Model of 
Risk for the Banking System that allows risk to be determined simultaneously by 
regulation and by all the other banking performance determinants that are significant. 
According to these results, risk has decreased with full liberalisation of the banking 
market. 
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
1.1. - MOTIVATION FOR THIS RESEARCH: IMPORTANCE AND 
RELEVANCE OF THE SUBJECT 
(lA constant process of evaluation and adjustment may be required 
to maximise the benefits (and minimised the costs) of financial 
regulation" 
Vittas, Dimitri. Financial Regulation: 
Changing the Rules of the Game 
Portuguese financial regulation changes have their roots in the 1980's. 
Notwithstanding that, only now can their full impact begin to be assessed. For in 
reality, although credit controls and administrative interest rates were abolished in 
the late 80's, barriers to entry were dismantled only in the early 1990's. The right of 
establishment, and complete liberalisation of capital movements, were only achieved 
in 1993. 
The financial sector, and therefore financial liberalisation, encompasses the banking 
system, capital markets and the insurance sector. During her experience as a senior 
economist at a Portuguese banking group, the author noticed that the path of 
liberalisation has introduced several changes in the banking decision-making process 
related to the allocation of funding resources. Hence, the field of the present research 
is confined to banking activities. 
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The aIm of this thesis is to look at the change in banks' performance as a 
consequence of financial liberalisation, and to draw some conclusions about the 
impact of liberalisation on financial stability in Portugal. 
The framework of these regulatory changes in Portugal has several characteristics. 
The most important ones are the solvency ratio and liberalisation of capital flows. 
The solvency ratio was introduced in 1991. Full capital movements' liberalisation 
was achieved at the end of 1992. These measures were followed by new sources of 
uncertainty, namely interest rate volatility and the cost of risk based capital. Interest 
rate volatility became a much more relevant issue to banking management and new 
approaches to capital allocation had to be adopted. 
The degree of uncertainty introduced by financial liberalisation lay in a growing 
difficulty in forecasting interest rate term structure. For example, unanticipated 
increases in short term interest rates, when the trend for interest rates was downward, 
had a negative effect on the profitability of banks' decisions about funding in money 
markets. Unanticipated increases in short term interest rates occurred in 1993 and 
1995 to prevent speculation against the Portuguese Escudo. Simultaneously, banks 
that had a substantial proportion of their assets in securities suffered big losses. 
The adoption of the solvency ratio led to a mistaken allocation of resources. Banks 
were undertaking sub-optimal decisions. Decisions were sub-optimal in the sense 
that they only had the cost of capital as guideline. Instead of being concerned with 
both revenues and costs, banks dropped this profit maximising principle and began to 
direct their funding to those transactions less demanding in terms of risk based 
capital. 
Because of these new sources of uncertainty, the Portuguese banking system not only 
has improved its risk management techniques but also began the implementation of 
internal informational systems. 
With the new approach of capital allocation, the evidence points to the banks' 
balance sheets having, perhaps, an excess weight of liquidity (money market lines), 
15 
securities and off-balance sheet transactiuns (because they required less amount of 
capital). 
Therefore, financial liberalisation, as well as the new rules that followed, may have 
induced banks to conduct their business not in the best interests of the stability of the 
system. The new regulatory regime based on prudential rules and on credible 
supervision schemes, has as its objective a growing soundness and stability of the 
financial system. Nevertheless, we may be facing a perverse effect of regulation. The 
objective of this thesis is to investigate whether regulation designed to reduce risk 
may have the unintended effect of increasing risk and the vulnerability of regulated 
institutions. 
1.2. - THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.2.1. - THE APPROACH 
The research will be focused on the study of the behaviour of 33 1 Portuguese banks. 
In 19972 5 banking groups, in a total number of 16 banks3, dominated the banking 
market. By themselves, they account for 4/5 of the retail market4 . The Portuguese 
banking system is a 'concentrated market, with the above-mentioned groups holding 
80%5 of total assets. The ten biggest banks, when ranked by assets, hold around 70% 
of total assets. 
Analysis will be carried on through the period 1975 - 1997. In 1975, in the aftermath 
of the Portuguese "Carnation" Revolution, all the Portuguese banks were 
nationalised. In 1997, after intense regulatory changes, the Portuguese banking 
system experienced a period of consolidation. The thesis presents an analysis of the 
1 In a total amount of 51 banks operating in Portugal in 1997. 
2 Figures presented refer to 1997 year end. 
3 These groups are: 
BPI Group, comprising 4 banks 
BCP Group, comprising 3 banks 
Espirito Santo Group, comprising 3 banks 
Champalimaud Group, comprising 4 banks 
C.G.D. group (the government group), comprising 2 banks. 
4 More precisely: 81.31 %% on total credit and 86.19% of total deposits. 
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regulatory changes experienced by the Portuguese banking system between 1975 and 
1997. 
For quantitative testing purposes, the period of this study will be reduced to 1985-
1997. Between 1975 and 1984 the State was the market. Under a completely state 
owned banking system, banks weren't profit-maximising firms, but performed a 
social role instead. 
The central hypothesis of this thesis relates to the correlation between regulatory 
changes and risk in banking activity. The research is aimed at testing the theoretical 
assumption that regulatory changes have increased risk on banks' performance, from 
the standpoint of banking system stability 6. 
The questions to be answered are divided into two sets. The first group refers to steps 
one and two of the research process, of which explanation will follow. The second 
group comprises the hypothesis to be tested (third and last step of the research 
approach). 
The first set of questions includes: 
What is financial deregulation? How can we interpret the financial regulatory 
reform? Why do we explain the regulatory reform as a move from macroeconomic, 
structural and allocative controls to prudential, organizational and protective 
controls? 
How can we explain changes in the regulatory framework? 
How did financial regulatory reform occur in Portugal? 
The second group comprises: 
How to assess the merits and weaknesses of the regulatory reform using as criteria 
stability? 
What is the best measure of banks profitability? 
What have changes in regulation done to banks' profitability? 
5 More precisely 79.86%. 
6 Banks' risks may also be assessed on the financial management standpoint (Gap Analysis; Durantion 
Analysis, Gap Duration Analysis, for instance). 
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A three-step research approach will be employed. The first one consists In an 
analytical framework of the financial regulatory reform, which is carried out in 
chapter 2. The second concerns the history of regulatory changes in Portugal and is 
developed in chapter 3. The third provides an assessment of Portugal's regulatory 
reform, where these research hypotheses are due to be tested, and encompasses 
chapters 4 to 7. The conclusion is presented in chapter 8. 
The first step comprises the identification of the subject (financial deregulation or 
regulatory reform?), the regulatory reform's nature (its contents) and the reasons 
behind that regulatory reform (its causes). 
"Deregulation became a very popular slogan in everyday discussions,,7 
Investigating the subject of this research, the author faced a contradiction between 
the use of the expression "financial deregulation" and the fact that banks are each 
time more regulated. Investigating what has been termed "financial deregulation", it 
is concluded that we are facing a financial regulatory reform rather than a financial 
deregulation process. Why? The answer lies in the nature of regulatory changes. We 
have several types of regulationS, whose enforcement varies through time. Thus it is 
necessary to research those groups of regulation. This research leads to the corollary 
that the regulatory reform consists in moving the emphasis of regulation from type to 
type of regulation. \Vhy? The answer lies in the causes of the regulatory reform. The 
analysis of regulatory changes' causes ends the first step of the approach. 
It follows that the forces that drove, and still are driving, the regulatory reform in 
market economies are also present in the Portuguese financial regulatory framework. 
In Portugal there is an additional cause: ideological transformation, which prompted 
the speed of changes. These changes occurred in only one decade. The examination 
of Portuguese financial regulatory reform provides the content of step two in the 
research approach. 
7 Charles B. Blankart (1990). "Strategies of Regulatory Refonn: An Economic Analysis with some 
remarks on Germany". In Deregulation or Re-regulation? By Giandomenico Majone, p.2ll. 
8 Macroeconomic Controls; AlIocative Controls; Structural Controls; Prudential Controls; 
Organizational Controls and Protective Controls. 
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The third and last step in the research is the construction of the hypotheses to be 
tested. These hypotheses are an attempt to find out whether the banking system 
stability is threatened or not by financial regulatory reform. The idea behind it is that 
if banks' profitability become more volatile, banking has become more risky unless 
the level of profitability rise substantially. Under these circumstances, the empirical 
analysis will test significant changes in the level and volatility of profitability before 
and after liberalisation. 
Although it is unclear whether profitability' volatility went up or down, the way 
banks have accommodated their management strategies to financial regulatory 
changes in Portugal suggests that something may have happened with profitability's 
volatility. 
For instance the solvency ratio became effective by 1991. Banks reacted by 
increasing the volume of those lower weighted risk assets, such as interbank lines 
and financial assets portfolios (especially with public debt whose weight to the 
solvency ratio is 0%). While interbank lines may probably have reduced profits' 
volatility, a financial assets portfolio's increase adds volatility to profits9 because 
financial assets are more prone to interest rate risk than traditional lending. 
Furthermore an explosion in personal credit followed the liberalisation of loans for 
consumer spending, effective in 1993. Although very attractive as a result of high 
intermediation margins, this may have brought more volatility to profitability. The 
same argument applies to credit card loans. In addition, the emergence of new 
financial instruments, like derivatives, induced banks into new off balance sheet 
transactions, increasing profitability's volatility. The proliferation of investment 
funds, nourished by the excellent performance of capital markets, may have given a 
positive contribution to profitability volatility as well. On the other hand, in the early 
90's, commercial banks entered the previously forbidden mortgage loans, especially 
housing loans up to 20 years. This may have contributed to decreasing profitability 
volatility. 
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The objective of this thesis is to research whether financial regulatory reform in 
Portugal has had a significant effect on profitability's volatility or whether the 
presumed increased volatility from securities portfolio, personal credit and financial 
derivatives has been offset by a presumed decreased volatility arising from interbank 
lines and mortgage loans. 
1.2.2. - RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
Several working hypotheses and propositions will be investigated. The mam 
propositions are: 
Proposition 1: There hasn't been any financial deregulation of financial 
markets and institutions. 
At the beginning of the research, there was some difficulty in understanding the 
dynamic process of changes in the financial sector. The expression "financial 
deregulation" did not seem to be compatible with changes in this economic sector. 
Although very commonly applied, the author thinks that this expression is less 
accurate to clarify the situation than the expression "financial regulatory reform". 
The argument is that, after all, banks are currently much more regulated then in the 
past. As a corollary, the author argues that the banking system is experiencing a 
process of financial regulatory reform. 
Proposition 2: 
regulation. 
The likelihood of bank failures has rIsen with changes m 
The argument is that the soundness and stability of the banking system has worsened 
with the regulatory reform. Evidence suggests that bank practice since 1990 may 
have brought an increase in profitability's volatility. This performance is not 
incompatible with the possibility that average profitability rose. 
9 Diversification, made possible by market liberalisation, decreases non systematic risk but not 
systematic risk. 
20 
Proposition 3: Profits are the best measure of banks' earnings. 
There is no formal or institutional definition for banks' earnings. Profits seem to be 
the most suitable proxy for earnings. The suggestion is that either shareholders or 
managers look at profits to assess their investment profitability or their management 
performance, respectively. 
Proposition 4: The regulatory reform has increased profitability volatility/risk in the 
Portuguese banking system. 
The proposition will be tested against two assumptions. First, that the modem 
approach to prudential regulation, which emphasises risk-based capital requirements, 
may have differentiated in favour of some activities as a result of the risk weights 
that are applied to different types of assets. Secondly, that structural controls used to 
limit the range of activities of different types of financial institutions have been 
dismantled, allowing entry in new markets and trading with new instruments. As 
result of financial regulatory reform Portuguese banks have increased interbank lines, 
securities, off balance sheet transactions, personal credit and mortgage loans. More 
interest rate sensitive assets like securities and off balance sheet instruments, along 
with more prone to default assets, like consumption credit, seem to overweight those 
less riskier assets, like money market lines and mortgage loans. Hence, the author 
expects the results to show an increase on profitability's volatility. If the hypothesis 
is not rejected then the regulatory reform has not achieved its alleged end: the 
stability and soundness of the banking system. 
1.2.3. -A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON REGULATION AND 
ON THE PORTUGUESE BANKING SYSTEM 
The rules of the game in the banking system are viewed as a dynamic process of 
change. This study aims to contribute to a better knowledge on both the nature of 
regulatory reform and its effect on banking motivated by regulatory changes. 
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The main contributions are twofold: 
1 st: To improve the study of the process of regulatory change in the financial sector, 
with particular emphasis on assessing its consequences to the banking system. 
2nd : To make a contribution to a better knowledge of the Portuguese banking 
system's performance. 
When studying financial regulation, the central issues to address are the purposes of 
regulation, the specific nature of regulation, that is, its form and scope, and finally, to 
assess the merits of regulation. 
The first of the above-mentioned issues, the objectives of regulation, are very well 
expressed in both the Capture Theory of Regulation and the Public Interest Theory of 
Regulation. The former was explained by Stigler (1971 and 1975) and formalised by 
Peltzman (1976), while Kay and Vickers (1988) set out very clearly the economic 
justifications for regulation sustained by the latter. The "Capture Theory" of 
regulation's basic proposition is that regulatory agencies are "captured" by the 
industry they are supposed to be regulating 10. The "Public Interest Theory" is a 
normative theory of regulation that states what regulation "ought" to do: regulation 
"ought" to bring economic efficiency to markets by means of the identification and 
correction of market failures 11. There is a considerable debate and a voluminous 
academic literature on the rationales of regulation. 12 
The second issue, the specific nature of financial regulation, will be developed later, 
in chapter 2 of this thesis. Yet, a brief explanation seems to be pertinent. 
Gual and Neven (1992) distinguish between structure and conduct regulation. These 
authors explain financial deregulation as a move from structure regulation (when 
regulators are concerned with the way markets are organised) to conduct regulation 
to 'As a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its 
benefits". Stigler (1971), "The Economic Theory of Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, 2/), pJ 
t t Economic justifications for regulation range from consumer protection (asymmetric informational 
problems) to risks that are correlated across firms (externalities). The third rationale for regulation is 
the need to check the abuse of excessive concentration on the market place (market power). 
t2 See, for instance: L1ewellyn (1986); Capie and Wood (1991); Herring and Litan (1995); Hoenig 
(1996). Peacock (1984) presents an explanation on both The Public Interest Theory an The Capture 
Theory. 
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(when regulators are concerned with behaviour within the market). L1ewellyn (1986), 
arguing that "regulation implies that the business operations, balance-sheet structure 
and pricing policies of financial institutions are different from what would emerge in 
a fully competitive, unconstrained market environment" \3, establishes six forms of 
regulation: environmental, legal, self-imposed, moral suasion, self-regulation and 
external agency. Concerning the scope of regulation, this author identifies six areas: 
geographical, functional, ownership, pricing, entry and establishment, and business 
operations. For L1ewellyn the process of deregulation is about the "changing 
structure and operation of these (the above-mentioned) forms,,14 and "similarly 
relates to these (the above-mentioned scope) dimensions,,15. Dimitri Vittas (1992), 
arguing that "( ... ) the ultimate goals of financial regulation are the achievement of 
efficiency, stability, and fairness, not only in the financial sector but also in the 
economy at large,,16, presents six categories of controls that are adopted by 
governments, depending on their particular objectives: macroeconomic controls, 
allocative controls, structural controls, prudential controls, organizational controls. 
and protective controls. Dimitri Vittas encompasses a wider range of regulatory 
fields than the previous authors. Under those circumstances the analysis of the 
regulatory reform's nature performed in this thesis opts for Vittas' types of 
regulation. Apart from this, Vittas' presentation is the most adequate to assess the 
Portuguese Financial Regulatory Reform, from a historical perspective, as it is 
carried out in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
Finally, the third central issue is related to the assessment of the merits of regulation. 
Which will be carried out from chapter 4 onwards. Most studies only cover the 
objectives of the financial regulation and its form and scope stopping at this level. 
Discussions in the academic literature are over the best way to regulate financial 
markets and institutions rather than about assessing regulation. Some of those studies 
that outline the advantages and disadvantages of regulatory changes, like Blankart 
(1990), Benston (1991), Mayer (1995), and Mc Gowan and Seabright (1995), opt for 
descriptive analysis, lacking in both formalisation and applied economics. When 
13 The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions, p.IS. 
14 Op. Cit. p. 16. 
15 Op. Cit. p. 17. 
16 "The Impact of Regulation on Financial Intermediation", in Financial Regulation: Changing the 
Rules of the Game, Dimitri Vitas, ed., The World Bank: Whashington, p. 62. 
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formalised, as in Mayer and Neven (1991 )17, the assessment of regulatory changes 
still lacks testing. However some empirical research has been carried out, especially 
on the macroeconomic area. Even so, there is a need for more research effort 
involving the assessment of financial regulatory changes. This study tries to shed 
some light on banking response to the financial regulatory reform, using profitability 
as a performance measure. If profitability became more variable with the 
introduction of new regulatory rules we may be facing a threat to financial stability. 
Research fields may be microeconomic, macroeconomic or use combined micro and 
macroeconomic ana!ytical tools 18. 
Prior studies, like Heffeman (1995)19, Goddhart and Schoenmaker (1995), Thakor 
(1996) and Co le and Gunther (1998) focus on the macroeconomic area. They 
research regulation and bank failures, regulation and conflict of interests between 
monetary policy and banking supervision, capital requirements and aggregate bank 
lending, on-site and off-site supervision and bank failure, respectively. Hoggarth, 
Milne and Wood (1998) examine the links between financial innovation and 
financial stabilit/o. 
Studies in the microeconomic field are more rare. They should cover the issues of 
regulation and competition, regulation and operational efficiency, regulation and 
profitability. Heffeman (1987) sets out a research method to assess how regulatory 
changes affect the competitive structure of U.K. financial markets. Barros and Leite 
(1998) assess the impact of liberalisation in banking, testing for competition in both 
the deposits and loans markets. 
17 Also published in Insead Working Papers n090154IBP 
18 When we insert the determinants of banking performance we have to link profitability and 
economic policy, for instance. 
19 Together with macroeconomic variables, Heffernan uses micro-management variables in the 
assessment of bank failure. 
20 These authors, although highlighting financial stability, assess innovation through the behaviour of 
loan losses and profits in German and UK banking systems. 
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As far as the author's research permits21 any conclusion, there are no studies on the 
impact of regulation on banking operational efficiency, that is, on the extent to which 
resources costs are minimised for any level of service provided. Although efficiency 
is another field worthy to be studied, this study tries to analyse how the financial 
regulatory reform has affected banking profitability, measured by profits, return on 
assets (R.O.A.) and return on equity (R.O.E.). The Portuguese banking system 
provides the required empirical evidence for this study. 
It is the author's understanding that this study is conducted under the "umbrella" of 
combined micro and macroeconomic analysis. Banking performance provides the 
micro economic field. Thus, the study of regulation and profitability is clearly a 
microeconomic issue. The liaison between profitability volatility and banking 
stability bridges micro with macroeconomic issues. Banks offer a core banking 
service: liquidity to the economy. Asset Quality Transformation enables banks to 
finance the real sector of the economy. In providing investment-financing sources, 
the banking system plays a very important role in allocative efficiency. And last but 
not the least, if the entire banking system collapses there will be no mechanism for 
money transmission. A high level of profitability volatility is a source of instability 
in the banking system, augmenting the possibility of bank failures. The systemic 
issue is, with any doubt, in the macro economic field. On the other hand, the 
utilisation of this thesis' results will underpin the analysis of macroeconomic banking 
performance determinants such as fluctuations in real G.D.P. and in inflation rates, 
among other factors 22 • 
On the other hand, academic studies about the Portuguese banking system up to now 
fall in the industrial organisation field, while that of the financial behaviour of banks 
remains to explore. Risk23 in banking is a fertile realm worthy to be researched. 
21 The search has been carried on through Economic Literature Database, World Banking Abstracts 
and B.P.O. 
22 Other factors that may have had an impact on bank performance are on the micro level: 
misjudgement of interest risk; products incorrectly priced; lack of securitisation; oligopolistic market 
structure. 
23 We refer to risk measured through profitability's volatility. Another measure of risk in the banking 
system is the incidence of bank failure. As explained in Sergio (1995), the last huge banking crises in 
Portugal occurred on the 20's first half and had monetary policy relaxation as cause. On the yearly 
30's a couple of banks failed because they hold Brazilian debt. During the last twenty years only a 
small saving bank, on the islands, failed due to fraud and fraudulent mismanagement. 
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Pinho (1994) is concerned with banking markets imperfections, more especially with 
real resources costs and imperfect competition. Barros (1998) proposes a spatial 
competition model to explain price differences across banks in the deposit market. 
Barros and Leite (1998) assess the impact of Portugal's recent liberalisation on 
competition. Barros and Pinho (1995) explore the combined effect of privatisation 
and declining banking market concentration on the bargaining process between 
Portuguese banks and bankers. 
This study aims to shed some light on the nature of regulatory reform in general, and 
on the history of regulatory reform in Portugal in particular. In short, it hopes to help 
understand Portuguese banks' performance since shareholders' equity moved from 
state ownership to private hands. Showing the speed of financial regulatory changes 
in Portugal, and studying the way banks reacted to these changes, the analysis hopes 
to contribute to the enrichment of Portuguese literature on this subject. The 
theoretical assumption that regulatory changes' have increased profitability volatility 
will be tested with Portuguese banking data. Therefore, the study attempts to give a 
contribution to a better knowledge of the Portuguese banking system. 
The author first considers the relationship between financial regulatory reform and 
banking performance, concentrating in particular on profitability as a measure of 
bank performance. Results will be then displayed against a broader ground of 
financial stability, aiming to identify the relationship between the behaviour of 
profitability and changes on financial rules. If, as the evidence suggests, profitability 
volatility has increased, then regulation designed to reduce risk can have had the 
unintended effect of increasing risk and the vulnerability of regulated institutions. 
1.3. - STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The next chapter "Regulatory reform. Transition towards New Rules of the Game in 
the Financial System" provides an overview of the research topics on the analytical 
framework of the financial regulatory reform. It corresponds to the research design 
approach's first step. 
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In this chapter, after explaining possible misleading interpretations of the expressions 
"deregulation" and "regulation" (section 2.1), the study will begin to examine the 
nature and objectives of each type of financial regulation (section 2.2). These types 
of financial regulation are: macroeconomic controls, allocative controls, structural 
controls, prudential controls and protective controls. Financial regulatory reform 
consists of moving the emphasis from type to type of regulation through time, 
according with the objectives that the financial rules aim to achieve. For the 
following reasons, this is the best way to study the nature of the financial regulatory 
reform when the criteria for evaluating financial regulation are stability. Aggregating 
financial rules in several types, according to their objectives, is the approach that 
clearly relates regulatory changes with the response of banking management. The 
regulatory reform consists of the adoption of prudential, organizational and 
protective controls, which follow the removal of macroeconomic, allocative and 
structure controls. Therefore this seems to be the approach that better links regulatory 
changes with risk. Finally, once economic integration and technological innovation 
are identified as the causes behind the regulatory reform (section 2.3), the above-
mentioned approach is the one that is most easily identified with those causes. In 
order better to understand the financial rules' new scope and form, chapter 2 ends 
with the study of the reasons that forced changes in the regulatory framework of the 
financial system. Economic integration and technological innovation are 
incompatible with macroeconomic, allocative and structural controls. These controls 
were replaced by prudential, protective and organizational controls because banks 
and financial institutions are regulated for reasons of safety and soundness. 
Chapter 3 "The History of the Financial Regulatory Reform in Portugal" (with its 
correspondence to step 2 in the research approach) discusses the main aspects that 
characterise the financial regulatory reform's form and scope in Portugal. 
In this chapter will be analysed the regulatory transformation in the Portuguese 
Banking System during the last two decades. After presenting a brief historical 
perspective on the banking framework under Salazar's regime, the recent 
development on banking activities is split into three distinct periods: 1975 -1984, 
1985-1989 and 1990-1997. The Portuguese Government nationalised the banking 
industry in 1975. The privatisation process of the sector began in 1984 when the 
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government allowed private banks to incorporate and new foreign banks to enter the 
system. Since 1989 the Portuguese government has embarked on a programme of re-
privatising previously nationalised entities, which ended in 1996 when only two 
banks remained under state control. The first period (sec. 3.2) is dominated by 
macroeconomic, structural and allocative controls. As government directed financial 
institutions to lend to selected industries, interest rates were administrative priced 
and the amount of credit available was previously established by the government, the 
State acted as a substitute of the market. Deep structural controls' transformations 
occurred during the second phase (sce 3.3) aiming to design a more modern and 
flexible Portuguese banking system. These dramatic changes succeeded in rending 
the sector more in accordance with European patterns. Finally, the nature and 
participants of the Portuguese banking system changed significantly since 1990 as a 
consequence of the reprivatisation programme (sec.3.4). With special relevance to 
macroeconomic controls' changes and on a growing emphasis on prudential 
regulations, it can be proved how fast and deeply the regulatory financial reform took 
place in Portugal. In one decade the Portuguese banking system has been 
transformed from a state owned and regulated one (in the old fashion way) into a 
small but fit system, operating under market forces. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 (corresponding to the research design's third step) aim at 
assessing the merits of the financial regulatory reform in Portugal. 
Dewatripont and Tirole argue that "the existing (banking, intermediation, industrial 
organization and natural monopolies regulation) theory is quite far from regulators 
concems,,24 and they design a conceptual framework to embody a theory of 
regulation for the banking system. In the absence of such a theory, the research 
carried out through these chapters has as its objective to have a contribution to the 
stylised facts of a theory of regulation for the banking system. 
These chapters will begin with an overall description of banks in the Portuguese 
banking system, followed by the presentation of available sources for financial 
statements data collection and the research methodology (chapter 4). 
24 "La Reglementation Prudentielle des Banques" pp.9, 11 and 58 
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To assess the merits of the financial regulatory reform in Portugal the research 
method proposed encompasses three models (developed in chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
respectively), which are briefly explained as follows. 
First, an analysis of variance will be carried out to study banks' profitability 
behaviour before and after liberalisation. The objective is to test whether average 
profitability have increased or not with financial liberalisation in Portugal. While 
Gual and Neven (1992) suggest that with deregulation in the European Community 
profits fall, Hoggarth et al. (1998) contrast higher recorded level of bank profits in 
the UK with lower bank profits recorded in Germany (a more regulated market). The 
researcher proposes two fixed effects ANOVA models with two factors: time and 
banks. In the first ANOVA model to be tested time has two levels, before and after 
financial liberalisation, and includes twenty-four banks. The second model differs in 
what concerns the factor time. Now time is divided into three levels: highly regulated 
banking market, less regulated market and liberalised market. The aim is to test for 
the significance of time on average profitability. Tukey's method will allow for the 
comparison between average profitability between any levels of time for any group 
(or groups) of banks. 
The second model is an econometric unbalanced panel data model and aims to prove 
the statistical significance of regulation on profitability. The sample comprises all 
Portuguese banks with assets of more than 100 billions of escudos in December 
1997. Three measures of profitability (profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E.) are regressed on 
several banking performance determinants. Macroeconomic bank performance 
determinants as explanatory variables used in the regressions are: G.D.P., for real 
stability (Wood et al (1998», inflation rate, for nominal stability (Hoggarth et 
a1.( 1998», and the mechanisms through which interest rates affect banking 
profitability, this is the spread and the endowment effect. Microeconomic 
determinants of bank performance used in the regressions are: regulation as a dummy 
variable, ownership as a binary variable, the structure of the sector ( Miller and 
Noulas (1997), Bourke (1988), Arshadi and Lawrence (1987), Smirlock (1985», and 
the quality of management ( Hoggarth et al. (1998), Miller and Noulas (1997) and 
Boyd and Gertler (1994». 
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The third model is a regime switching model of risk for the banking system, a model 
with restrictions on the coefficients that derives its structure from Finance Theory. 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995), assessing the degree of integration or segmentation of 
capital markets, estimate a regime switching model of expected returns that allows 
returns to be determined at different times by domestic factors or by world factors 
markets. This regime switching model is proposed in the current research to allow 
risk in the banking system to be determined at different times by regulation (dummy 
variable) or by a composite index constructed with all banking performance 
determinants that are statistical significant. These banking performance determinants 
are selected from the second model of the research. "Whether accounting or market 
data provide better measures of risk and return is a debatable issue: each has 
advantages and disadvantages,,25. Faced with the impossibility of using market data 
(share prices) to compute a risk measure for the banking system in the context of this 
research (the floatation of Portuguese banks is very recent26), the author opted for the 
definition of risk provided in Uncertainty Theory: profitability volatility/ expected 
profitability. Both profitability volatility and expected profitability will be computed 
from the second model. 
This regIme switching model of risk for the banking system alms to test the 
hypothesis that the financial regulatory reform has increase risk in the banking 
sector. 
1.4. - FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS 
According to the deficiencies found in the literature concernmg the Portuguese 
Banking System, two future research topics deserve some attention: evidence of the 
Capture Theory in the Portuguese financial system, and research on the reasons that 
prevented a financial crisis in Portugal after an intensive period of financial reform 
(financial liberalisation). 
2S Boyd, Graharn and Hewitt (1993),p.47 
26 See appendix B to chapter 4. 
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When studying regulation and the interest of the industry, it can be concluded that 
regulation also serves the interests of the industry, although reference is always made 
to the ultimate interests of the consumer. The author holds the opinion that it is 
worthwhile to study capture theory in Portugal because this important issue seems to 
have an impact on the regulatory reform. 
It is the traditional view that liberalisation policy should serve to prevent decline and 
crisis in the economy. Another field of interesting research is to find out what 
prevented a financial crisis in Portugal. Scandinavian countries and Japan 
experienced severe systemic problems during the late 80's and early 90's. In recent 
years systemic banking crises even more severe than those of Scandinavia and Japan 
have occurred in a number of developing countries. Hoggarth Milne and Wood 
(1998) state that 
A pre-condition for financial problems of these kinds appears to be 
recent prior liberalisation of the financial system, with relaxation 
of controls over interest rates and removal of legislative and 
regulatory restrictions on the business activities of credit 
institution/7. 
A comparative study between the above-mentioned countries and Portugal, where 
financial regulatory changes occurred very fast without there being any threat to 
systemic risk, may contribute to understanding "the precise mechanisms by which 
macroeconomic developments interact with financial instability (that) are poorly 
understood and merit further investigation,,28 
27 "Financial Innovation and Financial Stability: some lessons from Germany and the UK", p. 6. 
28 Op. Cit. p. 3. 
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CHAPTER 2.- REGULA TORY REFORM: TRANSITION 
TOWARDS NEW RULES OF THE GAME IN THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM. 
2.1. - INTRODUCTION: AN INTERPRETATION OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM 
As the study of financial regulation is undertaken, expressIOns like such as 
"regulation", "deregulation", "re-regulation" or "supranational regulation with 
domestic liberalisation" become very familiar. What is the meaning of "regulation"? 
What can be understood as "deregulation" or "re-regulation"? What is "supranational 
regulation with domestic liberalisation"? Commenting on these questions is the task 
carried out in this chapter. 
In the task of explaining what is financial regulation, the study of financial regulatory 
reform illuminates the above-mentioned questions. The central issue is that, while 
some financial rules have been abolished, the upshot is not a "laissez-faire" financial 
market, but one in which new financial rules have been erected. 
There are several approaches to the study of changes in financial regulatory 
framework. One approach is to examine the use of the expression "financial 
deregulation". This chapter starts by explaining the use of this expression. It is 
argued that, although very commonly utilised, the expression "financial 
deregulation" is less accurate in explaining changes on regulation than the expression 
"financial regulatory reform", After all, financial institutions are currently much 
more regulated thar. in the past. Facing this fact it seems pertinent to explore the 
reasons for this paradox. That is the reason why this chapter proceeds with an 
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analysis of the meaning of financial regulatory reform. This analysis permits a full 
interpretation of the expression "financial deregulation". 
Webster's dictionary defines regulation as the act of reducing to order; of disposing 
in accordance with rule or established custom. For purposes of this thesis, by 
regulation is meant "a body of specific rules or agreed behaviour, either imposed by 
some government or other external agency or self-imposed by explicit or implicit 
agreement within the industry, that limits the activities and business operations of 
financial institutions,,29. 
Following this definition, does deregulation mean the adoption of a "laissez-faire" 
policy in the financial sector of the economy?30. The answer is no. Yet, the 
expression "financial deregulation" remains in use to characterise the environment 
where financial systems operate in market economies. Paradoxically, the question is 
not between regulation and non-regulation, but rather what exactly is implied by a 
change in regulation that is identified in this chapter as a regulatory reform in the 
financial system. 
In late 1970's, older, informal regulatory structures began to break down31 under the 
pressure of powerful economic and technological forces32, and began to be officially 
dismantled. This process is sometimes called "deregulation", but that is a misleading 
term because, as often as not, new and generally more explicit regulatory structures 
have been simultaneously erected in place of what went before. This apparent 
paradoxical combination of deregulation and re-regulation, which is very clear and 
evident in the financial services industries, is what Kay and Vickers (1988) mean by 
regulatory reform. This is the content of the expression "regulatory reform" that is 
adopted in this thesis. 
29 L1ewellyn, D. (1986), p. 9. 
30 For a very interesting study of a "laissez-faire" regime see George Selgin and Lawrence White 
(1994). 
31 In the U.K. informal regulation was replaced by statutory regulation with the enforcement of the 
1979 Banking Act, that followed the secondary crisis of British fringe banks that occurred in the early 
1970's. 
32 These trends will be explained in section 3 of this chapter and will be dealt as the causes for 
regulatory reform. 
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For a full interpretation, when the expression "financial deregulation" is employed it 
is needed to bear in mind that this expression is underpinned by two core ideas. 
First, time changes the appeal of rules and laws. Regulatory measures that have been 
necessary for the banking system in the past become obsolete. Given that the banking 
business is dynamic and changing, past regulatory orders and directives may become 
too restrictive and have needed to be replaced by new regulations. 
Secondly, research has evolved. Traditionally, theoretical and empirical studies of 
regulation in economics have focused on the control of prices and entry (quantities) 
in particularly industries)). "This type of regulation has become known as "old style" 
regulation,,34. To talk of a process of "financial deregulation" is not inappropriate if, 
and only if, we understand regulation as "old style". In fact, administrative controls 
of prices and quantities, which were a blueprint in the financial market for many 
years, are incompatible with the 90's financial world environment. Presented below 
are a set of rules that can be viewed as "old style" regulation and which have 
meanwhile been dismantled. This is the process behind the expression "financial 
deregulation" . 
Following the Great Depression, a "new economic order" was established in which 
banking became one of the industries most protected by virtually all levels of 
government. Historical reasons for comprehensive legislation concerning prices and 
quantities in financial markets can be found in the 1930's. As examples of the old 
style legislation that has been dismantled (financial deregulation) it can be presented 
the following instances: 
- Banks were legislated out of capital markets35 
- The Bretton Woods accord saw to it that for nearly 30 years after the World War 
II exchange rates were fixed 
33 See the books by Kahn (1970, 1971), Bonbright (1961), Philips (1969), Bailey (1973), Sheperd and 
Wilcox (1979), and Crew and Kleindorfer (1979) for overviews of the vast theoretical and applied 
literature. 
34 Spulber (1989) p.22. 
35 While in Europe the concept of Universal Bank has already been adopted, in the U.S.A. the 
Glass-Steagall Act is still under discussion. 
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- Interest rates in both sides of banks balance sheets were administratively 
established until the 1970s 
- In the U.S.A. interstate banking was forbidden 
- In some countries such as Portugal, governments had the arbitrary power to 
authorise the entry of new institutions in a particular national market 
- Credit ceilings were used as a tool of monetary policy, to control the stock of 
money 
Barriers to capital movements between nations persisted In Europe until the 
advent of the Single Market in 1993 
This process of regulatory change created new markets but also new risks. These 
new risks led to a new regulatory framework, sometimes called "re-regulation 
process", other times as "supranational regulation with domestic liberalisation". In 
order to avoid misunderstandings, it is argued in the current study that the best 
designation is "regulatory reform". Before defending the expression "regulatory 
reform" as the most suitable to characterise the state of the art on regulation, it is 
pertinent to describe what the current regulatory framework attempts to achieve. 
The economic justifications, or rationale, for financial regulation is the existence of 
market failure in financial systems arising from externalities, market power, and 
information problems. 
Externalities include the risk of systemic failure (i.e., the risk of failure of one or 
more institutions as a result of the actual or threatened failure of another), the 
infection effect (i.e., the general lowering of standards and prices caused by 
excessive competition), and network effects (i.e., the costs and benefits of linking 
together competing institutions to a common network). Other externalities are the 
achievement of macrostability (to avoid the distortion in relative prices, incentives, 
and expectations caused by high and volatile inflation) and the enhancement of the 
allocative efficiency of the financial system (to ensure the financing of projects and 
sectors, including small firms, that have dynamic efficiency benefits). 
Concern about market power steams from the fear that dominant firms may 
undermine both allocative and dynamic efficiency (the forming by charging high 
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pnces and earning exceSSIve profits and the latter by avoiding competitive 
pressures). Finally, information problems arise from poor price and product 
information, from the free rider problem, and from informational asymmetries 
between the suppliers and users of financial services36. 
Exploiting the accuracy of the expreSSIOn "financial deregulation", it may be 
concluded that what the system is facing is a financial regulatory reform. Why? The 
answer is in the nature of regulatory changes. We have several types of regulation the 
enforcement of which varies over time, according to the relevance assigned to each 
type's particular objectives. Thus it is necessary to research these types of regulation. 
This research is presented in section 2.2. 
The gradual substitution of one type of regulation by another IS the result of 
economic and technological pressures experienced by western economies. The 
1980's have witnessed an internationalisation of capital flows and trade. At root, 
financial instruments are claims on real resources, goods, or services. Efforts to 
restrict flows of financial instruments therefore hinder exchanges of goods and 
services, thus impending the transfer of resources to their best uses. On the other 
hand, new communications technologies have been especially significant for 
financial activity. Technological innovation has increased the knowledge of 
potentially profitable international exchanges and of economic opportunities abroad. 
Financial regulation was bound to change along with such innovations. The causes of 
financial regulatory reform are analysed in section 2.3. 
The current chapter concludes with an analysis of the incompatibility between 
economic integration and informational innovation on the one hand, and constraints 
on prices and quantities in the financial industry on the other. Whether the same 
reasons for regulatory reform have been present in the Portuguese Financial System 
is also investigated. 
36 For a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation, see Kay and Yickers (1988). 
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2.2. - TYPES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
In this section, the nature of financial regulatory reform is specified, that is, it's 
content. 
As stated earlier in chapter 1 (section 1.2.3.), Dimitri Vittas (1992) presents six 
categories of controls that are adopted by governments, depending on their particular 
objectives: macroeconomic controls, allocative controls, structural controls, 
prudential controls, organizational controls, and protective controls. 
In the remammg chapters of this thesis, the term consistently used is financial 
regulatory reform and Dimitri Vittas's types of regulation support it. The reason for 
this analytical framework follows. 
Among several approaches to financial regulatory analysis presented in the academic 
literature, that approach is chosen which classifies financial regulation in terms of its 
objectives. For the following reasons this seems to be the best way to study the 
nature of financial regulatory reform when the criterion for evaluating financial 
regulation is stability37. 
When financial rules are classified in several types in terms of their objectives (such 
as controlling aggregate economic activity, favouring priority activities, preventing 
undue concentration, and protecting users of financial services), this seems the 
approach that clearly relates regulatory changes to the resultant bank behaviour's 
response. Regulatory reform consists of the gradual adoption of prudential, 
organizational and protective controls, following the removal of macroeconomic, 
allocative and structure controls. Therefore this seems to be the approach that better 
links regulatory changes to risk. Finally, once economic integration and 
technological innovation are identified as the causes that triggered financial 
regulatory reform, the chosen approach is the one that is most easily identified with 
these causes. 
37 Other possible criteria for evaluating financial regulation are efficiency and fairness. 
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The ultimate goals of financial regulation are the achievement of efficiency, stability, 
and fairness38, not only in the financial sector but also in the economy at large. 
To achieve these goals, governments adopt various controls and interventions that 
can be classified in six categories, depending on their particular objectives: 
Macroeconomic Controls 
Allocative Controls 
Structural Controls 
Prudential Controls 
Organizational Controls 
Protective Controls 
The objectives of each category vary as we proceed to explain. 
Macroeconomic Controls 
Governments are motivated to maintain the overall control over the level of 
aggregate economic activity and to avoid major internal and external imbalances. 
Special importance is given to controlling the expansion of credit and to maintaining 
price stability. As examples of Macroeconomic Controls we can present: 
- Reserve requirements 
- Direct credit and deposit ceilings 
- Interest rate controls 
- Restrictions on foreign investment 
Allocative Controls 
Applying allocative controls, governments are motivated by the desire to favour 
priority activities. By the utilisation of several tools that are listed below, the 
38The author is aware that while "efficiency" and "stability" are positive objectives, the "fairness" of 
the financial sector is a normative matter. The normative bias of fairness in the financial system is 
presented on the debate about the degree of competition the banking sector should achieve. 
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objective is to reallocate financial resources in the economy in favour of priority 
activities. Governments, therefore, try to compensate for the tendency of banks, 
especially commercial banks, to finance either low risk activities, such as short term 
trade finance, or high risk speculative projects with short pay-back periods, such as 
real estate development. 
Examples of allocative controls can be found in the utilisation of: 
- Selective credit programs 
- Compulsory investment requirements 
- Preferential interest rates 
Structural Controls 
Structural controls are motivated mainly by economic and political considerations. 
These kind of controls, for instance separating commercial and investment activities 
or imposing restrictions on the type of financial assets that can be managed, are 
undertaken with the aim of preventing undue concentration of economic and 
financial power. Structure control can be achieved through: 
- Entry and merger controls 
- Geographic restrictions 
- Limits on the range of activities of different types of financial institutions 
Prudential Controls 
Prudential controls aIm to reduce the risk of systemic failure and to avoid the 
disruptions caused by financial crises. To preserve the safety and soundness of 
individual financial institutions and sustain public confidence in the stability of the 
financial system as a whole, several requirements may be implemented: 
- Authorisation criteria 
- Minimum capital requirements 
- Limits on the concentration of risks 
- Reporting requirements 
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Organisational Controls 
Organisational controls aim at ensunng the smooth functioning and integrity of 
financial markets and information exchanges. These organisational controls try to 
cope with externalities caused by the existence of networks such as stocks and other 
trading exchanges, payment clearing systems. and information networks. By setting 
out the rights and obligations of market participants by objective criteria, such as 
technical competence and financial standing, they promote the efficiency and 
integrity of networks without discriminating against new institutions. Organisational 
controls can be found in: 
- Rules of market making and participation 
- Disclosure of market information 
- Minimum technical standards 
Protective Controls 
Protective controls deal with the information problems that affect the relations of 
financial institutions with their customers, especially small ones. These arise from 
the existence of informational asymmetries between the suppliers and users of 
financial services, and from poor price information. In accordance, protective 
controls have the aim of providing adequate protection to users of financial services, 
especially consumers and non professional investors. As examples of protective 
controls we have: 
- Information disclosure to consumers 
- Compensation funds 
- Ombudsmen to investigate and resolve disputes 
At a very simple level, financial regulatory reform consists of the move from 
Macroeconomic, Allocative, and Structural Controls to Protective, Prudential and 
Organisational controls. Similarities can be found with the analyses presented in the 
introduction to the present chapter. The "old style regulation" (price and quantity 
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constraints) has its correspondence in Allocative, Macroeconomic and Structural 
Controls. In modern market economies, the financial regulatory framework is based 
on Prudential, Protective and Organizational Controls. The proposition that the 
financial world is facing a process of regulatory reform instead of a process of 
financial deregulation is, therefore, reinforced. Indeed, the upshot of financial 
deregulation is not a "laissez-faire" market. 
The regulatory types that have just been analysed are not separately enforced. In the 
financial world, we face an interlap and overlap of financial regulation with different 
degrees of intensity. We have several types of financial regulation. for which 
enforcement varies through time. The analysis of the nature of financial regulation 
leads to the conclusion that the financial regulatory reform consists in moving the 
emphasis of financial regulation from one type of regulation to another. Why? The 
answer lies in the causes of regulatory reform. International economic integration 
and technological innovation have pressured for changes in financial regulation. 
Due to the importance and magnitude of the economic and technological forces that 
have triggered changes in financial regulation, these forces deserve to be carefully 
analysed. This is the task that is proposed to be undertaken in the next section. 
Once quantity and price constraints have been abolished, the research's concern is 
that, in their quest to harmonise capital standards and other prudential and protective 
regulations, regulators may compromise the central objective of strengthening the 
financial system. This is the hypothesis of this thesis, which attempts to evaluate 
modem financial regulation against the criterion of stability. 
2.3. - CAUSES OF THE REGULATORY REFORM 
Two fundamental sources of the transformations in financial regulation that the 
world has been experiencing in the last decades are identified: international 
economic integration and technological innovation. They can be included in a 
broader band of economic transformations. 
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Let us examine the economic transformations that changed the rules of the game in 
the financial sector of the economy. 
While researching the causes of regulatory reform, we became familiar with 
expressions such as "globalisation", "internationalisation", and "information 
technology revolution". Whatever the causes are, and we will explain them carefully, 
the benefits of international economic integration are the main cause of financial 
regulatory reform, as we proceed to explain. 
The Second World War was followed by substantial economic and political 
transformations. With these transformations, the old method of regulation (direct 
control on prices and quantities in the market) became untenable. 
After World War II, most national governments began - sometimes unilaterally, 
more often collaboratively - to lower their separation fences, making them more 
permeable, or sometimes even tearing down parts of them39. The lowering of fences 
for financial transactions began later and was less dramatic. Nonetheless, by the 
19905, government restrictions on capital flows, especially among the industrial 
countries, were much less important and widespread than at the end of World War 11 
and into the 1950's. Despite the time gap between liberalisation in the market for 
goods and in the market for financial services, the latter change was also motivated 
by the benefits of economic integration. 
The achievement of economic integration implies the removal of barriers to capital 
flows. This removal of barriers raises a variety of new regulatory issues. In the 
absence of other specific changes, firms, which in the past developed their activities 
under different regulatory structures, come into competition with each other. This 
puts all forms of regulation under pressure. With a much wider range of financial 
institutions transacting between themselves, and increasing amounts of capital 
flowing from country to country, the rules of financial regulation had to change. 
39 The most prominent examples of fence lowering for trade in goods are the multilateral negotiations 
under the auspices of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). 
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Although regulatory reform in financial services IS largely the product of the 
internationalisation of capital markets. other specific changes contributed to the need 
to improve the traditional bank regulatory framework. One of the changes is in the 
field of technology. 
The technology revolution has changed the way people see the world. 
Technological advances have reduced the costs of cross-border transactions in all 
sectors of the economy. Spectacular reductions in the costs of transportation, 
telecommunications, and computation have greatly increased the ease with which 
firms can bridge the natural barriers of time and space that separate national markets, 
especially in financial services. 
A symptom of the increasing world economic integration, the new communications 
technology has been especially significant for financial activity. Computers and 
telecommunications satellites have slashed the cost of transmitting information 
internationally, of confirming transactions, and of paying for transactions. In the 
1950s, for example, foreign exchange could be bought and sold only during 
conventional business hours in the initiating party's time zone. Such transactions can 
now be carried out instantaneously twenty-four hours a day. Large banks pass the 
management of their worldwide foreign exchange positions around the globe from 
one branch to other, staying continuously ahead of the setting sun. 
The information technology revolution has enhanced competition in the financial 
sector. New databases and information-producing agencies, such as rating agencies 
and news services, have reduced the advantage held by banks in being more 
informed about clients than anyone else. 
Companies have become sufficiently well known and analysed to tap markets 
directly. 
Faster data processing has made the markets themselves more liquid, enabling 
companies to raise large pools of money. The revolution has affected individual 
customers too. They now have credit histories, which they can take to any potential 
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lender and automatic teller machines, further reducing their dependence on the local 
branch. 
The information technology revolution has given traditional bank clients a choice of 
service provider. Without a regulatory reform, some large clients could simply by-
pass what can be called archaic regulations, eventually forcing them to change.4o 
Such technological innovations have increased the knowledge of potentially 
profitable international exchanges and of economic opportunities abroad. The need to 
obtain more flexibility in the environment (domestically and internationally) in 
which banks perform their activities can be identified as one source of regulatory 
reform. 
The economic integration that has just been presented, based on the free movement 
of capital and on the technology revolution, has led to significant structural changes 
in financial markets around the world in recent years. 
Among the more important of these changes are the growing importance of capital 
markets in credit intermediation, the emergence of markets for intermediating risks 
(a very fertile field for product innovation), changes in the activities and the risk 
profiles of financial institutions, and the increasingly global nature of financial 
intermediation. These changes, permitted by the liberalisation of capital movements, 
have been spurred largely by a technological revolution that has reduced the cost of 
information gathering, processing and transmission. More than ever before, banks 
face greater competition from other financial institutions. As this information 
revolution continues, there is little doubt that the changes in the financial markets 
will also continue. As the changes occur, financial activities are increasingly taking 
place outside the traditional bank regulatory framework. Financial regulatory reform 
is a living process that, although influencing the structure of the financial sector, 
40 For example, Japanese companies' access to domestic bond markets was severely restricted until 
the early 1980's. As a result, large firms started tapping the Eurobond markets. Faced with the risk of 
losing their best clients to foreign underwriters, banks relented and the domestic bond markets were 
freed up. 
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must be able to follow the changes in the world of international finance that evolve at 
a rate which seems to accelerate with each passing year. 
This is the reason why the search for the most important and fundamental regulatory 
action, called by Dimittri Vittas41 "basic financial constitution" of a country, has 
been carried out on a basis of international co-operation. 
This basic financial constitution should cover several types of financial regulation, 
namely structural, prudential, organizational, and protective regulation, and should 
govern what financial institutions are permitted to do, when they can operate, who is 
allowed to own or manage them, and what basic conditions they have to meet. 
In the present international environment, as previously characterised, a sound 
regulatory action would not impose arbitrary entry, branching and merger restrictions 
on individual financial institutions, but would encourage them both to diversify their 
risks and to accumulate substantial capital reserves to absorb losses. The most 
important and fundamental regulatory action for the financial system should play a 
decisive part in the soundness and robustness of the banking system. 
2.4. - CONCLUSION 
Economic and technological forces are behind the dramatic changes incurred by the 
financial system in the last decades. These forces represent the reasons that 
compelled the dismantling of old style regulation because economic integration and 
financial innovation on one hand are incompatible with limits on market quantities 
and prices on the other. Instead of a "laissez-faire" regime where banks were left 
unregulated, a regime guided by market discipline in which banks would have an 
incentive (survival) lO create ways of preventing bank failures, the concern with both 
the stability and the soundness of the financial system gave birth to a new regulatory 
framework, the so-called prudential regime. This is the interpretation of financial 
regulatory reform used throughout this thesis. 
41 In "Financial Regulation: changing the rules of the Game" p.68. 
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Were the above-mentioned forces present in Portugal as weIl? 
Forces behind Portuguese Financial Regulatory Reform have two origins: adherence 
to E.E.C. and political changes in the country. These two sources of financial 
regulatory changes cannot be analysed separately because they are inter-related. 
Political changes, that began in the second half of the 70's, played an important role 
in Portugal's E.E.C. membership's negotiations. In 1986, nine years after the request 
for adherence, Portugal became a full European Member State. This event called for 
new rules in the Portuguese Banking System. Portugal had to adopt the E.E.C. 
financial regulation framework into internal law. 1985, as will be shown in the next 
chapter, was the threshold of substantial changes in the Portuguese Financial System. 
Therefore, though indirectly via E.E.C. membership, the causes that are driving 
financial regulatory reform in Western Countries are the same as those that forced 
changes in the rules of the game in Portugal. The evidence of Portuguese financial 
reform is provided in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 - HISTORY OF FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
REFORM IN PORTUGAL 
3.1. - INTRODUCTION: FINANCIAL REGULATORY REEFORM 
IN PORTUGAL 
Over the past decades, the Portuguese Banking System has undergone profound 
transformation from being an almost completely state owned system to a fully 
privatised one with only two banks42 still belonging to the state.43 44 
These changes occurred not only in the legal property (ownership) and regulatory 
framework of the banking system, but also in its function, organisation and activity. 
There are two possible approaches to the study of regulatory reform in the 
Portuguese Banking System (as well as in any applied study of other financial 
systems). 
One of these approaches consists m the analysis of the transition from 
macroeconomic, structural and allocative controls to protective, prudential, and 
organisational controls.45 
The other approach focuses on movement from structural regulation (when 
regulators are concerned with the way a market is organised) to conduct regulation 
42 Caixa Geral de Dep6sitos (C.G.D.) and Banco Nacional Ultramarino (B.N.U.) 
43 Table 4.1. chapter 4, presents the evolution in the number of banks in The Portuguese Banking 
System. 
44 Annex 11 (vo\.II) presents the name of banks in Portugal in 1975. 1984.1989.1992 and 1997. In this 
annex banks are split into three categories: Portuguese commercial banks, foreign commercial banks 
and investment banks. 
45 Types of Regulation presented by Dimitri Vittas (1992). 
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(when regulators are concerned with the behaviour within the market)46. The analysis 
carried out in this chapter will emphasise the former. 
Until 1974 the Portuguese Banking System consisted of a number of private banks 
that operated in an almost closed economy under Salazar's regime. Decree Law 
41,403/1957 and Decree Law 42,64111959 strictly regulated financial activities. 
These Decree Laws were still binding when the revolution occurred in April 1974. 
The current analysis encompasses the period that began with nationalisation in 1975 
and ended in 1997, when the programme of re-privatisation in the Portuguese 
banking system was completed. The beginning of a concentration process, which, by 
itself, deserves a separate study, followed this programme. 
In the historical perspective, the army sized power during the so-called "Carnation 
Revolution" in 197447 and a democratic regime was reinstated. All the banks and 
financial institutions were then placed under government control and formally 
nationalised in March 1975 - with the exception of foreign institutions48 , namely the 
Credit Franco Portugais (now called Credit Lyonnais), the Bank of London and 
South America (now Lloyds Bank) and the Banco do Brasil. Both mainland and 
offshore activities were nationalised under the Decree Laws 450-211974 and 132-
AI1975 provisions. Nationalisation was made irreversible in Portugal's 1976 
Constitution, a principle that was upheld in the 1982 revision, but which was omitted 
in subsequent revisions. Thus there may be found in the fundamental legal 
framework (that is, the one stipulated in the Portuguese Constitution) reasons for 
dividing the temporal analysis of this study into three distinct evolutionary phases. 
The first phase relates to the nationalisation of banks and financial institutions in 
1975. The second phase begins with the reopening of the banking sector to private 
banks in 1984/85 when Law 11183 reintroduced the principle of private enterprise49 • 
This period is characterised by the simultaneous existence of state owned banks and 
46 See Kay and Vickers p.224, and Gual and Niven (1992). 
47 Dated April the 25th • 
48 19 "Caixas Econ6micas" (regional saving banks) and some 200 "Caixas de Credito Agricola" 
(Agricultural Credit Saving Banks) were not nationalised either, they had (and still have) very little 
weight in the system. 
49 Made possible after the first revision of the Portuguese Constitution. 
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new private banks. In fact Law 11/83 was the outcome of the political impossibility 
of withdrawing from the Constitution the statement "irreversibility of 
nationalisations" in its first revision dated 1982. State owned banks remained stated 
owned, but the Government succeeded in making it possible for new private banks to 
enter the market5o. The re-privatisation process that began in 1989 when political 
parties succeeded in withdrawing from the constitution, in its second revision, the 
expression "irrever~ibility of nationalisations", marks the start of the third phase. 
During this third phase all state owned banks but two were successively re-
privatised. The final re-privatisation occurred in 199651 . 
3.2. - THE STATE INSTEAD OF THE MARKET: 1975-1984. THE 
DOMINANCE OF MACROECONOMIC, STRUCTURAL AND 
ALLOCATIVE CONTROLS 
The history of Portuguese Financial Regulatory Reform begins in 1975 when all 
Portuguese banks were nationalised. For the decade, which followed, 
macroeconomic, allocative and structural controls dominated the banking system. 52 
As will be explained below, the reasons for strong macroeconomic controls, such as 
credit ceilings, interest rate limits and restrictions on capital flows, were rooted in the 
macroeconomic imbalances experienced by the Portuguese economy after the 
revolution of April 1974. A further consequence of this revolution, that installed a 
communist government in the country, was that the strong aIlocative and structural 
controls had ideological causes. These controls endured in the industry until 1984. 
Banking activities were constrained by macroeconomic imbalances. During the late 
seventies, the Portuguese economy experienced high inflation rates, huge budget 
deficits and a growing foreign debt, together with a chronic negative balance on the 
so The first private commercial bank was founded in 1984 (November). Private banking activities 
began to make a difference in the market from 1985 onwards. 
51 A comprehensive list of the most important steps in Portuguese financial regulatory legislation is 
presented in appendix to this chapter, the source being all the Portuguese monetary and financial 
legislation since 1974 until 1997. 
52 A list with macroeconomic, allocative and structural controls during this period is presented in 
appendix to this chapter. 
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current account. The main function of the banking system was to finance the budget 
deficit together with all non-financial companies belonging to the state that came 
close to insolvenc/3. Banks fulfilled a social function, in the sense that by 
preventing state owned companies going bankrupt they mitigated unemployment. 
Meanwhile, however, banking activities were carried on under very strict rules, the 
most important of which were direct credit ceilings. The resulting scarcity of funds 
available to the private sector brought bankruptcy to private companies, contributing 
to a rising unemployment rate. 
Interest rates were also subject to macroeconomic control. Administrative interest 
rates, in both loans and deposits, gave banking management little margin of 
manoeuvre in following government directives. Among other things, the government 
determined average expected growth rates on demand deposits, time deposits, total 
domestic credit and credit to the public sector. 
Finally, still in the field of macroeconomic controls, all inflows and outflows of 
capital required government authorisation. No foreign exchange market was present 
in the banking envlrorunent, exchange rates being administratively priced by the 
Portuguese Central Bank54 . As restrictions on foreign investment were binding, even 
an increase of capital shareholder capital in the few foreign banks in the economy 
required government authorisation. 
In order to influence the allocation of financial resources in favour of priority 
activities, allocative controls, several selective programs and preferential interest 
rates were set in place. Because Portugal was considered a developing country55 
these schemes favoured the primary sectors of the economy. With the industrial 
sector debilitated, the foundations of the economy were agriculture, fishing and 
tourism 56. As one rr..ight have expected, the priority sectors benefiting from selective 
53 The Portuguese Constitution didn't permit state owned companies to go bankrupt. 
54 The Portuguese Central Bank was a policy vehicle of the Minister of Finance. 
55 Portugal was considered by O.E.C.O. as a developed country only in 1989. 
56 Active population in each economic sector in the first semester of 1979 was: 
agriculture and fishing: 30.9% 
industry: 35% 
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credit programmes and preferential interest rates were: agriculture, fishing, cattle 
raising, tourism, and the production of canned fish together with housing and small 
and medium size enterprises. Special loans were also available to state owned 
compames. 
The third kind of controls was structural. In fact, the whole structure of the financial 
system was directly controlled by the state, in accordance with the constitutional 
principle of the "way to the socialism" implemented by 1974's revolution. For 
instance, entry to the market by private banks was forbidden and the government 
determined which slate owned banks were allowed to merge or to be acquired by 
other banks. In the same way, geographic expansion needed a government 
authorisation. On the other hand, the range of banking activities was circumscribed 
to traditional lending and deposit taking transactions, and no financial institutions 
other than banks were authorised. There was only one investment bank, in the sense 
that its task was to grant long term loans to the industrial sector. Two saving banks 
and a dozen commercial banks formed the rest of the system. The Lisbon stock 
exchange, which closed in the aftermath of the revolution57, reopened some months 
later58 but remain torpid throughout the period. 
A very timid structural transformation took shape in the beginning of the 80' s with 
the authorisation of leasing, factoring and investment companies. Once more, this 
change was forced by macroeconomic imbalances. The economic situation was so 
catastrophic that Portugal presented its first Letter of Intention to the IMF in 197959. 
IMF medicine, characterised by high interest rates and strict credit ceilings to fight 
inflation, made loans to firms almost impossible. Faced with this very strong credit 
constraint, firms barely could survive. Leasing, factoring and investment companies 
emerged as a substitute for banking financing offirms60 6162. 
services: 34.1 % 
I.N.E. (the National Statistics Institute) doesn't give disaggregated numbers for tourism. 
S7 The Lisbon Stock Exchange Market was closed in 29th April 1974. 
S8 The reopening of the Lisbon Stock Exchange Market was authorised in December 1975, 
transactions formally began on January the 12th 1976. 
S9 The Macroeconomic situation was so dramatic that in 1983 Portugal presented its second Letter of 
Intention to the IMF. 
60 Between 1981 and 1983 they were authorised 8 leasing companies and 5 investment companies. At 
present there exist 24 leasing companies in the Portuguese financial system. 
61 They played a complementary role in the banking system. 
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To conclude, the banking system was a state owned monopoly. With Portugal 
outside the European Economic Community, and with this kind of market structure, 
organizational, protective and prudential controls were, as one might expect, absent 
from the financial system. 
With the approach of the EEC integration63 , some reforms were gradually introduced 
in the banking system. The one with the greatest impact was the decision, in 1983, to 
allow private banks to enter the market. In the next section the analysis of these 
reforms is carefully pursued. They aimed at modernising the banking system and at 
bringing more flexibility to the financial environment. 
3.3 - MODERNISATION AND FLEXIBILITY: 1985 -1989. THE 
DOMINANCE OF STRUCTURAL CONTROLS' CHANGES 
Portugal, as a western country, didn't escape the dramatic changes in its financial 
system that most other countries have experienced. These changes began in 1985 as a 
consequence of the opening of the banking industry to the private sector and the 
entry of Portugal into the E.E.C.. Since then, non-bank financial intermediaries and 
the financial markets emerged as significant competitors to the commercial banks 
that had long dominated the financial system. 
Between 1985 and 1989, when the re-privatisation process began, the Portuguese 
financial system moved towards greater liberalisation and deregulation of the 
monetary, financial and foreign exchange markets. As it will be explained in this 
section 64, this movement can be interpreted as one dominated by changes in 
structural controls. 
62 From 1993 onwards banks are authorised to perform leasing and factoring transactions. 
63 Portugal became a European Member in January 1986. The request for membership was presented 
to the EEC in 1977. 
64 A list containing changes on structural controls is presented in appendix to this chapter. 
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In 1984, the first private bank to enter into the market was inaugurated65 and 
signalled the beginning of a fundamental restructuring of the sector. New private 
banks rapidly increased, with seven being established66 in 1985. 
In 1986, Portugal joined the European Union. The creation of a single market in 
financial services in the European Community has proved an important factor in the 
evolution of the Portuguese banking system. Decree Laws 2311986 and 2411986, 
took Portuguese regulations for licensing credit institutions closer to European Union 
Directive 771780/CEE, marking the transition to European regulations. 67 
In order to foster a more efficient promotion of savings and investments, in line with 
the then current international trends and within the limits set by the overall economic 
situation, these changes pointed towards more intense competition, diversification, 
disintermediation and internationalisation of the Portuguese financial system. 
We can consider this second period as one in which the framework of the financial 
system was re-shaped. It was then, in fact, that regulatory reform focussed on 
transformations in the field of structural controls. 
This dominance of structural controls is emphasised because, throughout the process, 
Monetary Authorities (the Ministry of Finance and the Banco de Portugal) were 
active in producing intensive and innovative legislation, creating new financial 
institutions and instf'Jments, and changing the framework of the relevant markets. 
Some elements that contributed to enlarging the range of activities in the market and 
to modifying the different types of institutions are: 
65 Manufacturer Hannovers in November. 
66 Banco Portugues do lnvestimento (Portuguese Investment Bank) and Chase Manhattan in March. 
Barclays Bank in October. City Bank, Banco Comercio e Industria (Portuguese commercial bank) and 
Banque Nationale de Paris in November. General Bank in December. 
67 The changes introduced with the aim of adjusting the Portuguese legal framework to the EEC, but 
still within the scope set up by the Treaty of Accession, were characterised by two types of restrictions 
to the activity of Commercial Banks, those relating to the whole system and those relating to each 
bank operation. The establishment of new credit institutions in Portugal had been conditioned, until 
the end of 1992, on a previous authorisation, on a case-by-case basis, subject to the non discrimination 
rule. This authorisation needed to be given by legal order signed by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Finance, after consulting the Banco de Portugal, and had to be based on the "market 
economic needs" criterion at the national, regional or local level. 
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- The surge of new institutions, either Portuguese or foreign, and of new financial 
instruments 
- The introduction of new rules governing the money market and the creation of the 
spot and forward exchange markets 
- The growing autonomy of the banks in fixing interest rates 
- The growing automation of Banking Services 
- The dynamism of the capital market 
The growing number of institutions operating in the market, and the development of 
non-banking financial activities, were factors contributing to structural changes 
through their role in stimulating competition. 
The tendency towards the diversification and expansion of the financial system was 
particularly evident in the non-credit sub-sector. Along with insurance companies, by 
then authorised to carry out new operations, new institutions emerged, namely 
Venture Capital Companies, Investment Fund Companies and Pension Fund 
Companies. 
These institutions, aImIng either to promote investment and innovation (Venture 
Capital Companies) or to foster and attract savings (Investment Funds and Pension 
Funds), acted as important regulators for the capital market, thus making a relevant 
contribution to the balanced development of the whole financial system. 
Among the non-banking credit institutions, Investment Companies and Leasing 
Companies underwent a rapid expansion, contributing significantly to the 
diversification of the financial market and the promotion of investment68 . 
At the same time, the type and volume of services and products offered by the 
system has increased. 
68 Non-banking credit institutions experienced the following growth of the credit market share: 1985-
1%; 1986-3.4%; 1987-6.4%; 1988-8.7%. Between December 1988 and December 1989 credit granted 
by non-banking institutions grew 77.1 %.(Source: Banco de Portugal- Annual Reports). 
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Changes in the situation were particularly felt in the application of households' 
savings and companies' cash surplus. In fact, for ten years, time deposits were almost 
the only application of savings. Between 1985 and 1989 many alternatives for 
savings emerged such as Treasury Bonds, Investment Funds, profit-sharing bonds, 
other types of bonds, shares, Certificates of Deposits (CD's), and specifically 
featured bank deposits. 
The switch in the Public Sector financing from bank resources to Treasury Bills, 
issued as from August 1985, was particularly relevant in the whole process of the 
changes in structural controls. In this context, the transfer of an increasing proportion 
of the Government Debt from the banking system to the public was onc of the first 
steps towards the creation of an open market. The open market, along with an 
adequate policy for bank's reserve requirements69, created the necessary conditions 
for replacing the then current credit ceilings system by an indirect management of the 
money supply. This indirect control of money supply, as shall be seen, came into 
existence at the beginning of the 90's. 
During the 80's, the management of money supply in Portugal was still based on the 
direct control of some policy aggregates, namely the targeted evolution of the 
exchange rate, the fixing of some interest rates and, as basic device, the amount of 
outstanding credit allowed to every bank on a monthly base. Credit rationing, with 
interest rates and exchange rates controls, was only possible because of controls on 
capital flows. 
Connected with the movement towards the indirect control of the money supply, a 
more flexible interest rate policy was progressively introduced in order to let market 
forces adjust in a gradual way. The definitive abolition of administrative interest 
rates on lending was effective by September 1988, while credit constraints remained 
in the market until 1991. The rationing of quantities with liberalisation on prices 
69 Cash reserve requirements in 1988: 
Credit institutions were deemed to observe the following minimum cash reserves: 
The average amount of (domestic currency) cash assets should be, each week. not less than the sum 
of the following figures: 
- 15%, 12%, 3% and 1 %, respective to the amounts of demand deposits, deposits from 30 days up to 
180 days, deposits from 180 days up to one year and deposits over one year. 
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allowed banks to benefit from abnormal margins of net interest. On one hand, this 
phenomenon strengthened the delicate financial condition of state owned banks 
(preparing them for re-privatisation), while on the other hand it created grounds for 
the success of the infant private banks. 
In general, macroeconomic controls were gradually lifted from 1985 onwards. 
Interest rates were gradually liberalised between 1985 and 1988. Foreign exchange 
rates floated in 1987. From 1986, the purchase of Portuguese shares/bonds and direct 
investment by non-residents was permitted. The acquisition of unlisted companies by 
non-residents was allowed in 19897°. Quantitative credit ceilings were the most 
important macroeconomic control that prevailed in the economy during this period71 • 
Another important structural change that characterised Portuguese financial 
regulatory reform during this period was the evolution of capital markets. After a 
long period of stagnation, the capital market began to show a dramatic revival from 
1985 onwards. This revival was a joint effect of actions taken by banks and by the 
Government. Major banks gave incentives to their clients to buy units in investment 
funds because they wanted to reduce costs with time deposit liabilities. On the other 
hand, the Government implemented a package of fiscal incentives on both sides of 
demand and supply in bonds and shares. Finally, an improved overall economic 
situation, particularly in terms of inflation rate, also made its contribution to the 
dynamism of the capital market. 
The revival in the capital market was first felt in the private bond market in 1985, 
with a significant expansion of the amounts either bought or subscribed by the 
public. The share market registered a similar evolution only in 1986, with 30 issues 
offered to public subscription. These 30 issues followed a twelve-year period during 
which only one issue had occurred in 1983. The capital market began to show an 
70 The resulting large inflow of international capital created some problems in achieving the targeted 
level of inflation and keeping the escudo stable against Portugal's main trading partners. In 1990 and 
1991, as we shall see, the Banco de Portugal reintroduced some restrictions on international capital 
flows, including blocking non residents' access to the money market and short term securities, in an 
attempt at extending some control over funds. These restrictions were completely lifted by the end of 
1992 as agreed in the timetable laid out at the time of Portugal's European Union membership 
negotiations and revised in 1988 (Directive 88/36 I IEEe). 
7 I See appendix to this chapter. 
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appreciable dynamism, channelling a growing volume of savings towards business 
investment. 
To conclude, the Portuguese Banking System in the second half of the 80's reflected 
a certain balance between the specialisation induced by the traditional legislation that 
regulated the sector, and the trends that emerged internationally and that pointed 
towards "universal banking". 
Until liberalisation and re-privatisation become a reality, banking was essentially low 
risk, being powerfully controlled by the Blanco de Portugal and the Ministry of 
Finance. As a result of financial regulatory reform in Portugal, it will be seen in the 
next section how prudential, organisational and protective controls were introduced 
in the system and how they have affected its behaviour. 
3.4. - CONSOLIDATION: 1990 
PRUDENTIAL, 
CONTROLS 
ORGANIZA TIONAL 
1997. ADOPTION OF 
AND PROTECTIVE 
After the first private bank was founded in 1984, signalling the beginning of a 
fundamental restructuring of the Portuguese financial system, another very important 
step towards consolidation of the sector arose through the process of re-
privatisations. After 1990 a substantial number of the state banks were re-
privatised72, and the structure of the competitive environment changed completely, 
along with the adoption of European standard measures for depositors' protection, 
prudential behaviour and market discipline 73. 
The most important structural control for this period is represented by the "Banking 
Law" (Law 29811992, dated 31 December) that aimed to design the structure of the 
financial system, settling entry and merger conditions, establishing the range of 
activities in the sector, and defining the different types of financial institutions. 
72 All state owned banks, but two, have already been re-privatised. See footnote number one. 
73 Regulatory rules changes during this period are presented in appendix to this chapter. 
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The "Banking Law" abolishes the distinction between commercial and investment 
banks and introduces, in accordance with European Union legislative practice, the 
concept of "uni versal banking". 
This Law defines two broad categories of financial entities: credit institutions, those 
whose activities involve taking deposits from the public and the provision of credit74 , 
and financial companies, which are involved in a wide range of specialist financial 
activities but are not allowed to accept deposits from the public. These financial 
companies raise funds through bond issues, through bank loans, and by means of 
their shareholders' equity. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the institutional structure of the 
Portuguese Financial System before and after January the 1 sI 1993 respectively. 
The procedures for establishing a new credit institution, or a branch, in Portugal were 
also adjusted to reflect European Union requirements. These include prudential 
regulations regarding "own funds" and solvency. The principle of home country 
control has also been adopted, in line with European Union Statements. 
Macroeconomic controls were dismantled during this third phase, especially during 
its first years, just on the eve of the Single Market. In this context, it is convenient to 
address the issue of the link between monetary policy in the early 90's and its effect 
on banking activity. This central matter fostered macroeconomic transformations. 
Monetary policy objectives were to restrain the excessive growth of aggregate 
demand, to restrain inflation, and to prepare the financial sector for full integration 
into the Single Market. 
Policy measures undertaken between 1990 and 1992 had as their objective a smooth 
transition from direct money supply control to an indirect control system of liquidity 
in the economy75. Accordingly, in March 1990, the regime of credit ceilings was 
abandoned. However, as a result of the emergence of inflationary pressures, the 
74 Portugal adopted the definition of credit institution following the First Banking Directive dated 
December 12 1977 (Directive 77 /780/EEC). 
7S As it has been explained in section 3.3. conditions for open-market operations were established 
since 1985 and interest rates liberalisation began in 1985 as well. 
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complete removal of credit constraints was effective only at the beginning of 1991 76 , 
confirming the transition to an indirect control regime of liquidity 1991 was the year 
banks began their financing in the inter-bank monetary market. Another main step in 
this transition process was accomplished with a new legal reserve requirement 
system implemented in 1992, covering a wide range of institutions and financial 
instruments. 
The gap between interest rate liberalisation on lending, effective from 1987, and 
credit ceiling abolition in 1991, was responsible for one of the most remarkable 
phenomena in the Portuguese banking system. This gap performed the role of a 
medicine for financial institutions. Clearly, an environment characterised by 
quantities rationing, in which players were free to establish pnces, made its 
contribution to an upward trend in credit interest rates. As a result, until 1991, net 
interest margins remained very high. The outcome was twofold. On the one hand, 
high interest margins explain some of the success of the private banks newly arrived 
in the market. On the other hand, increasing interest margins became a source of 
profitability for state owned banks that were due to be re-privatised, making possible 
a slight recovery from the structural financial imbalance inherited from the previous 
years of government oriented banking activity. 
The trend of increa<;ing interest margins was inverted in 1991. Beyond the end of 
credit ceilings, other factors contributed to their fall. Competition has augmented, the 
Banco de Portugal began, in its turn, a downward trend on key interest rates, while 
interest rates on bank deposits remained high in order to capture clients. 
The drop in interest rates on lending became manifest by the second half of 1991, 
beginning the process by which interest margins decreased. Since than, interest 
margins have gradually fallen to values very similar to those prevailing in other 
European countries. 
76 International capital flows were fully liberalised in 1992. Although allowed before 1992, a large 
inflow of international capital, attracted by high interest rates, created some problems in achieving the 
targeted level of inflation and keeping the escudo stable. In 1990 and 1991 the Banco the Portugal re-
introduced some restrictions that were lifted in 1992. 
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FIGURE 3.1.- THE PORTUGUE E FINANCIAL YSTEM 
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As shown in figure 3.3, interest margins in the Portuguese banking industry have 
halved in the last five years of this study, after dropping at a rate previously unseen 
in Europe. They have now fully converged with the levels attained by the most 
competitive European banking systems. Interest margins are likely to stabilise at 
current levels, as no competitive or structural forces to prompt further reductions are 
expected77 • 
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A decrease in interest margins is one of the symptoms of financial disintermediation. 
With the consolidation of the "cross-selling" concept, insurance and mutual funds are 
providing the major instruments of savings disintermediation. 
This is a spreading situation in Portugal as is shown by table 3.l. Non-interest 
income is rising, and there should be ample room for its growth. In reality banks are 
switching with an increasing emphasis from traditional lenders to service providers. 
77 At present the trend is towards concentration. 
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Table 3.1- Net interest income and net non-interest income as a percentage of 
gross income 
Year Net interest income Net non-interest income 
1991 82.80% 17.20% 
1992 78.80% 21.20% 
1993 75.50% 24.50% 
1994 77.90% 22.10% 
1995 73.20% 26.80% 
1996 65.70% 34.30% 
1997 64.40% 35.60% 
Source: Assocla9ao Portuguesa de Bancos (Portuguese BankIng AssocIation). 
Besides the abolishment of the remaining macroeconomic controls, such as credit 
ceilings and interest rates 78, financial regulatory reform during this period was 
characterised by the adoption of a set of prudential controls, and by a flavour of 
organizational and protective controls79 . 
The new prudential regIme has been gradually implemented SInce 1990. From 
December of that year, banks were required to hold provisions to cover credit risk, 
pension funds liabilitiesBO Bland potential losses on equities. The solvency ratio was 
enforced in 1990, although the achievement of the 8% minimum level became 
compulsory only in 1993. Provisions for interest rate risk and exchange rate risk 
were implemented in May 1993, and provisions for country risk have been in force 
since December 1995. Since January 1997, the solvency ratio must cover market risk 
as well. 
The study proceeds with an explanation of the impact that the above-mentioned 
prudential regime has had on the banks' operational environment. On the one hand, 
due to the accrued cost of capital caused by the solvency ratio, banks have diverted 
78 See appendix to this chapter. 
79 A list with macroeconomic, structural, prudential, organizational, protective and allocative controls 
is presented in appendix. 
80 Until banks were reprivatised, pensions burden was supported by each year profits. 
81 Banco de Portugal settled a period of five years to allow banks to fully cover their liabilities with 
pensions, until 3) December 1995. In 1993 this period was extended for a further two years. 
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the allocation of their funds to less weighted transactions such as money market 
lines, securities portfolios, mortgage lending82, and off balance sheet transactions. On 
the other hand, the effort required to make provisions for effective risks on credit and 
securities portfolio, as well as on pensions, has put the profitability of banks under 
stress. The latter effect occurred when former state owned banks were revising their 
financial structure in order to recover from the squizophrenic centralised 
management of the 70 's and early 80 's, which indeed they succeeded in doing. 
In reality, between 1991 and 1994, provisions had a significant impact on profits. 
The increase in the level of provisions, together with a slowdown on economic 
activitl3 (and the subsequent increase on defaults as evidenced in figure 3.4), made 
previous levels of profitability unattainable. This was an asymmetric situation, with 
the continuing state owned banks evidencing a weak level of solvability and 
provisions insufficiency, and private and re-privatised banks managing to 
accommodate fully the new prudential rules. 
Figure 3.4.- Ratio: Default Credit/Total Credit 
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After 1995, once the operational problems posed by the prudential regime were 
overcome, a process of bank concentration accompanied the re-privatisation 
programme still in progress. The banking sector's re-privatisation gave some of the 
re-privatised banks an opportunity to increase their market share. In fact , the main 
banks and their core shareholders engaged in a contest for acquiring those remaining 
banks to be privatised. 
82 Although weighted by 50% mortgage lending is seen as a lower risk allocation of funds. 
83 Recession hit the Portuguese economy in 1993. 
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The trend towards concentration was triggered by the acquisition of two big 
Portuguese banks by other two Portuguese private banks84 (one of them recently re-
privatised) in 1995. The acquisition of one more state owned bank85 by another 
private bank in 199686 further concentrated the banking sector. As a result, in the end 
of 1997, the five main Portuguese banking groups87 controlled about 82% of the total 
assets of the whole banking system. 
Following the re-privatisation programme designed by the Portuguese Government88 , 
it is the common ~elief that foreign competition does not pose a threat to the 
Portuguese banking system. The acquisition process experienced since 1995 seems to 
have as its objective either to prevent hostile take-overs or to exclude foreign 
competition from the market, or both. In support of this idea is the fact that 
acquisitions in the Portuguese banking system were accompanied by organic growth. 
However, the concentration process in Portugal is not incompatible with competition 
in the banking market. The Herfindahl Index of concentration89 shows a steady 
decrease in the credit side from 1990 until 1997, which evidences an increase on 
competition. At the beginning of this period concentration in the market was 
equivalent to the existence of 9 institutions with the same size. In 1997 the banking 
market was more competitive, and its structure was equivalent to the existence of 13 
equal banks (table 3.2). The pattern of behaviour in the deposit side of the market 
was different, as is depicted by table 3.2. After a fall in concentration between 1987 
and 1993, evidence suggests that this trend might have began its inversion from 1993 
onwards. Nevertheless, this fall in competition by deposits might also be explained 
84 Banco Totta & Arrores and Banco Portugues do Atlantico were acquired by Banco Pinto & Sotto 
Mayor and Banco Comercial Portugues respectively. 
8S The last to be sold. 
86 Banco Portugues de Investimento acquired Banco de Fomento e Exterior. 
8? The five portuguese banking groups are as follows: 
Banco Portugues de Investimento, Banco Fonsecas e Burnay, Banco Borges e (rmao, Banco de 
Fomento e exterior 
Banco Comercial Portugues, Banco Portuges do Atlantico, Expresso Atlantico 
Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor, Banco Totta e Arrores, Banco Chemical, Credito Perdial Portugues 
Banco Espirito Santo, Banco (nternacional de Credito, Banco Essi. 
Caixa Geral de Dep6sitos, Banco Nacional Ultramarino ( the only one state owned ). 
88 Which forbidden foreign participation on newly re-privatised banks above a minimum level. 
89 The Herfindhal Index is the sum of the squared market shares of the firms in the market. The 
inverse of the Herfindhal Index corresponds to the hypothetical number of firms in the market that are 
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by the diversion of savings for other financial instruments, such as mutual funds and 
insurance services. As a main feature, this analysis permits the conclusion that 
competition is greater on the credit side of the banking market than on the deposit 
one. That is, competition grew faster for lending than for funding. The banking 
sector, in 1997, was as concentrated as if there were only 13 institutions90 of the 
same size on the lending market (against 8 institutions in 1985), and 9 institutions of 
the same size on the deposits market (against 7 in 1985). Table 3.2 evidences other 
relevant features. On the one hand, the resistance of the banking system towards 
greater competition for lending between 1986 and 1989, the explanation of which 
lies in credit rationing, accompanied by interest rates liberalisation (earlier explained 
in the current chapter). On the other, a slightly more substantial drop in 
concentration, in the credit side as well, between 1989 and 1994, which resulted from 
the removal of legal barriers to entry. 
Table 3.2 - Herfindahl Index of Market Concentration 
Herfindahl Index 11 Herfindahl Index 
Year Credit Deposits Credit Deposits 
1985 0.1229 0.1294 8.13 7.73 
1986 0.1250 0.1370 8.00 7.29 
1987 0.1365 0.1362 7.33 7.34 
1988 0.1239 0.1195 8.07 8.37 
1989 0.1303 0.1137 7.67 8.80 
1990 0.1094 0.1219 9.14 8.20 
1991 0.1002 0.1088 9.98 9.19 
1992 0.0871 0.0980 11.48 10.20 
1993 0.0782 0.0940 12.78 10.64 
1994 0.0755 0.0953 13.25 10.49 
1995 0.0756 0.0976 13.22 10.25 
1996 0.0730 0.1011 13.69 9.89 
1997 0.0744 0.1012 13.44 9.88 
Source: The author's re~earch shown In annexes I and II (volume 11) 
characterised by having hall the same size. This number is equivalent to each value of the Herfindahl 
Index of concentration. 
90 Ilherfindhal index. 
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In conclusion, the year 1997 was the consolidation year for the largest financial 
groups in the banking sector as a result of the acquisitions made over the previous 
two years. In the current scenario, these institutions are undergoing an internal 
restructuring, which has resulted in the unavoidable integration of the operations of 
affiliated companies at both the national and international levels. Rationalisation of 
costs and efficiency gains through the adequate allocation of human resources, the 
implementation of information and technology systems and the integration of 
accountancy methods, are in the field of priority concerns within these financial 
groups. Together with the implementation of more accurate risk management 
methods, these are the trends that characterise the Portuguese financial system at 
present. 
Finally, a flavour of organizational and protective controls arose with the adoption by 
the banking sector of financial accounts on a consolidated basis (1992), and a deposit 
guarantee scheme in 1995. In November 1997 government representatives began to 
declare the necessity of ombudsmen offices for the financial sector. 
3.5 - CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Portuguese financial system has progressed to the point where it is 
now in line with the highest standards within the European Union. After 
nationalisation in 1975, the opening of the banking sector to private initiative in 
1984, the re-privatisation initiated in 1990, and concentration since 1995, together 
with the regulatory reform measures, presented in this chapter, have produced what 
is believed to be a small but fit banking system in Portugal. 
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APPENDIX - REGULATORY REFORM IN THE PORTUGUESE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
1 SI PHASE 1975 - 1984 
DOMINANCE of MACROECONOMIC, STRUCTURAL and ALLOCATIVE 
CONTROLS 
STRUCTURAL CONTROLS 
1974 April - closing of Lisbon's capital market 
1974 September - nationalisation of the Banco de Portugal (Central Bank) 
1975 March - natior.alisation of the banking system 
1975 June - extinction of '"Gremio Nacional dos Bancos e Casas Bancarias", 
corporative body under Salazar's Regime, in charge of the decision-making process in 
the banking system 
1975 June - extinction of "Inspec9ao Geral de Credito e Seguros", entity in charge of 
supervision in banking and insurance 
1977 February - extinction of a state owned bank 
1977 August - creation of an interbank money market. but the way banks exchange 
among them reserves in excess is administrative. 
1978 February - creation of an interbank securities market 
1979 May - creation of Parageste (latter called Paraempresa) with the aim of helping 
state owned companies in financial difficulties 
1979 May - authorization to the establishment of leasing companies 
1979 May - authorization to the establishment of investment companies 
1979 August - four state owned banks merged into other three state owned banks 
1980 October - authorization of the establishement of regional development 
companies 
1981 January - creation of an equity market in Oporto 
1983 November - Approval by the Counsel of Ministers of the new Law that opens to 
the private initiative activities on banking and insurance 
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ALLOCA TIVE CONTROLS 
In order to influence the allocation of financial rcssources In favor of priority 
activities, several selective credit programs and preferential interest rates were 
authorized in the following fields: 
fishing 
agriculture 
cattle raising 
housing 
imports and exports 
tourism 
manufacture of canned fish 
small and medium size enterprises 
special loans to state owned companies 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROLS 
- Direct credit ceilings 
- Interest rate controls 
I - Restrictions on foreign investment, capital imports and exports require government 
I h' . 1 aut onsation 
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2n PHASE 1985 - 1989 
DOMINANCE of STRUCTURAL CONTROLS' CHANGES 
STRUCTURAL CONTROLS 
1984 February - the reopening of banking to the private sector 
1985 May - the launching of fiscal incentives both on the supply and demand sides of 
capital market, namely to bonds 
1985 May to July - regulation laws concerning Investment Funds (on both securities 
and real estate) and the associated Management Companies. 
1985 July - authorisation to Credit Institutions to do spot operations (buying and 
selling) of foreign currencies against escudos, among themselves. with their clients 
and with Banco de Portugal 
1985 August - creation of treasury bills 
1985 August - regulation of the issue of Profit-Sharing Bonds 
1985 August - greater flexibility in the functioning in the Interbank Money Market -
Institutions are authorised to negotiate directly among themselves interest rates. And 
maturities of up to 90 days were liberalised (in May 1987 the maximum maturity was 
extended to I 80 days) 
1985 August - regulation of the issue of Pension funds 
1986 January - lauching ofTRM's - Bonds for money regulation 
1986 February - Decree Law 23/86 (and its complementary legislation), lays dawn 
the rules on the establishment and functioning of Credit Institutions in Portugal. and 
on the opening and operating of offices and branches of foreign Credit Institutions. 
That is, the Legal framework authorising Banking Institutions is change to comply 
with EEC Law. 
1986 February - laws on the issue of Venture Capital Companies 
1986 March - regulation of special deposits (creation of new and more flexible type 
of deposits) 
1986 March - regulation of securities' accounts with buying guaranteed price 
I 
11986 June - regulation of intermediary Companies operating in the Money Markets 
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1986 October - creation of Automatic Compound "Fixed Interest Bonds" and 
Treasury Bonds without coupon 
1986 December - regulation of Subordinated Funds 
1986 December - greater flexibility on the access of Portuguese Credit Institutions to 
the international money market. as well as to forward exchange operations they may 
carry out among themselves, with their clients and with Banco de Portugal. 
1987 - February - regulation of Certificates of Deposit (eDs) 
1987 February - beginning of operations in the forward exchange market 
1987 June - previous legal rules restraining the participation of a single shareholder in 
the equity of Financial Institutions are revoked 
1987 November - creation of Treasury Bonds. medium term assets, with maturities 
between 18 and 36 months, with fixed interest rates, in the auction system (market 
mechanisms) 
1988 July - creation of closed Investment Funds 
1988 July - regulation of Asset Management Companies 
1988 July - money market intermediary companies are allowed to operate in the 
exchange market 
1988 July - regulation on brokers and dealers 
1988 September - banks are no longer required by the Government to open a branch 
on a less desirable region for each opening request of a branch on a desirable onc. 
1989 January - abolishment of the compulsory acquisition of bad loans from state 
owned banks as a legal requirement for new banks to enter the market 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROLS 
1985 August - beginning of interest rates liberalisation. Credit Institutions are 
authorised to fix interest rates except on Time Deposits over I 80 days and on loans 
with maturities of from 90 to 180 days and over two years 
1987 March - further liberalisation of some interest rates - only maximum lending 
rates and minimum deposit rates over 180 days remain subject to administrative 
pricing 
1987 October - transformation in the way exchange rates are determined. Beginning 
of daily "fixing" sessions at the Portuguese Central Bank. Exchange rates ceased to be 
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, unilaterally and administratively priced by Banco de Portugal. 
, 
I 1988 September - abolition of the maximum interest rate in credit operations 
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3rd PHASE 1990 -1997 
ADOPTION of PRUI>ENCIAL, ORGANISATIONAL and PROTECTIVE 
CONTROLS 
PRUI>ENTIAL CONTROLS 
1990 July - large risks exposure controls 
1990 December - minimum provisions requirements to cover: credit risk, general credit 
risks. pension funds liabilities provisions and losses of value in equities 
1990 December - implementation of the solvability ratio 
1993 May - provision for interest rate risks and exchange rate risks 
1995 January- the risk provisions' coefficient for general credit risks decreased from 2% 
to 1% 
1995 March - distinction in the portfolio from negotiation equities, investment equities 
and equities held until maturity. Investment equities are required to be provisioned 
against potential losses 
1995 December - provisions for country risk 
1997 January - the solvability ratio covers, from now on, market risk as well as credit 
risk 
MACROECONOMIC CONTROLS 
1990 March - ending of credit ceilings. Macroeconomic imbalances required its 
substitution by "recommended credit" 
1990 - new system of reserve requirements encompassing a larger number of institutions 
and financial instruments 
1991 January - definitive abandon of credit ceilings 
1990 and 1991 - Bank of Portugal reintroduce some restrictions on international capital 
inflows, including blocking non residents' access to the money market and short term 
securities, and a compulsory non interest bearing deposit on external financing. in an 
attempt at extending some control over funds int10ws 
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1992 May - all interest rates become free market determined. Previously, banks did not 
compete for demand deposits on the basis of interest rates (loan interest rates were 
liberalised in 1987) 
1992 December - restrictions on international capital flows, introduced between 1990 
and 1991, arc completely lifted 
1992 December - liberalisation of foreign financing 
1993 January- liberalisation of the credit to consumption 
1995 January - minimum reserve requirements arc reduced from 17% to 2% 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS 
1990 January - new official accounting planning for thc financial sector 
1992 March - presentation of financial accounts on a consolidated basis 
STRUCTURAL CONTROLS 
1992 December - New General Regime of Banking and Financial Entities "The Banking 
Law". Law 298/1992, dated 31 sI of December, ''The Banking Law", establishes 
"universal banking" and presents the procedures to establish new credit institutions or 
branches in Portugal. 
PROTECTIVE CONTROLS 
1994 August - Compulsory information disclosure to the public 
1995 September - Deposit funds guarantee is implemented 
1997 November - government representatives begin to declare the necessity of 
ombudsmen offices for the financial sector 
ALLOCATIVE CONTROLS 
Preferential interest rates in housing financing 
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CHAPTER 4.- RESEARCH METHOD, DATA COLLECTION 
AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
4.1. - INTRODUCTION 
There is no theory of regulation for the banking system. Neither Banking theory, nor 
Financial Intermediation theory provides a theoretical framework to study the merits 
offinancial regulation for banking stability. Nor does Industrial Organisation theory. 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) designed a conceptual framework to embody a theory 
of regulation for the banking system. For these authors 
The existing (banking and financial intermediation) theory is quite 
far from regulators' concerns. The objective of this (their) 
monograph is to bring a start of prudential regulation's analysis of 
the banking system9192 
Combining banking theory, industrial organisation theory and natural monopolies 
regulation in the study of banking, Dewatripont and Tirole attempt to bridge the gap 
between theory and the concerns of regulators. 
Industrial organisation theory together with natural monopolies regulation is the 
usual approach where competition in the banking industry is under discussion. 
91 "La theory existante est assez eloigne des preocupations des regulateurs. L'objet de cette 
monographie est d'apporter un debut d'analyse de la reglementation prudentielle", p.9 
92 Bringing it closer to regulators concerns (author comment). 
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Dewatripont and Tirole argue that industrial economics as applied to the banking 
system is "far more useful for the understanding of some banks behaviours than for 
the study of current regulators' apprehensions ,,93 . 
State of the art banking theory does not enable us to assess the merits of regulation 
for the banking system. In fact, Banking Theory does not embrace a Theory of 
Regulation for the Banking System. For Dewatripont and Tirole (1993), "this 
literature (the literature on banking theory) has been very useful in the understanding 
of certain behaviours and banking peculiarities, but has not applied a conceptual 
framework that allows an assessment of traditional prudential regulation" 94. 
In the absence of a theory of regulation for the banking system this research makes a 
contribution to forming the stylised facts of a theory of regulation for the banking 
tern 9596 sys . 
George Benston's paper (1991) focuses on regulation. It distinguishes two aspects of 
stability in the banking system: systemic stability and the stability of individual 
banks. We may, therefore, conclude that there are two measures of risk in the 
banking system: 
Incidence of banking failure 
Level and behaviour of profitability 
Empirical studies, like Heffernan (1995), Cole and Gunther (1998), Hoggarth Milne 
and Wood (1998), are concerned with the first measure. The current study refers to 
the second measure of risk. In this context, while Hoggarth et a1. (1998) analyse the 
93 p.58 
94 Author's translation. "Cette literature (literature theorique sur la banque) a ete fort utile pour 
comprendre certains comportements et specifites bancaires, mais n'a pas utilise un cadre conceptuel 
~ermettant d'evaluer la reglementation prudentielle traditionnelle" p.11 in the original 
~ Clive W. J.Granger (1992) provides a interesting discussion of the importance of the role of the 
theorist, the econometrician and the applied economist in building a theory. 
96 A discussion about differences and similarities between banks and other industries can be found in 
Benston (1986). Chant (1987) and Giannini (1986) provide a detailed review about the literature 
focused in the nature of financial intermediation as an attempt to provide a theoretical foundation to 
the uniqueness of banks, denied by the "new view" and by the so called "Legal Restrictions Theory", 
in connection with the issues of banking regulation and supervision. Hewllig (1991), Battacharya 
(1991), and Fama (1980 and 1985) provide a detailed discussion of banks and non-financial firms. 
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importance of the level and volatility of profits for financial stability and hence for 
systemic risk, this research aims at empirically testing that importance by examining 
the stability of individual banks. The research is aimed at testing the general 
assumption that volatility/risk has increased with financial liberalisation, using data 
from Portuguese Banks. An assessment of the volume and behaviour of profitability 
in the banking system is undertaken. If volatility/risk has increased then. David 
Llewellyn's statement that "in a context (that of deregulation) where the evidence 
suggests that, if anything, risks in financial systems have increased not least ( ... ) 
because of the eroding of traditional demarcations,,97 holds good. Prudential 
regulation, aimed at bringing soundness and stability to the banking system. has as its 
outcome a perverse effect. 
To assess the merits of financial regulatory reform, the research method proposed is 
as follows. 
An Analysis of Variance, which allows a comparison between the level of profits 
before and after liberalisation, developed in chapter 5, is followed by the estimation 
of a linear regression model of unbalanced panel data, which is the content of chapter 
6. The objective of this model is to analyse the statistical significance of regulation 
on profitability. Finally, a modelling of the functionallinstitutional relation between 
regulation and volatility/risk is carried out in chapter 7. This third model derives its 
structure from Finance Theory. This model is combined with uncertainty theory 
principles. The research design is, therefore, a compilation of different theoretical 
and practical methods and methodologies. The research models are used for 
describing and analysing profitability behaviour as response to changes in the 
regulatory rules. This is a framework that allows an assessment of the merits of 
financial regulatory reform. Therefore, some conclusions can be drawn about the 
consequences of this reform for banking stability. 
97 "The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions", Gilbart Lectures on Banking 1986, p.7. 
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4.2. - SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND DATA COLECTION 
4.2.1. -COMPLEMENTARY APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: INTERVIEWS 
While proceeding with the required research in the literature about financial 
regulation, a complementary approach to the problem of changes in financial 
regulatory rules has been adopted. Several interviews were conducted aiming at 
complementing the framework of the research design. A list of these interviews is 
presented in Annex III (Vol. II) together with a brief commentary on the contents of 
each. The objectives of these interviews are multifold, namely, to be aware of the 
concerns of the monetary and supervisory authorities, to acknowledge the way some 
Chairman of Portuguese Banks are reacting to changes in the financial sector, to have 
a more accurate perception about changing mentalities in the Portuguese financial 
system, to understand what attention has been paid to several kinds of risk either by 
banks or by monetary authorities, to learn about accounting methodologies and the 
main problems posed by changes in accounting procedures, and finally to learn to 
what extent banks have diversified their activities following the process of 
liberalisation. 
4.2.2. - NUMBER OF BANKS IN THE PORTUGUESE BANKING 
SYSTEM AND MEASUREMENT OF THEIR 
PERFORMANCE 
Table 4.1.- Number of banks in the Portuguese System 
1975 1984 1989 1992 1993 1997 
Portuguese Commercial Banks 20 13 17 19 20 26 
Foreign Commercial Banks 3 4 11 12 11 11 
Investment Banks 0 0 1 4 11 14 
Total 23 17 29 35 42 51 
Source: APB (Portuguese Bankmg AssociatIOn) and Banco de Portugal (Portuguese Central Bank) 
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Empirical testing begins in 1985. Before that year, all Portuguese banks were state 
owned (the first phase of Financial Regulatory Reform) and financial statements 
must be analysed with caution. 
Between 1975 and 1984, six banks have disappeared as result of administrative 
Government decisions. From 13 state owned banks in 1984, the number of banks has 
increased to 50 in 1997. This is the consequence of the financial liberalisation 
process in Portugal98 . We may distinguish two sub-periods: 1985-1989 (the second 
phase of financial regulatory reform) and 1990-1997 (the third phase of financial 
regulatory reform). During the first sub-period foreign commercial banks are the 
origins of expansion. During the second sub-period, the jump from 29 institutions in 
1989 to 51 in 1997 is mainly the result of the transformation of investment 
companies already in the market into investment banks. These Investment 
Companies were operating in the market from the yearly 80'S99. The increase in 
Portuguese commercial banks after 1992 is the result of a surge of banks specialised 
in credit for consumption. 
Annex IV (Vol. II) displays the institutional evolution of banks in the Portuguese 
system. This Annex was drawn up with information collected from APB (The 
Portuguese Banking Association founded in 1985) and complemented by the dates 
banks registered with the Banco de Portugal. The Annex gives the name of each 
bank, the date each bank began operations (or was registered with the Portuguese 
Central Bank), and the date each bank withdrew from the market 100. Simultaneously, 
from Annex II, one can discern the number of banks annually operating in the 
Portuguese system. 
'l8The removal of barriers to entry is behind the increase in the number of players in the market. 
Constitutional barriers to entry were partially lifted in 1984 and were definitely abolished in 1989. 
Some legal and administrative barriers, such as compulsory purchase of default credit, compulsory 
opening of branches in non-desirable locations and establishment of joint venture companies were still 
binding by the end of the 80's. All administrative barriers were finally dismantled by January 1993. 
99 They were not banks due to barriers to entry. Namely: level of minimum capital requirement, 
compulsory purchase of default credit from state-owned banks and necessity to establish a joint 
venture company. See chapter 3, figure 3.1 - "The Portuguese Financial System before 1 January 
1993". 
100 This was the case of Chase Manhattan Bank when, in 1993, this American Bank decided to 
reorganise its international strategy, and of Banco Comercial de Macau (BCM) which ceased its 
activities after Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP) bought Banco Portugues do Athlntico (BPA). 
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As explained below, the performance measurement of the Portuguese banks will be 
pursued in terms of their profitability. 
Heffernan (1996) gives a review of the methods used to measure bank performance. 
Value added is "perhaps the best method for assessing the performance of any 
institution"lol. A bank's generation of wealth seems to be a fair measure when the 
banking system stability is under scrutiny. Unfortunately "value added ( ... ) is not 
affected by difference in regulatory regime." I 02 Therefore the choice for this study 
falls on profits, R.O.A. (Return on Assets) and R.O.E. (Return on Equity), as the best 
measure of banking performance. R.O.A. is the ratio of earnings to total assets, while 
R.O.E. is the ratio of earnings to equity (being equity the sum of capital with 
reserves). Profits will be computed as "net profits"lo3. These measures of banking 
performance have been chosen because the subject of this research is the assessment 
of banking system stability. In this sense, stability can be viewed as synonymous 
with profitability. 
All profitability and risk measures are computed using accounting data instead of 
market (stock price) data. Whether accounting or market data provide better 
measures of risk and return is a debatable issue: each has advantages and 
disadvantages. A well-recognised problem with accounting data is the smoothing of 
profits stemming in part from marking assets and liabilities at historical cost rather 
than at market value (e.g., Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988)). This is a particularly 
undesirable property when estimating measures of volatility as it will be done in 
chapter 7. Stock prices, on the other hand, quickly reflect all material information 
about a firm, as it becomes known; thus, market returns are not smooth as are 
accounting returns. However, "no one has yet provided a totally satisfactory 
explanation as to why equity returns are so volatile relative to other economic time-
series"lo4. Nevertheless, using accounting data in a semi-annual basis and a measure 
of volatility coming from uncertainty theory instead of finance theory, the study of 
101 Heffernan, S.(l996) Modern Banking in Theory and Practice, p.3). 
102 Op. Cit. p.32. 
103 For a discussion about the meaning of earnings in the banking system and about the use of "gross 
profits" vs. "net profits" in the study of stability, see Appendix A. This appendix also develops an 
analysis about the different approach of R.O.A. and R.O.E. on both North American and O.E.CO. 
studies. 
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volatility carried out in chapter 7 tries to mitigate the smoothing on returns problem. 
On the other hand, in this study this issue is largely overcome because Portuguese 
banks only began floating in the early 90's (with very few exceptions as shown in 
table 4.2), which hinders the use of market data. 
Table 4.2- Portuguese Banks Listed in the Lisbon Stock Exchange 
Name of the Bank Date of Admission Date of exclusion B.V.L. code 
Cpp 30 - December - 1992 121 65 000 302 
BCP 03 - September - 1987 121 65 003 502 
Credit Lyonnais 14 - December - 1989 121 65006302 
BES 15-July-1991 121 65 007 802 
BANIF 25 - March - 1992 12165008802 
BPSM 22 - June - 1995 12165009302 
BPA 21 - December - 1990 121 65009402 
BTA 30 - October - 1989 12165009502 
Central B.1. 06 - October - 1997 I 2 I 65 0 I I 902 
Banco ESSI 01 -June- 1993 12165062802 
BPI 19 - September - 1986 28 - December - 1995 121 65 000 702 
BPI - SGPS 105 28 - December - 1995 12165096902 
BIC 18 - December - 1989 13 - December - 1996 121 65003602 
BFE 02 - January - 1995 25 - June - 1997 121 65000202 
UBP 20 - April - 1993 13 - September - 1996 121 65 009 602 
B.MelJo(de investO) 03 - April - 1992 25 - September - 1996 12165033 102 
B. Mello Comercial 13 - September - 1996 10- February - 1997 121 65098302 
B. Mello (current) 10- February - 1997 121 65 098 502 
Source: B.V.L.- Bolsa de Valores de LIsboa (LIsbon Stock Exchange) 
4.2.3. - SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION 
There are five sources for banking financial data in Portugal. These sources are: 
A.P.B. (the Portuguese Banking Association), the Stock Exchange Market Official 
Journal, "Dim-io da Republica" (the Republic of Portugal Official Law Journal), 
Individual Annual Banking Reports and, finally, the Banking Supervision 
Department of the Portuguese Central Bank. 
104 Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993), p.47. 
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The Portuguese Banking Association has published its semi-annual bulletin since 
June 1988 with information covering all the banks in the system. Table 4.3 presents 
the publication's year, the nature of financial information (Balance Sheet and/or 
Profit and Loss Account), the basis of financial information (individual or 
consolidated), the frequency of this financial information (annual or semi-annual), 
and the base date. 
Table 4.3-Sources of Data Collection 
Source Year Nature of Basis Frequency Base date 
information 
APB'uO N° I-Jun. I 988 B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec.87 
APB N° 2-Dec. 1988 B.S. Individual Annual Dec.82-Dec.87 
B.S. Individual Semi-Annual Jun. 88 
APB W 3-Jun. I 989 B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec.88 
B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec.82-Dec88 
APB N° 4-Dec.1989 B.S. Individual Annual Dec83-Dec.88 
B.S. Individual Semi-Annual Jun. 89 
APB W 5-Jun. 1990 B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec.89 
B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec.83-Dec.89 
APB N° 6-Dec.1990 B.S Individual Semi-Annual Jun. 90 
APB N° 7-Jun.199l B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec. 90 
APB N° 8-Dec. I 991 B.S. Individual Semi-Annual Jun 90-Jun.91 
APB N°9-Jun.1992 B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec.91 
B.S.lP&L Individual Annual Dec.90-Dec.91 
B.S.lP&L Individual Semi-Annual Jun.90-Jun.91 
APB N° ID-Out. 1992 B.S. Individual Semi-Annual Jun.90-Jun.92 
APB N°II-Jun.1993 B.S.lP&L Consolidated Annual Dec. 92 
APB N°12-Dec.1993 B.S. Consolidated Semi-Annual Jun. 93 
APB N°I3-Jun. 1994 B.SIP&L Consolidated Annual Dec. 93 
B.S/P&L Consolidated Annual Dec.92-Dec.93 
B.S. Consolidated Semi-Annual Jun. 93 
APB N°14-Dec.1994 B.S. Consolidated Semi-Annual Jun.93-Jun.94 
APB N°15-Jun.1995 B.S/P&L Consolidated Annual Dec. 92-Dec. 94 
APB WI6-Dec.1995 B.S/P&L Consolidated Semi-Annual Jun.94-Jun.95 
APB W17-Jun.1996 B.S/P&L Consolidated Annual Dec.92-Dec.95 
APB WlS-Dec.1996 B.S.+P&L Consolidated Semi-Annual Jun.95-Jun.96 
APB N°19-Jun.1997 B.S/P&L Consolidated Annual Dec. 92-Dec. 96 
APB N~O-Dec. I 997 B.S.lP&L Consolidated Semi-Annual Jun.97 
B.S.lP&L Consolidated Semi-Annual Jun.96-Jun.97 
B.S.lP&L Consolidated Annual Dez. 92-Dez. 96 
APB N°21-Jun.1998 B.S.lP&L Consolidated Annual Dec.97 
B.S.lP&L Consolidated Annual Dez.93-Dez.97 
The Stock Exchange Market Official Journal, as a disclosure requirement, publishes 
the Balance Sheets and the Profits and Loss Accounts for all listed banks. Table 4.2 
displays the Portuguese Banks that are listed in the Lisbon Stock Exchange as well as 
the date they went public. Financial statement disclosure is semi-annual and 
IOS SGPS - holding company. 
106 APB -Associa~iio Portuguesa de Bancos (Portuguese Banking Association). 
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statements are presented on both individual and consolidated basis. 
From the Republic of Portugal Official Law Journal ("Diario da Republica"), we are 
able to collect on!y Balance Sheet information. Although this information IS 
quarterly, it is presented only on an individual and not on a consolidated basis. 
The fourth source of data collection is the Annual Report of each bank. On the basis 
of these reports we can analyse either individual or consolidated information, 
covering both Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Accounts. 
All the above-mentioned financial statements are audited. 
Very particular and careful attention must be paid to the problem of consolidation, 
given the different meanings applied to the concept in the U.S.A. and Europe. While 
in the United States consolidated financial statements mean information covering 
domestic activities as well as activities carried out abroad, in Europe consolidation 
refers to the aggregate activities of the parent bank and all its subsidiaries. An 
explanation of the importance of consolidation to this research follows in the next 
section. 
STATEMENTS CONSOLIDATION: 4.2.4. - FINANCIAL 
TECHNICAL PROBLEM POSED BY CHANGES ON 
ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES: HOW TO OVERCOME IT 
The most comprehensive Portuguese banking database is A.P.B. because it publishes 
information about all Portuguese banks. As it will be explained below, this database 
is not the only one necessary. A problem arises from changes in the way financial 
information is presented by this source. As demonstrated in Table 4.3, up to 1991 
information was disclosed in an individual basis. From 1992' 07 onwards, financial 
statements have been consolidated. That means that consolidated financial 
information incorporates the activities of subsidiary banks, fund management 
107 In Portugal consolidation was enforced by the end of 1992 (Decree-Law 36 dated march 28 1992). 
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companies, leasing companies, factoring companies, asset management companies. 
dealers and joint venture companies, where relevant. 
The changes in accounting procedures seem, at the first glance, a problem for the 
consistency of data collection. In reality, a noise is introduced when the horizon of 
this research ranges from 1985 to 1997. This technical problem posed by changes in 
accounting procedures required special attention and a search for the best approach 
to overcome it. 
From 1985 until the first half of 1992 this research collects its financial information 
fi P 108 rom A. .B. . 
From the second half of 1992 onwards, to avoid duplication of profits and other 
assets or liabilities items in the sample construction, the following steps have been 
pursued: 
1 SI: From the APB bulletins it was possible to differentiate banks that consolidated 
from those that didn't consolidate (Appendix B to this chapter l09) 
2nd: When a bank consolidates its financial statements, its annual report has been 
consulted. Consultation of these annual reports made it possible to know whether or 
not another bank was included in that consolidation (Appendix B). 
3rd : Where there is a case of consolidation, a consolidated statement of the parent 
bank is replaced by individual financial statements from that parent bank. The source 
for these individual financial statements is the Stock Exchange Market Official 
Bulletin. As shown in Appendix B, when the parent bank consolidated with 
subsidiary banks, the parent bank was already quoted in the stock exchange market. 
The only exceptions are C.G.D., the State owned bank, and Banco de Fomento 
108 Complemented by Balance Sheets (B.S.) published in the Portuguese Official Law Journal when 
required (B.S. for June 1985,1986,1987). 
109 Banks listed on this appendix are the banks included in the sample construction: this is, banks 
whose assets worth more than 100 billion escudos in December 1997, plus Banco do Brasil and 
Generale Bank. 
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Exterior - B.F.E, that floated only between January 1995 and June 1997. In both 
cases, individual financial statements were obtained from each bank annual report. 
The above procedure in managing consolidation aims at mitigating the problem of 
the duplication of data. With individual data from the parent bank, the only 
information lost is related to non-bank subsidiary companies. Profits from these 
companies may be considered negligible when compared to the core activities of 
banks. We may add that, before consolidation techniques were implemented, the 
banks' financial statements did not capture these companies' profits. Therefore, we 
assume that the way consolidation is managed in the current research will not 
introduce biased results in estimation procedures or inconsistency of hypothesis 
testing in the models that will be developed in next chapters. 
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APPENDIX A - HOW TO MEASURE EARNINGS IN THE 
BANKING SYSTEM: DIFFERENCES IN TERMINOLOGY 
BETWEEN THE O.E.C.D. AND THE UNITED STATES 
Axiom: profitability is the best measure of banks' performance. 
The standard measures of profitability are: 
1) Profits 
2) R.O.A. 
3) R.O.E. 
1) Gross Profits (profits before taxes) or Net Profits (profits after taxes)? 
When analysing profitability, profits should be seen as Gross Profits (profits before 
taxes). Government intervention, through fiscal policy, is independent of banks' 
performance. In other words, the fiscal regime should not be interpreted as one of the 
determinants of banks' performance (whose volatility is the subject of this study). On 
the other hand, studying the banking system's stability from the profitability 
standpoint implies that profits are net of taxes. Stability is viewed as soundness and 
solvency of the banking system, which are analysed both in liquidity and capital 
adequacies terms. The wealth structure of a bank is thus evaluated by means of its 
financial ratios. These ratios are obtained from a bank's balance sheet where net 
profits instead of gross profits are registered. 
It may be argued that stability is positively correlated with gross profits, instead of 
net profits, because taxes are administrative procedures. It seems to be a weak 
argument. Financial fragility is installed well before it can be detected through 
accounting data collection. Exempting financial institutions from taxation, although 
86 
improving capital equity (bringing net profits close to gross profits), cannot be 
viewed as a remedy for financial fragility. 
Corollary 1: This study uses net profits (profits after taxes) to measure banks' 
profitability. 
How to measure R.O.A. and R.O.E.? 
Heffernan (1996)110 defines R.O.A. and R.O.E. : 
R.O.A. = earnings/total assets 
R.O.E. = earnings/total equity 
No matter how "earnings" are measured, and it will be discussed below, their value 
is registered on banks' income statement covering the entire year. Total assets and 
total equity comes from balance-sheet data. Thus, while "earnings" are a flow of 
funds, total assets and total equity are stocks of funds measured at mid and year-end. 
The first step in data analysis converts balance-sheet data by a simple average to 
semi-annual mid levels. 
R.O.A. = earnings/ {(total assetsn_l+ total assetsn) /2)} 
R.O.E. = earnings/ {(total equitYn_1+ total equitYn) /2)} 
There is no formal or institutional definition for "earnings" in the banking system. 
The Financial Report defines earnings. Nevertheless banks are not included in this 
report. 
Frame and Holder (1994)111 present the following computation of R.O.A. and 
R.O.E.: 
110 "Modem Banking in Theory and Practice", p.30. 
I11 "FYI-Commercial Bank Profits in 1993", Economic Review (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta). 
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R.O.A.= Net Incoml- / average assets 
R.O.E.= Net Income/ average equity capital 
When looking at the O.E.C.O. definition of net income 112 (table A.4.l) it was 
possible to believe that earnings were the sum of profits before taxes with net 
provisions (e.g. gross income less operating expenses). But looking at an American 
bank's income statement l13 (table A.4.2) it becomes apparent that net income is 
synonymous with net profits, e.g. profits after taxes. Therefore it is possible to 
conclude that earnings are viewed as net profits in the U.S.A where the bulk of 
studies about bank profitability have been carried on. It is also possible to conclude 
that the technical expression "net income" has different meanings in the U.S.A and in 
the O.E.C.D. 
There is a strong argument in favour of net profits as earnings instead of net income 
(O.E.C.D. 's definition). If earnings were measured as the sum of net interest and 
non-interest income less operating expenses we would lose information about the 
impact of provisions on earnings. In accordance, allowing earnings to be affected by 
the level of provisions this study is better able to capture the effects of regulation on 
profitability. 
Corollary 2: (Net) Profits are the best measure of banks' earnings. 
Corollary 3: R.O.A and R.O.E will be measured as follows: 114 
R.O.A.= Net Profits/ Average Assets R.O.E.= Net Profits / Average Equity 
Corollaries 2 and 3 stress the importance of corollary 1. 
112 Bank Profitability - 1997. 
113Nelson and Reid (1996), "Profits and Balance-Sheet developments at U .S. Commercial Banks in 
1995", Federal Reserve Bulletin, 82,6,483-505. 
114 In spite of the utilisation by O.E.C.D. of "net income", "net provisions" and "profits before taxes" 
in its publication "Financial Markets Trends" (chapter on bank profitability). 
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Table A.4.1.-Income Statement. O.E.C.D. structure. 
r------------------------------------
- Interest income 
- Interest expenses 
- Net interest income (item I minus item 2) 
Non-interest income (net) 
- Gross income (item 3 plus item 4) 
- Operating expenses 
- Net income (item 5 minus item 6) 
- Provisions (net) 
- Profit before tax (item 7 minus item 8) 
- Income tax 
- Profit after tax (item 9 minus item 10) 
Source: O.E.C.D. Bank Profitability - 1997 
Observation: Nelson and Reid (1996) state that " ... profits were lifted last year by 6 
2/3 percent increase in total revenue - non-interest income plus net interest 
income.,,115 In accordance the best translation for O.E.C.D. 's "gross income" is "total 
revenue". 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Table A.4.2.- Report of Income. V.S. structure. 
- Gross interest income 
- Gross interest expenses 
- Net interest income (item 1 minus item 2) 
- Loss provisioning 
- Non-interest income 
- Non-interest expense 
- Net non-interest expense (item 6 minus item 5) 
- Realised gains on investment account securities 
:9 - Income before taxes and extraordinary items (item 3 minus item 4 minus item 7 
i plus item 8) 
10 - Taxes 
11 - Extraordinary items 
12 - Net Income (item 9 minus item 10 plus item 11) 
Source: Nelson and Reid (1996), "Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial 
Banks in ) 995", Federal Reserve Bulletin, 82,6, p. 495 
115 "Profits and Balance Sheet Developments at V.S. Commercial Banks in 1995", Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, 82 ,6 , p.490. 
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APPENDIX B: PORTUGUESE BANKS AND CONSOLIDATE ACCOUNTS 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Banks included in the consolidation Date of flotation I 
2nd half 2nd half 2nd half 2nd half 2nd half 2nd half 
I 
ABN N N N N N N I 
BBV/Lloyds Y Y Y Y Y Y No other banks I 
BBI N N N N N N I 
ChemlMan Y Y Y Y Y Y No other banks I I 
BCA Y N N N Y N No other banks I 
BCP Y Y Y Y Y Y Consolidates BPA since 1992 Is quoted since Set.87, individual accounts audited and published in 
the stock exchange official journal I 
BFE Y Y Y Y Y Y Consolidates BBI since Dec. 92 Is quoted since Jan. 95, individual accounts audited and published in; 
I the stock exchange official journal 
BII N N N Y Y No other banks 
BCI N N Y Y Y Y No other banks 
BES y Y Y Y Y Y Consolidates BIC since July 95 and BESSI Is quoted since July 91, individual accounts audited and published in 
July 1997 the stock exchange official journal 
B.Finantia Y Y Y Y Y No other banks 
BFB y Y Y Y Y Y No other banks 
BIC N N N N N N 
BANIF Y Y Y N Y Y Consolidates BCA since the 2nd half of 1996 Is quoted since March 92, individual accounts audited and published 
in the stock exchange official journal 
BMIIB.Mell Y Y Y Y Y Y No other banks 
BNCI N Y Y Y Y Y No other banks 
BNU y Y Y Y Y Y No other banks 
BPSM y Y Y Y Y Y Consolidates BT A and CPP since the 1 st half Is quoted since June 95, individual accounts audited and published 
of 1995 and Chemical since the 2nd half of in the stock exchange official journal 
1996 
BPI Y Y Y Y Y Y Consolidates BFB since Dec.92 and BFE and Is quoted since Set. 86, individual accounts audited and published in 
BBI since Dec. 96 the stock exchange official journal 
BPA y Y Y Y Y Y Consolidates UBP since 93 Is quoted since Dec. 90, individual accounts audited and published 
in the stock exchange official journal 
BSN y Y Y Y Y No other banks 
BTA y Y Y Y Y Y Consolidates CPP since the 2nd half of 1992 Is quoted since Oct. 89, individual accounts audited and published in 
the stock exchange official journal 
BNP N N N N N N 
---.~---
----- - - -~-- - --~ ---- - ---
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1992 1993 1994 1995 
2nd half 2nd half 2nd half 2nd half 
Barclays N N N 
CGD Y Y Y 
CISF Y Y 
Citi N N N 
Cl Y Y Y 
Cpp Y Y Y 
DBI Y Y Y 
Finibanco Y Y 
MG N N N 
BMelllUBP Y Y Y 
B.BrasU N N N 
Generale N N N 
"Y" (Yes) for consolidated financial statements 
"N" (No) for non-consolidated financial statements 
Sources: 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
1996 1997 Banks included in the consolidation 
2nd half 2nd half 
N N 
Y Y Consolidates BNU since the 2nd half of 1992 
Y Y No other banks 
N N 
Y Y No other banks 
Y Y No other banks 
Y Y No other banks 
Y Y No other banks 
N N 
Y Y Consolidates B. Mello Inv. Since 1 st half 96 
N N 
N N 
-A.P.B. (Portuguese Banking Association) for consolidated or non-consolidated financial statements 
-Individual annual reports to depict which banks are included in the consolidation 
-Lisbon Stock Exchange Market to know the date of flotation 
Obs.:Banco Mello changed its name to Banco Mello de Investimentos in the 2nd half of 96 
Obs.:UBP changed its name to Banco Mello in the 2nd half of 1996 
91 
Date of flotation 
State owned bank 
Is quoted since April 1993, individual accounts audited and 
published in the stock exchange official journal 
-. - -- -
CHAPTER 5- LEVEL AND BEHAVIOUR OF BANKING 
PROFITABILITY IN THE COURSE OF THE FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM 
5.1. - INTRODUCTION: PROPOSITIONS TO BE TESTED 
George Benston's paper (1991) focuses on regulation and distinguishes two aspects 
of stability in the Banking System: systemic and the stability of individual banks. We 
may, therefore, conclude that there are two measures of risk in the banking system: 
Incidence of banking failure 
Level and behaviour of profitability 
Empirical studies like Heffernan (1995), Cole and Gunther (1998) are related to the 
first measure of risk. Bourke (1989) states that the literature has never adequately 
examined the consequences (for profitability) of changes in the intensity of 
regulation I 16. To assess the merits of financial regulatory reform from the 
profitability standpoint, this chapter develops several models with the purpose of 
studying the behaviour of average banking profitability in the course of financial 
regulatory reform in Portugal. 
While Gual and Neven (1992) suggest that in the European Community profits fall 
with deregulation, Hoggarth et a1. (1998) contrast higher recorded levels of bank 
profits in the UK with lower but more stable bank profits recorded in Germany (a 
116 "Concentration and other Determinants of Bank Profitability in Europe, North America and 
Australia". 
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more regulated market). The objective of this chapter is to test whether average 
profitability has increased or not with the financial liberalisation process in Portugal. 
The propositions to be tested are: 
1.- Average profitability is significantly different after regulatory reform 
2.- Average profitability is significantly higher after regulatory reform 
To test these propositions, three different approaches are adopted in this chapter. 
First, the aggregate behaviour of banking profitability is analysed. This analysis 
focuses on regressipg aggregate profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E (each one at its turn) on 
time "t". The objective is to draw some conclusions about how profitability, in 
average terms, rose or fell during financial regulatory reform. 
Secondly, two Multifactor ANOVA models are tested. their importance in this 
context arising from the fact that they explain the effect of the explanatory variables 
("the factors") on the average behaviour of a response variable of basic interest, the 
explained variable. Thus, the reason for developing these models is that they allow 
studying the effect of time as well as the effect of banks (the "factors") on average 
profitability (the response variable of basic interest). In synthesis, both multi factor 
ANOVA models have two factors: "time" and "banks". In both models the factor 
"banks" has 24 levels (the number of banks included in the sample). What 
distinguish these models are the levels assigned to the factor "time". In the first 
model "time" has only two levels, 1986-1991 and 1992-1997. In the second model 
"time" has three levels: 1986-1989, 1990-1993 and 1994-1997. This different 
division of time, as will be explained later in this chapter, allows accounting for the 
effect of the abolishment of barriers to entry, during the change of the rules in the 
banking system. 
Finally, the third and last approach of this chapter consists of performing a One Way 
ANOV A study which aims at analysing how average profitability differs (or does not 
differ) between the different periods of financial regulatory reform in Portugal. These 
periods are 1986-1988, 1989-1992 and 1993-1997, the same periods that will be 
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considered on chapter six where regulation, a banking profitability determinant, is 
introduced as a dummy variable in an unbalanced panel data model. 
All the required input data for models developed in this chapter are presented in 
annex V, Vol. n. 
5.2. - THE REGRESSION OF AGGREGATE BANKING 
PROFITABILITY ON TIME 
The study encompasses 24 banks whose profitability, measured by profits, R.O.A 
and R.OE., is tracked from the first half of 1986 until the second half of 1997. In 
each semi-annual period these profitability measures are aggregated. The aim of this 
approach is to study how aggregate banking profitability has evolved during the life 
span of the analysis . Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 concerning profits, R.O.A and R.O.E., 
respectively, give evidence of this evolution. 
Table 5.1.- Legend/or Charts 1, 2, and 3, matching the variable time with the 
. I' d I 'd d' I I' seml-annua perlO S t zat are conSl ere In t le ana,£sls. 
trIME I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
PERIOD 1~lhalf86 2ndhalf 86 1~lhalf87 2nahalf87 1~lhalf88 2nohalf 88 I > , half 89 2nohalf 89 
trIME 9 10 II 12 13 14 15 16 
PERIOD 1 sIhalf90 2nohalf90 l SIhalf91 2ndhalf91 I SI half92 2nohalf92 I SI half93 2nohalf93 
trIME 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
IPERIOD I SI half94 2Mhalf 94 I SI half95 2nahalf95 1~'half96 2oahalf96 1"half97 2oahalf97 
FIGURE 5.1.- Semi-annual Profits in the Portuguese Banking System 
(1986 to 1997) 
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FIGURE 5.2.- Semi-annual R.O.A. in the Portuguese Banking System 
(1986 to 1997) 
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FIGURE 5.3.- Semi-annual R.O.E. in the Portuguese Banking System 
(1986 to 1997) 
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Next, the empirical analysis is conducted on a semi-annual basis and all the 
conclusions are interpreted in average terms of profitability behaviour. This 
empirical analysis consists of estimating several linear regressions having time "t" as 
regressor. The study of how profitability, in average terms, grew or fell between 
1986 and 1997 is split into two stages, for each profitability regressant, as follows. 
In the first stage, the adjustment of a linear regression to the data embraces the whole 
period, which means 24 semi-annual observations, and the resulting estimated 
equations are equation (5.1) for profits, equation (5.4) for R.O.A. and equation (5 ,7) 
for R.O.E., as shown below. Then, in a second stage, the linear regression that is 
adjusted to each of the aggregate profitability measure described above is divided 
into two periods of 12 semi-annual observations each. The first period ranges from 
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the first half of 1986 until the second half of 1991, and the second one from the first 
half of 1992 until the second half of 1997. The reason for this cut-off lies in the fact 
that the most significant financial regulatory changes occurred at this time, such as: 
a) The minimum level of 8% for the solvency ratio was enforced in 1992. 
b) Credit ceilings w~re definitively abandoned in 1991. 
c) Full capital movements' liberalisation became effective in 1992. 
d) Interest rates on deposits were liberalised in 1992 
e) The barriers to entry that still remained in the banking system were finally 
abolished in January 1993. 
This second stage estimation results are presented below by equations (5.2) and (5.3) 
for profits, equations (5.5) and (5.6) for R.O.A., and equations (5.8) and (5.9) for 
R.O.E .. The analysis of these results allows drawing some conclusions about the 
effect of time on aggregate banking profitability when a liberalised market has 
replaced a more restricted environment activity for the banking system. 
5.2.1. - THE GENERAL FUNCTION SPECIFICATION 
In the analysis that follows, the comparison between the angular coefficients (that is, 
the trend) carried out in both regressions in the second stage of the study, provides 
information about the acceleration of average banking profitability in the course of 
financial regulatory reform. 
The general function to be estimated has the following specification: 
Y/ = a + j3t + G / 
All the information pertaining to the issue under analysis is contained in the angular 
coefficient (the trend); this is the estimator for p. In the first stage of the current 
study the angular coefficient shows whether profitability, in average terms, is 
increasing or decreasing and its respective magnitude. In the second stage, the 
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comparison between the angular coefficient carried out in both regressions for each 
profitability measure, provides information about the acceleration on average 
profitability after the most significant changes in regulatory rules, as described 
earlier in this chapter, have occurred. 
The estimation procedure is the traditional OLS one and all "1" statistics are shown in 
parenthesi s. 
For each of the nine estimated regressions that follow, Table 5.2 displays the "F" 
statistics, the R-squared, the number of observations, the Durbin Watson test for 
autocorrelation, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test whether the normal distribution 
fits the data adequately, and the estimated parameters of the normal distribution fitted 
to the sthocastic terms. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test is employed to test if the stochastic term in 
each of the linear regressions follows a normal distribution. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test is a procedure that allows testing the 
overall goodness-of-fit between the distribution of the data and the assumption of 
normality of the disturbance terms that underlies this studyll7. The test calculates the 
maximum vertical distance between the cumulative distribution function of the two 
samples (the data sample and the sample with a theoretical normal distribution). If 
this distance is large enough, the hypothesis that the two samples come from the 
same distribution is rejected. For each linear regression, the results of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test immediately follows the analysis of the statistically 
significance of each coefficient estimator. 
117 The Kolmogoroy-Smimoy test, undertaken to determine whether residuals can be adequately 
modelled by a normal distribution, is described later in this chapter, in section 5.3.3 .. 
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Table 5.1.- Time as Explanatory Varillble /0' Banking Profitability. Some Results 
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5.2.1.1.- Aggregate profits behaviour during the life span of the analysis, 
1986-1997: 
~ 
profils, = 11524.39+3867.981 (5.1.) 
(2988) (13960) 
In equation 5.1. both estimators of ex and p are statistically significant at the 1 % level 
of significance. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maximum distance is 0.226019. The p-value equals 0.172288. 
Because the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that 
residuals come from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher 
confidence. 
5.2.1.1.1.Aggregate profits behaviour when the banking market was still regulated 
with several kinds o/"old style regulation": 1986-1991. 
" profits, = - 548.8631) + 5804 .941 1 (5.2.) 
(-0.085) (6672) 
The angular coefficient of equation 5.2. is statistically significant at the 1 % level of 
significance while the intercept is statistically non-significant. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maximum distance is 0.190097. The p-value equals 0.778708. 
Because the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that 
residuals come from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher 
confidence. 
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5.2.1.1.2. Aggregate profits behaviour during the period where the banking market 
was already liberalised: 1992-1997. 
1\ 
profits, = 37210.26+2451.612t (5.3.) 
(16'0) (2.046) 
The angular coefficient in equation 5.3. is statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance while the intercept is statistically non-significant. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maximum distance is 0.206904. The p-value equals 0.683222. 
Because the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that 
residuals come from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher 
confidence. 
5.2.1.2.- R.O.A. behaviour in the banking system during the life span of 
the study: 1986-1997 
/\ 
r.o.a., = 22.91471 - 0.921 t (5.4.) 
(8956) (-5 147 ) 
Both the intercept and the angular coefficient shown in equation 5.4. are statistically 
significant at the I % level of significance. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maxImum distance is 0.0837644. The p-value equals 0.99598. 
Because the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to O. I 0, the idea that 
residuals come from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher 
confidence. 
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5.2.1.2.1. R.O.A. behaviour in the banking system when structural controls and 
some macroeconomic controls still dominated the banking market: 1986-1991. 
r.o.Q" = 15 .588 + 0.386 t (5.5.) 
(5 Il2 ) (0 936 ) 
This equation's constant is statistically significant at the 1 % level of significance. 
However the angular coefficient is statistically non-significant. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maximum distance is 0.201902. The p-value equals 0.712217. 
Because the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that 
residuals come from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher 
confidence. 
5.2.1.2.2. R.O.A. behaviour in the banking system after prudential and protective 
controls were implemented in the banking market: 1992-1997. 
11 
r .o.a., = 24.019 - 1.045 t (5.6.) 
(2.84S) (-2.330) 
Both the intercept and the angular coefficient are statistically significant at the 5% 
level of significance. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maximum distance is 0.0971793. The p-value equals 0.999861. 
Because the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that 
residuals come from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher 
confidence. 
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5.2.1.3.- R.O.E. behaviour in the banking system during the life span of 
this study: 1986-1997 
1\ 
r.o.e" = 269 .591 - 8.918 t (5.7.) 
(10 9S4 ) (-S 177 ) 
In equation 5.7. both the constant term and the angular coefficient are statistically 
significant at the 1 % level of significance. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maximum distance is 0.10346. The p-value equals 0.959396. Because 
the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that residuals come 
from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher confidence. 
5.2.1.3.1. R.O.E behaviour in the banking system before the process of 
liberalisation in the banking market was accomplished: 1986-1991. 
" r .0 .e 01 = 238 .106 - 1 .865 t 
(6 038 ) ( - 0 348 ) 
(5.8.) 
The intercept is statistically significant at the 1 % level of significance and the 
angular coefficient is statistically non-significant. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maximum distance is 0.16342. The p-value equals 0.90574. Because 
the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that residuals come 
from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher confidence. 
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5.2.1.3.2.- R.O.E. behaviour in the banking system after the process of 
liberalisation was accomplished. 
1\ 
r.D.e., = 118 .222 - 1.512 t (5.9.) 
( 2 .00) ) ( - 0.48) ) 
The intercept is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance while the 
angular coefficient is statistically non-significant. 
K-S test: 
In this case the maXImum distance is 0.152247. The p-value equals 0.943677. 
Because the P-value for this test is greater than or equal to 0.10, the idea that 
residuals come from a normal distribution cannot be rejected with 90% or higher 
confidence. 
5.2.2. - TESTING FOR AUTOCORRELATED DISTURBANCES 
Supposing that in a general model of the matrix form: 
y = Xp + J..L, 
one suspects that the disturbances follow an AR( 1) scheme, namely, 
fJ, 1 = ({JfJ, 1_ I + el, 
the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is then: Ho : <p = 0 , and the alternative 
hypothesis is: HI : <p:l: O. 
The hypothesis is about the J.L'S, which are unobservable. One therefore looks for a 
test using the vector of OLS residuals, e = y - Xb. This raises several difficulties: e = 
MJ.L, where M = I - X(X'Xr l X' is symmetric, idempotent of rank n-k. Thus the 
variance-covariance matrix of the e's is: var(e)=E(ee,)=O'2~ M. So, even if the null 
hypothesis is true, in that E(J.LJ.L')= 0'2 ~ I, the OLS residuals will display some 
autocorrelation, because the off-diagonal terms in M do not vanish. "More 
importantly, M is a function of the sample values of the explanatory variables, which 
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vary unpredictably from one study to another" 1 18. This variation makes it impossible 
to derive an exact finite-sample test on the e's that will be valid for any X matrix that 
might ever turn up. In conclusion, hypothesis testing associated with an AR( 1) 
process for the disturbances J..l are not very reliable in testing the presence of 
autocorrelation. 
Durbin and Watson treated these problems in a pair of classic articles 119. The Durbin-
Watson test statistics is computed from the vector of OLS residuals e = y - Xh. It is 
denoted as d and is defined as: 
f(e l -e ,_1 )2 d = .:...;cl =...=.2 ____ _ 
" 2 L e , 
I = I 
Durbin and Watson established upper (du) and lower (dL) bounds for the critical 
values. These bounc.s depend only on the sample size and the number of regressors. 
They are used to test the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation against the alternative 
hypothesis of positive first order autocorrelation. 
The testing procedure is as follows: 
1.- If d<dL , the null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated disturbances is rejected in 
favour of the hypothesis of positive first-order autocorrelation. 
2.- If d>du ,the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is not rejected. 
3.- If dL < d < du ,the test is inconclusive. 
There are two important qualifications, which are fulfilled in this study, to the use of 
the Durbin-Watson test. First, it is necessary to include a constant term in the 
regression. Second, it is strictly valid only for a non-stochastic X matrix. 
If the value of "d" exceeds 2, the study tests the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of negative first order 
autocorrelation. This test is done by calculating "4-d" and comparing this statistic 
118 Johnston and Dinardo (1997), p.179. 
119 J. Durbin and G. S. Watson, "Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Squares Regression", 
Blometrlka, 37,1950, 4(19-428; 38, 195 I, 159-178. 
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with the tabulated critical values, as if one were testing for positive 
autocorrelation. 12o• 
As it is shown in Table 5.2, the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation is not rejected 
in respect of equations (5.1), (5.3), (5.4), (5.5), (5.6), (5.8) and (5.9). Since in 
equation (5.2), "4-d" is lesser than dL with 5% significance points, the null 
hypothesis of non-autocorrelated disturbances is rejected in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis of negative first order autocorrelation. Referring to equation (5.7), the 
Durbin-Watson statistic allows the conclusion that the null hypothesis is rejected in 
favour of the hypothesis of positive first order autocorrelation, because d<dL . 
5.2.3. -ESTIMATION RESULTS121 
The analysis pursued in sub section 5.2.2 makes possible the following conclusions. 
Aggregate profits in the Portuguese Banking system have increased in average terms 
3,868 millions of escudos per half year between 1986 and 1997 (equation 5.1). 
Comparing equations (5.2) and (5.3), the analysis of the p estimator gives evidence 
of a slow down on profits evolution between the periods 1986-1991 and 1992-1997. 
In fact, while in the first period average profits grew by 5,805 millions of escudos per 
half a year, between 1992 and 1997 this growth fell to 2,562 millions of escudos. 
Finally, in what concerns profits behaviour, the explanatory capacity of equations 
(5.2) and (5.3) allows the conclusion that growth in the first period was mainly due to 
inertia because time explains 81.66% of profits behaviour against only 29.51% in the 
second period. Thus, other factors than time are required to explain the evolution of 
profits in the banking system between 1992 and 1997. 
120 Johnston and Dinardo (1997) prove that the range of "d" is from 0 to 4. They prove that d<2 for 
positive autocorrelation of the e's, d>2 for negative autocorrelation of the e's, and d::2 for zero 
autocorrelation of the e's, as well (p. 180). 
121 Although there is the presence of autocorrelation of first-order in equations (2) and (7), the study is 
carried out with the OLS estimators. Nevertheless it is worthwhile mentioning the following. In eq. 
(2) the more classical iterative Cochrane-Orcutt estimator of ~ is 6,190.048 (15.115), while the more 
recent maximum likelihood estimator of Beach and Mackinnon of ~ is 6,189.987 (19.362). In eq. (7) 
the Cochrane-Orcutt estimator of P is -10.03 (-3.307), while the MLE of Beach and Mackinnon of ~ 
is -7.904 (-3.083). 
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The trend of aggregate R.O.A. behaviour in the Portuguese banking system is 
downward from 1986 until 1997, with a decrease of 0.921 percentage points on 
average R.O.A. per half a year (equation 5.4). Although no conclusions can be drawn 
from the angular coefficient between 1986 and 1991 (equation 5.5), equation 5.6 
shows that R.O.A. has decreased, on average, 1.045 percentage points per half a year 
between 1992 and 1997. But the explanatory capacity of equation 5.6 is only 
35.19%, which leads to the earlier conclusion about profits that factors other than 
time are more important in explaining profitability behaviour after 1991. 
Finally, the study carried out about aggregate R.O.E. in the Portuguese banking 
system is less conclusive than the study of the previous profitability measures. 
Between 1986 and 1997 aggregate RO.E in the Portuguese Banking system has 
decreased, on average terms, 8.918 percentage points per half a year (equation 5.7), a 
substantial drop when compared to aggregate RO.A. behaviour in the same period 
(equation 5.4). In addition, from 1986 to 1997 time explains 55% of both the 
behaviour of aggregate R.OA. and R.OE. (equations 5.4 and 5.7 respectively). Since 
the angular coefficient in equations 5.8 and 5.9 is statistically non-significant, 
nothing can be state about changes in R.OE. behaviour from 1986-1991 to 1992-
1997. 
Looking at the propositions to be tested in the current chapter, which are: 
1.- Average profitability is significantly different after regulatory reform 
2.- Average profitability is significantly higher after regulatory reform 
The explained results allow only the conclusion that profitability measured by profits 
has increased in average terms during the period of the regulatory reform, while, 
during the same period, profitability measured both by RO.A. and by R.O.E. has 
decreased in average terms. 
The weakness of this approach is derived from the fact that the study considers time 
alone as the explanatory variable for banking profitability. In other terms, the 
analysis is based on a trend model rather than on an explanatory model. To overcome 
this weakness, two multifactor ANOVA models are developed in the next section. 
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The reason is that these models allow the study of the effect of other factors than 
time on average banking profitability. The second factor that is introduced in the 
study as affecting banking profitability behaviour is the factor "banks". 
5.3. - MULTIFACTOR ANOVA MODELS 
In this section two Fixed Effect ANOV A Models with two factors are tested. Both 
models add to the factor time the factor "banks" to capture the influence that banks 
also have on profitability behaviour. The study of each model begins with some 
empirical facts concerning average and volatility of the banking profitability 
measures: profits, R.OA. and R.O.E .. This analysis is followed by empirical tests 
related to the same banking profitability measures. The objective is to test whether 
average banking profitability is significantly different in the several moments of the 
course of financial regulatory reform. If so, the study concludes with the analysis of 
the direction of these average differences. The several periods considered in the 
course of financial regulatory reform will be explained below, and they match the 
most important moments of financial regulatory reform. In addition, these moments 
match the ANOV A models with balanced cells that are tested. 
5.3.1. -A FIXED EFFECTS ANOVA MODEL WITH TWO 
FACTORS: "TIME" AND "BANKS", WHERE THE FACTOR 
"TIME" HAS TWO LEVELS, 1986-1991 AND 1992-1997 
The Analysis of Variance carried out in this section considers a fixed effects model 
with two factors, time and banks, and aims at testing the hypothesis that average 
banking profitability is significantly higher after financial regulatory reform in 
Portugal. 
The factor time has two levels: i=l and i=2. Thus, in a table of double entry, the 
factor "line" is 1=2. 
The factor bank has 24 levels: j= 1 ...... 24. Thus, in a table of double entry, the 
factor column is J=24. 
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The first level of time, which is "i = 1 ", relates to the period before financial 
liberalisation, that is from the first half of 1986 until the second half of 1991. The 
second level of time, which is "i=2", refers to the period after financial liberalisation, 
that is from the first half of 1992 until the second half of 1997. The year of 1992 has 
been chosen because, as has been explained in the previous section, the most 
significant regulatory changes occurred during this period such as: 
The minimum level of 8% for the solvency ratio was enforced in 1992. 
Credit ceilings were definitively abandoned in 1991. 
Full capital movements' liberalisation became effective in 1992. 
Interest rates on deposits were liberalised in 1992 
Barriers to entry were finally abolished in January 1993 
The sample of banks consists of the same 24 banks that were considered when the 
regression of each banking profitability measure on time was estimated in section 
5.2 .. These were the banks operating in the banking market over all the period and 
for which data are available (table 5.3.). 
Table 5.3.- -Sample of Banks/or the ANOVA MODELS 
BBV-Banco Bilbao Viscaya (Lloyds Bank until 1990) 
BBI·Banco Borges &Irmao 
BCA·Banco Comercial dos A~ores 
BCP·Banco Comercial Portugues 
BFE·Banco de Fomento & Exterior 
B.Brasil·Banco do Brasil 
BCI·Banco Comercio e Industria 
BES·Banco Espirito Santo 
BFB·Banco Fonsecas & Burnay 
BIC·Banco Internacional de Credito 
BPSM·Banco Pinto & Sotto M~or 
BPl·Banco Portugues de Investimentos 
BPA·Banco Portugues do Atlintico 
BTA·Banco Totta & Acores 
BNP·BanQue Nationale de Paris 
Barclays·Barclays Bank 
CGD·Caixa Geral de Dep6sitos 
Citi·Citibank 
CL·Credit Lyonnais 
CPP·C-6dito Predial Portugues 
Generate B.·Generate Bank 
Chemical-Banco Chemical (Manufacturers until 1992) 
MG·Montepio Geral 
B.Mello-Banco MelJo (Unilo de Bancos Portugyeses until 19961 
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5.3.1.1.- MODEL SPECIFICATION 
With semi-annual information on profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E., the model 122 is 
designed with forty-eight cells with twelve observations in each cell (K=12), 
totalling 576 observations concerning profits, and the same number of observations 
in respect of R.O.A. and R.O.E.The functional relation between each observation and 
the factors that affects its behaviour has the following form: 
X 'Ik = f..l + a , + f3 1 + r" + E '1 
Where: 
Xijk - observation "k" in cell (ij) 
J.l - global parameter 
o,i - factor time's effect on profitability 
J3j - factor bank's effect on profitability 
Yij - interaction 
Eij - disturbance in ,;ell(ij) 
5.3.1.2 -HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
5.3.1.2.1.- Test/or interaction between/actors: 
Ho: Yij = 0 (for all "i" and all "j") 
HI: some Yij '# 0 
" F "- ratio MS of interactio n = --------- ~ F(/_,)*(J-').(I*J )*(K -I) 
MS of residuals 
122 In reality three models are tested: one for profits as the response variable, one for R.OA. as the 
variable whose behaviour is explained, and a third model for the banking profitability measure R.O.E. 
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Where "MS" is the "Mean Square" that equals the "Sum of Squares"(SS) divided by 
the correspondent degrees of freedom. 
5.3.1.2.2.- To test if the effects "time", aj , is significantly different from zero, the 
structure of the ANOVA test is asfollows: 
Ho: (Xi = 0 (for all "i") 
HI: some (Xj:t:. 0 
" F "- ratio = 
MS of factor tim e 
MS of the residuals 
Where "MS" is defined as above. 
~ F (/ I). (/'.1)' (K I) 
5.3.1.2.3.- Testfor the significance of the factor "banks" on average profitability: 
Ho: ~j = 0 (for all "i") 
HI: some ~i:t:. 0 
" F "- ratio 
MS of factor bank 
= ----------- ~ F(J-l),('*J )*(K -I) MS of the residuals 
Where "MS" is defined as above. 
The descriptive statistics of this ANOV A model and the analysis of variance tables 
for "profits", "R.O.A." and "R.OE" follows. 
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TABLE54 D S . - escrtptlve tatistlcs. ANOVA-Two-Factor with replication 
SUMMARY PROFITS(millions escudos) R.O.A (%) R.O.E.(%) 
TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
First Period: 
June 86 to December 91 
Count 288 288 288 
Sum 438997 220.0918 2668.523 
Average 1524.295 0.764208 9.265704 
Variance 9751509 0.738259 148.4849 
Standard Deviation 3123 0.85922 12.185 
Second Period: 
June 92 to December 97 
Count 288 288 288 
Sum 991141 56.25581 \083.162 
Average 3441.462 0.195333 3.760981 
Variance 41401846 1.378959 52.34554 
Standard Deviation 6434 1.1743 7.2350 
TABLE 5.5. - Profits. ANOVA TABLE: Two-Factor with replication 
Source of Sum of Of Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
Variation Squares Square 
Time 5.29E+08 1 5.29E+08 68.06381 1.27E-15 3.859128 
Banks 8.8E+09 23 3.82E+08 49.17853 2.7E-115 1.549761 
Interaction 1.78E+09 23 77370226 9.949652 5.68E-29 1.549761 
Residual 4.11E+09 528 7776174 
Total l.52E+I0 575 
TA LE 5 6 R OA ANOVA TABLE T Fi 'h r B - . · wo- actor Wit repj IcatlOn . . . 
· 
Source of Sum of Df Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
Variation Squares Sauare 
Time 46.6<H13 1 46.60113 62.87532 1.32E-14 3.859128 
Banks 97.07551 23 4.220674 5.694632 5.62E-15 1.549761 
Interaction 119.2296 23 5.183896 6.994232 2.42E-19 1.549761 
Residual 391.3363 528 0.741167 
Total 654.2425 575 
TABLE j 7 ROE ANOVA TABLE T Fi 'h f 
- · 
wo- actor Wit rep, IcatlOn . . . . 
· 
Source of Sum of Df Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
Variation Squares Square 
Time 4363.485 1 4363.485 59.18685 7.08E-14 3.859128 
Banks 11888.43 23 516.8884 7.011139 2.13E-19 1.549761 
Interaction 6852.38 23 297.9296 4.041154 2.02E-09 1.549761 
Residual 38926.21 528 73.72389 
Total 62030.51 575 
The above ANOV A Tables decompose the variability of profits, R.O.A and R.O.E 
into contributions due to two factors: "time" and "banks". The contribution of each 
factor is measured having removed the effects of all the other factors. 
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5.3.1 .3. - THE RESULTS 
Some empirical facts resulting from the analysis of descriptive statistics (table 5.4) 
are enlightening. This analysis focuses its attention on averages, and on the volatility 
of the banking profitability measures: profits, R.O.A. and RO.E .. It can be stated that 
average profits rose from 1 524 millions of escudos to 3 441 millions of escudos, 
after the most important new regulatory rules were implemented. but that they also 
became more volatile. Average R.O.A. and average R.O.E. decreased between the 
same period, from 0.76% to 0.20% and from 9.27% to 3.76% respectively. 
Nevertheless, while R.O.A. became more volatile, RO.E. was less volatile from 
1992 to 1997 than from 1986 to 1991. 
Three tests have been performed to test whether average banking profitability was 
significantly different between the two periods that are considered. The first test 
concerns the significance of financial regulatory reform on average profits, whose 
results are shown in the ANOVA Table 5.5. The ANOVA Table 5.6 depicts the 
significance of the effect of the financial regulatory changes on average RO.A. and, 
finally, the ANOVA Table 5.7 conducts the same analysis having RO.E. as the 
response variable. 
These ANOVA models are models with interaction, where the effects "time" and 
"banks" are statistically significant in explaining the behaviour of average profits, 
RO.A. and R.O.E., at a level of significance of 5%, as we proceed to explain. 
Assuming normality of the disturbances, both tests performed emphasise the 
statistical significance of "time" on average profitability in the Portuguese Banking 
System. Therefore average profitability was significantly different, before and after 
the more important changes of financial regulatory reform. Yet, following the 
changes in financial rules, the behaviour of average profits was different from the 
behaviour of both the average RO.A. and the average RO.E .. 
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We will look first at the ANOVA model concerning the behaviour of average profits, 
and then draw some conclusions from the Analysis of Variance when the response 
variable is the behaviour of R.O.A. and R.OE. 
Following the ANOVA Table 5.5, we have an ANOVA model with interaction and, 
at a level of significance of 5%, the null hypothesis for both factor "time" and 
"banks" is rejected. Hence factors "time" and "banks,,123 affect significantly the 
behaviour of average profits with a level of confidence of 95%. Therefore, on 
average, profits in the Portuguese Banking System have increased by, I 917 millions 
of escudos from the first to the second period of this analysis (table 5.4). The 
ANOV A results (table 5.5) prove that this difference is statistically significant. The 
very low level for the "p-value" reinforces our confidence in the statistical 
significance of the results obtained from the analysis of variance. 
Analysis of Variance results for average RO.A. and RO.E. are shown in tables 5.6 
and 5.7, respectively. Both factors "time" and "banks" are statistically significant in 
explaining R.OA. and RO.E. behaviour. As a result, it can be stated that, with a level 
of significance of 5%, average RO.A. have decreased by 0.57% while RO.E. have 
decreased by 5.5.% between 1986-1991 and 1992-1997 (table 5.4). 
It can, therefore, be argued that, when compared with average profits behaviour, 
average R.O.A. and average RO.E. moved in the opposite direction with financial 
regulatory reform. The disinflationary process that began in Portugal in the early 
1990's explains this movement (table 5.8). 
Table 5.8 -Portuguese Inflation Rate (1 985-1997) 
1985 19.60% 
1986 11.80% 
1987 9.30% 
1988 9.70% 
1989 12.60% 
1990 13.40% 
1991 11.40% 
1992 8.90% 
1993 6.50% 
1994 5.20% 
1995 4.10% 
1996 3.10% 
1997 2.20% 
Source:Banco de Portugal 
123 As the effect of factor "banks" is not the core subject of this analysis, the study will not pursue this 
approach. Nevertheless the ANOVA models allows the conclusions about which bank (or group of 
banks) are statistically significant in explaining average profitability. 
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With decreasing inflation rates, along with the need to balance the corresponding 
squeeze in net interest margins, banks were forced to increase their assets more than 
proportionally to the growth of profits in order to mantain the levels of these profits. 
On the other hand, the behaviour of average R.O.A. and R.O.E. provides evidence 
that the growth of off-balance sheet transactions, experienced in the Portuguese 
Banking System during the second period, and feeding net income with 
commissions, has not been sufficient to maintain the levels of R.O.A. and R.O.E .. 
In conclusion, analysis of variance applied to the performance of the Banking System 
in Portugal reinforces the argument presented by Hoggarth et al. (1998) that more 
liberalised financial markets induce higher but more variable level of banking profits. 
But the current study also allows the conclusion that profitability measured by 
R.O.A. and R.O.E. is lower after liberalisation, despite the fact that R.O.E. becomes 
more stable. On the other hand, the tests performed on average profitability in the 
Portuguese Banking System weaken Gual and Neven's (1992) suggestion that, with 
deregulation in the European Community, profits have fallen. 
The next step is to test a fixed effects ANOVA model with the same two factors, 
"time" and "banks", but assigning to the factor "time" three levels. The objective is 
to account for the effect on banking profitability of lowering fences and of the 
progressive abolishment of barriers to entry in the Portuguese Banking market. 
5.3.2. - A FIXED EFFECTS ANOVA MODEL WITH TWO 
FACTORS: "BANKS" WITH 24 LEVELS AND "TIME" WITH 
THREE LEVELS: 1986-1989, 1990-1993 AND 1994-1997 
5.3.2.1.-THE FACTOR TIME AND THE ABOLISHMENT OF 
BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN THE BANKING MARKET 
In this second ANOV A Model, time is split in three levels, while the same 24 banks 
of the previous model are used in the sample. Thus the study refers to an ANOV A 
Model with two factors, "time" and "banks", "time" having 3 levels and "banks" 24 
levels. The object of this study is to analyse the effect on banking profitability 
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behaviour, resulting from lowering fences and from the progressive abolishment of 
barriers to entry in the Portuguese Banking market. To account for the effect of 
lifting barriers to entry, three distinct periods are assigned to the factor time. The first 
period is from the first half of 1986 until the second half of 1989, the second from 
the first half of 1990 until the second half of 1993, and the last from the first half of 
1994 until the second half of 1997. The reason for this division is to be found in the 
following facts, that add the treatment of barriers to entry to the already mentioned 
more important changes in regulatory rules: 
a) Until 1988, banks were required by the government to open a branch in a less 
desirable region for each request to open a branch in a desirable one. 
b) In September 1988, the maximum interest rate on credit operations was lifted. 
c) The re-privatisation programme in the banking system began in 1989. 
d) From 1989 onwards, the compulsory acquisition of bad loans from state owned 
banks as a legal requirement for new banks to enter the market was abolished. 
e) From 1989 onwards, banks were no longer required to form joint venture capital 
firms if they wanted to enter into the banking market. 
f) The minimum level of 8% for the solvency ratio was enforced in 1992. 
g) Credit ceilings w~re definitely abandoned by the end of 1991. 
h) The liberalisation of full capital movements became effective in 1992. 
i) Interest rates on deposits were liberalised in 1992 
j) Barriers to entry were definitely abolished in January 1993 
Hence, the ANOV A Model herein developed has 72 cells with 8 observations in each 
cell, totalling the same 576 observations from the previous ANOV A Model. This 
structure of the model is applied separately to both the behaviour of profits, the 
behaviour of R.O.A. and the behaviour of R.OE. As in section 5.3.1., this design of 
the model allows the matching of the decisive steps in financial regulatory reform 
with a balanced ANOV A Model, that is, a model with the same number of 
observations per cell. 
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5.3.2.2.-METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 
TWO FIXED EFFECTS ANOV A MODELS 
Comparing this model specification and the resulting hypothesis testing, with the 
ANOVA Model studied in the previous section, there are a few differences to be 
considered. Switching from one model, where "time" has two levels, to another 
where the factor "time" has three levels, the model specification is the same. The 
hypothesis tests for the significance of the main effects, "time" and "banks", and for 
interaction is also the same, except in what concerns the number of degrees of 
freedom in the statistic of each test. This is so because, now, the factor "line" is 1=3 
and the number of observations per cell is K=8. 
These differences are summarised as follows: 
Test for interaction between factors: 
The "F-ratio" under the null hypothesis follows an "F" distribution with 46 and 504 
degrees of freedom. This is, (1-1)*(1-1) d.f. in the numerator and (I*l)*(K-I) in the 
denominator. 
Test for the statistical significance of the effect "time": 
The "F-ratio" under the null hypothesis follows an "F" distribution with 2 and 504 
degrees of freedom. This is, (I-I) d.f. in the numerator and (1* J)*(K-I) dJ. in the 
denominator. 
Test for the statistical significance of the factor "banks": 
The statistic of the test, that is the "F-ratio", under the null hypothesis follows an "F" 
distribution with 23 and 504 degrees of freedom. This is, (1-1) d.f. in the numerator 
and (I*J)*(K-l) d.f. in the denominator. 
Another difference lies in the method to test whether the means are statistically 
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different between each level of time. In the ANOVA Model where "time" has two 
levels, once the statistical significance of time on the explanation of average 
profitability behaviour is tested (tables 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7), it is enough to look at each 
one of the two means and compute the difference between them. Now, with an 
ANOV A Model where the factor "time" has more than two levels, multiple range 
tests must be performed using the joint definition of confidence intervals by the 
Tukey Method, whose explanation follows. 
Joint Definition of Confidence Intervals by the Tukey Method 
The confidence intervals' limits for (J.l i I. - J.l i 2 .), with "; I .:f:. ; 2.'" and where (J.l i I 
• - J.l i 2 .) is the difference between the expected values of lines. at the level of 
confidence of (1 - a.)* 100% are given by: 
(x it. - X i
2
• )± q I,DJ (a )* .J RMS I J * K 
Where: 
"I" is the number of lines, that is the number of levels of factor "time" 
"J" is the number of columns, that is the number of levels of the factor "banks" 
"K" is the number 0: observations per cell, 
"RMS" is the Residual Mean Square (which equals the Residual Sum of Squares 
divided by the correspondent degrees of freedom) 
"a." is the level of significance, and 
"Of' is the number of Degrees of freedom that equals "1* l*(K-I)", and 
q I. DJ (a ) - is a tabulated factor 
The study of the current two factors ANOVA Model is pursued through several 
approaches. The study begins with some findings related with descriptive statistics 
(table 5.9), followed by the analysis of the ANOVA TABLES (tables 5.10, 5.11 and 
5.12) from which some conclusions can be drawn related to the statistical 
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significance on profitability behaviour of both factors "time" and "banks". Finally, 
the multiple range tests based on the Tukey Method provide information on the 
means that are statistically different between the three periods of time that are 
considered (tables 5.13,5.14, and 5.15). 
TABLE 5.9 - Descriptive Statistics. ANOVA-Two-Factor with replication (time 
with three levels) 
SUMMARY PROFITS(millions R.O.A (%) R.O.E.(%) 
escudos) TOTAL TOTAL 
TOTAL 
First Period: 
June 86 to December 89 
Count 192 192 192 
Sum 192235 143.4453 1843.706 
Average 1001.224 0.747111 9.602634 
Variance 4956903 0.714844 200.9484 
Standard Deviation 2226.41 0.8454845 14.175627 
Second Period: 
June 90 to December 93 
Count 192 192 192 
Sum 563614 118.7237 1274.132 
Average 2935.49 0.618353 6.636103 
Variance 23734773 0.674467 36.2859 
Standard Deviation 4871.83 0.8212594 6.023777 
Third period: 
June94 to December1997 
Count 192 192 192 
Sum 674289 14.17863 633.8477 
Average 3511.922 0.073847 3.30129 
Variance 47466147 1.779255 67.55268 
Standard Deviation 6889.57 1.3338872 8.2190 
TABLE 5.l0-Profits. ANOVA TABLE: Two-Factor with replication (time with 
three levels) 
Source of Sum of Df Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
Variation Squares S~uare 
Main effects 
Time 6.64E+08 2 3.32E+08 47.31092 1.48E-19 3.013611 
Banks 8.8E+09 23 3.82E+08 54.48415 l.lE-120 1.550738 
Interactions 
TimelBanks 2.21E+09 46 48107005 6.853888 9.37E-31 1.391189 
Residual 3.54E+09 504 7018937 
Total 1.52E+I0 575 
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TABLE 5.11-R.O.A.ANOVA TABLE: Two-Factor with replication (time with 
three levels) 
Source of Sum of Of Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
Variation Squares Square 
Main effects 
Time 49.04636 2 24.52318 35.31353 4.44E-15 3.013611 
Banks 97.07551 23 4.220674 6.077797 3.59E-16 1.550738 
Interactions 
Time/Banks 158.1222 46 3.437438 4.949932 2.2E-20 1.391189 
Residual 349.9985 504 0.694441 
Total 654.2425 575 
TABLE 5.12 - R.O.E. ANOVA TABLE: Two-Factor with replication (time with 
three levels) 
Source of Sum of Of Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
Variation Squares Square 
Main effects 
Time 3816.260 2 1908.103 30.18658 4.15E-\3 3.013611 
Banks 11888.43 23 516.8884 8.177282 4.4IE-23 1.550738 
Interactions 
Time/Banks 14467.88 46 314.5192 4.975758 1.58E-20 1.391189 
Residual 31857.99 504 63.2103 
Total 575 
TABLE 5.13 - Multiple Range Testsfor Profits by Time. Method of Tukey (level of 
confidence: 95%) 
Time ~ LSMean 
1 192 1001.19 
2 192 2971.13 
3 192 3511.92 
Contrgst Di[ference +/-/imits 
1-2 *- 1969.93 773.55 
1-3 *- 2510.73 773.55 
2-3 - 540.797 773.55 
*denotes a statistIcally sigmficant dIfference 
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TABLE 5.14 - Multiple Range Tests for R.O.A. by Time. Method of Tukey (level of 
confidence: 95%) 
Time Count LSMean 
1 192 0.747187 
2 192 0.618021 
3 192 0.0735417 
Contrast Di{ference +I-Iimlts 
1-2 0.129167 0.230503 
1-3 *0.673646 0.230503 
2-3 *0.544479 0.230503 
*denotes a statistically significant difference 
TABLE 5.15 -Multiple Range Testsfor R.O.E. by Time. Method of Tukey (level of 
confidence: 95%) 
Time Count LSMean 
I 192 9.60255 
2 192 6.63562 
3 192 3.30129 
Contrast Di(ference +/-lImlt 
1-2 *2.96693 2.20117 
1-3 *6.3013 2.20117 
2-3 *3.33437 2.20117 
.. 
*denotes a statistically significant difference 
5.3.2.3.- THE RESULTS 
While several barriers to entry were dismantled together with the implementation of 
the most important new financial regulatory rules, the descriptive statistics shown in 
table 5.9 allow us to reach some conclusions regarding the empirical facts of 
profitability behaviour in the Portuguese Banking System. 
In this context, average profits grew in the course of financial regulatory reform, but 
this growth was followed by higher volatility as well. This result reinforces the 
findings of the ANOV A Model where the factor "time" had only two levels. This 
conclusion is contrary to Gual and Neven' s suggestion that, with liberalisation, 
profits have decreased. At the same time, Hogarth et aI's statement that more 
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liberalised markets produce higher but more volatile profits IS, once more, 
reinforced. 
On the other hand, average profitability behaviour measured by R.O.A. and R.O.E. 
exhibits an opposite trend with both the R.O.A. and the R.O.E decreasing with the 
market's liberalisation. R.O.E. steady decreased from the period 1986 to 1989 to the 
period 1990 to 1993, and from the latter to the period 1994 to 1997. It is worth 
mentioning that average R.O.A. dropped abruptly from the period 1990 to 1993 to 
the period 1994 to 1997, that is when the market was completely liberalised. This fall 
went along with a substantial increase in R.O.A. volatility, which may suggest 
increasing difficulty management strategies to cope with the new financial regulatory 
environment. Another interesting result lies in the fact that, what seemed to be a 
positive behaviour in terms of R.O.E.'s volatility l24 turns out to be a more realistic 
result when barriers to entry abolishment are included in this study. In reality, 
R.O.E. 's volatility remarkably decreased during the period 199011993 and only 
suffered a slightly improvement after 1994. 
Assuming that the disturbances of the model are independent and normally 
distributed, findings from ANOVA TABLES 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 are in line with the 
conclusions of the analysis of variance previously carried out when to the factor 
"time" was assigned only two levels. Because the .oF-RATIOS" are greater than the 
"F" critical value in all the above-mentioned tables (together with very low 
probability values), it can be stated that both the factors "time" and "banks" are 
statistically significant to explain average profitability behaviour, at the 1 % level of 
significance. 
Finally, tables 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15, apply a multiple comparison procedure to 
determine which means are significantly different from which others. As already 
mentioned, when the Tukey Method is followed, the bottom half of the output shows 
the estimated difference between each pair of means. 
Following table 5.13, where multiple range tests for profits by time are evidenced, it 
124 As it is demonstrated by table S.2 and by the corresponding analysis carried out on page 102. 
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can be stated that the pairs of means 1 and 2 and 1 and 3 show statistically significant 
differences at the 95.0% confidence level 12S . Because the sign of the difference is 
negative, it can be stated as well that average profitability increased from period I to 
period 2, and from period 1 to period 3, which reinforces the descriptive analysis. It 
must be added that, according to the Tukey Method, there are no statistically 
significant differences between average profits in period 2 and 3. 
The analysis of table 5.14, representing multiple range tests for R.O.A. by time, 
allows the conclusion that the differences between the pairs of means referring to 
periods 1 and 3 and 2 and 3 are statistically significant at the 95.0% level of 
confidence. Because the sign of difference is positive, it means that average RO.A. 
have decreased from period I to period 3 and from period 2 to period 3. This is in 
accordance with table 5.9. Table 5.14 also shows that there are no statistically 
significant differences in average RO.A. between periods I and 2. 
Finally, following the study of the statistically significant differences between 
averages RO.E. in each pair of time depicted in table 5.15, it can be stated, at the 
95.0% level of confidence, that average R.O.E. is statistical significantly different 
from period 1 to period 2, from period 1 to period 3, and from period 2 to period 3. 
As above, the positive sign of the difference means that average R.O.E. IS 
significantly decreasing. Once more, the multiple range tests analysis is In 
accordance with conclusions drawn from table 5.9. 
In conclusion, Multifactor Anova Models have been chosen in this chapter because 
they are an accurate method to study the effect of a factor on the average behaviour 
of a response variable, which in the current study is average profitability measured 
by profits, by R.O.A. and by R.O.E .. 
The above analysis of variance assumes that the models' disturbances follow a 
normal distribution with mean zero and constant variance. This is a crucial 
assumption in building the confidence intervals that enclose the true value of each 
mean. The study developed in the next section refers to testing whether or not a 
mWith this method, there is a 5% risk of calling one or more pairs of means significantly different 
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normal distribution fits the stochastic term of each model. After performing a 
residual plot, it will be applied a non parametric test, the Kolgomorov-Smimov test 
for the goodness of fit for residuals in each model. The objective is to test whether 
the assumption of normality underlying the analysis of variance holds, that is, is not 
violated by the data. 
5.3.3. - TESTING FOR THE NORMALITY OF THE RESIDUALS IN 
THE ANOV A MODELS. 
One of the assumptions underlying the Analysis of Variance is that the residuals 
follow a normal distribution with mean zero and constant variance. In this section, a 
test is performed to confirm that the assumption of normality of the disturbances 
holds. The test is the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smimov the aim of which is to 
test the goodness-of-fit of a normal distribution fitted to the residuals of the ANOV A 
Models developed in this chapter. As explained earlier in the current chapter, the 
Kolmogorov-Smimov (K-S) is a procedure that allows testing the overall goodness-
of-fit between the distribution of the data and the assumption of normality of the 
disturbance terms that underlies this study. The test calculates the maximum vertical 
distance between the cumulative distribution function of the two samples (the data 
sample and the sample with a theoretical normal distribution). If this distance is large 
enough, the hypothesis that the two samples come from the same distribution, that is 
that residuals follow a normal distribution, is rejected. 
A plot of each sample's residuals is shown in figures 5.4 to 5.9. In these figures the 
presence of outliers is obvious. These outliers may be the reason for rejecting the null 
hypothesis of residuals normally distributed. 
when their actual difference equals zero. 
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Figure 5.4.- Residual Plot - Multifactor ANOVA MOD L for Profit . Time 
with two levels 
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Figure 5.5.- Residuals Plot - Multifactor ANOVA MODEL for R.O.A .. Time 
with two levels 
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Figure 5.6.- Residuals Plot - Multifactor ANOV A MODEL for R.O.E .. Time 
with two levels 
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Figure 5.7.- Residuals Plot - Multifactor ANOVA MODEL for Profit. Time 
with three levels 
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Figure 5.8.- Residual Plot - Multifactor ANOVA MODEL for R.O.A .. Time 
with three levels 
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Figure 5.9.- Re iduals Plot - Multifactor ANOV A MODEL for R.O. .. Time 
with three level 
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Formalisation of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test follows: 
The objective of this test is to investigate the significance of the difference between 
an observed distribution and a specified population distribution 126, the normal 
distribution in the current study. 
The method consists of determining the cumulative distribution Sn(x) from the 
sample. and in plotting it as a step function. The cumulative distribution F(x) of the 
assumed population is also plotted on the same diagram. 
The maximum difference between these two distributions: 
D= I F-Sn I, 
provides the test static and this is compared with the value D(a) which is tabulated, 
and the source of the table is Massey (1951) 127 
If D> D( a) the null hypothesis that the sample came from the assumed population is 
rejected. 
Results of the K-S test applied to the ANOV A Models described in this chapter are 
shown in tables 5.16 and 5.17, for the first ANOVA Model with Two Factors where 
time has two levels and for the second ANOV A Model with Two Factors where time 
has three levels, respectively. 
Table 5.16- The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. Multi/actor Anova Model with two 
l!!ctors, where time has two levels 
Estimated mean of the residuals 
Estimated standard deviation 
residuals 
Kolmolloron-Smirnov Test 
Estimated Kolmogorov statistic 
DPLUS 
Estimated Kolmogorv statistic 
DMINUS 
Estimated overall statistic DN 
Approximate p-value 
126 Kanji, Gopal K. (1994), p.67. 
127 Kanji, Gopal K. (1994), p.186. 
0 
PROFITS R.O.A. 
-0.000216493 1.4276E-10 
2672.51 0.00825098 
0.203066 0.195834 
0.193005 0.205219 
0.203066 0.205219 
0.0 0.0 
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R.O.E 
-5.42569E-09 
0.0822786 
0.132911 
0.160658 
0.160658 
0.0 
Table 5.17 - The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. Multi/actor Anova Model with two 
factors, where time has three levels 
PROFITS R.O.A. R.O.E 
Estimated mean of the residuals 0.000799337 5.40278E-8 9.94568E-7 
Estimated standard deviation 0 3154.32 0.939925 8.97576 
residuals 
Kolmo[1oron-Smirnov Test 
Estimated Kolmogorov statistic 0.153564 0.170716 0.143231 
DPLUS 
Estimated Kolmogorv statistic 0.167013 0.177374 0.145146 
DMINUS 
Estimated overall statistic DN 0.167013 0.177374 0.145146 
Approximate p-value 0.0 0.0 0.0 
In conclusion, the above tables show the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test run 
to determine whether residuals, in each ANOVA study, can be adequately modelled 
by a normal distribution. Because the "p-value" for these tests is less than 0.0 I 
(which means that D>D(O,OI », the idea that residuals come from a normal 
distribution can be rejected with 99% confidence. The results of these goodness-of-
fit tests mean that the assumption underlying the analysis of variance is violated by 
the data. 
As mentioned above, the reason for these results may lie in the presence of outliers, 
so common in financial data. 
One way to overcome the conclusions from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is to apply 
a random number generation function, which aims at randomly chosen observations 
of profitability in each cell of the ANOV A Models. However, even choosing at 
random two observations per cell, the hypothesis of normality of the disturbances is 
still rejected. 
Despite this, several arguments in favour of the ANOV A Models developed in this 
chapter are presented: 
a) The method developed in this chapter 5 gives its contribution to the stylised facts 
for a Theory of Regulation for the Banking System, which is one of the 
contributions of this research. These stylised facts can be found in the analysis 
pursued from section 5.3.1. to section 5.3.2.2. 
b) The study is carried out assuming the normality of the residuals. This procedure 
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is methodological correct when modelling in economICS, provided that the 
models' results are always interpreted with the assumptions in mind. 
c) No one has so far modelled and empirically tested how profitability behaves in 
the course of financial regulatory reform. Thus, the current research is an attempt 
to find the best methodology for doing it. 
d) Both Multifactor ANOVA Models herein developed can give path and open 
ground to further research applied to different realities. That is, the analysis 
allows us to study the level and behaviour of banking profitability in different 
banking systems experiencing reforms in financial regulation. 
e) Even with residuals that are not normally distributed, both the descriptive 
statistics and the "F" statistics still hold. One of the objectives of this study is to 
give its contribution to the stylised facts of a Theory of Regulation for the 
Banking System. 
Since the introduction of the factor "banks", which had the purpose of enriching the 
analysis of section 5.2. where only time was considered in a linear regression 
adjustment, and since this approach poses the problem of non-normality on the 
disturbances distribution, a final approach will be considered in this chapter 5. 
The final approach in this chapter consists of running a One Way ANOVA Model 
where the factor is "time", divided into three levels. Once more, this model aims at 
analysing how average profitability varies (or not) in the course of financial 
regulatory reform in the Portuguese Banking System. In the model that follows, if the 
non-normality of the stochastic term distribution persists, assuming that this 
phenomenon comes from the existence of outliers, the problem will be overcome by 
choosing the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test. 
5.4. - A FIXED EFFECTS ANOVA MODEL WITH ONE FACTOR: 
"TIME" 
In this section a comparison between the means of three samples is pursued. Each 
sample consists of profitability behaviour in three distinct periods: ] 986-1988, 1989-
1992 and 1993-1997. And profitability is measured by profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E .. 
128 
The banks whose profitability behaviour is studied remains the same 24 banks, and 
the reasons for time cut-off are those explained for the ANOVA Model, with two 
factors having time three levels. 
The reason for the adjustment on the limits in the range of time when compared with 
the whole analysis carried out in the current chapter is twofold: 
First, a One Way Analysis of Variance does not required balanced cells, as is the 
case with the previous ANOV A models. Therefore the number of observations varies 
from sample to sample. The model is estimated with 144 observations in the first 
period, 192 observations in the second period and 240 observations in the third 
period. Second, with an even number of observations per sample, the division of time 
in this model coincide with the division of time applied in the succeeding chapter. In 
chapter 6, where the statistical significance of regulation on banking profitability is 
estimated, regulation is treated as a qualitative variable and assumes three classes, 
each one corresponding to the periods herein considered. 
The objective of this model remains the same: to test the assumption that profitability 
has increased with regulatory reform. This new approach has the advantage, as will 
be demonstrated, of overcoming the problem of sample disturbances that, in the 
event, do not follo~ a normal distribution. The disadvantage lies in the fact that the 
current model is based only on one factor "time". Thus, the influence of banks on 
average profitability is absent, which does not invalidate the analysis since what is 
under research is profitability behaviour over time. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that the weakness of the absence of the factor "banks" is mitigated in the 
next chapter where bank-specific explanatory variables are introduced to estimate 
banking profitability behaviour. 
Considering the factor time alone, the study proceeds with the explanation of the 
model specification followed by the correspondent hypothesis testing. Next, the 
multiple range tests ~o be conducted with samples of different sizes are explained. In 
fact, the Scheffe Method, to analyse whether the means from different samples are 
statistically different, is used instead of the Tukey Method employed earlier. This 
section ends with the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test that follows both the 
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analysis of the results and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the normality of the 
residuals. 
5.4.1. - MODEL SPECIFICATION 
When the purpose is to test whether the means from different samples (or groups) are 
statistically different the model has the following specification: 
Xij = Ili +Eij = Il + ai + Eij 
With: Eij - IN (0, cr2) 
Where: 
- "i" is the index related to the group of observations (the sample) where profitability 
is studied, in the model of this analysis "i" = 1 ,2,3. 
- "j" is the index related to a specific observation within each group, in the model of 
this analysis "j" = 1,2,3, ..... ,1 (where 1 = 144 for the first group of observations, J = 
192 for the second group of observations and 1 = 240 for the third group of 
observations). 
- "Xij " is observation ''j'' in the "i" group. 
- "Ilt is the expected value of group "i" of observations. 
- "Il" is a fixed global parameter 
- "at is a parameter that describes the effect of group "i". 
The model just described is called a Fixed Effects ANOV A Model with one factor 
since it allows to distinguish observations from one group to the other. 
5.4.2. - HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
What the model intends on the one hand is to estimate the expected value "1..It, that 
is average profitability in each group (sample). On the other hand, the model aims at 
testing whether expected values associated with each group are significantly different 
among them. 
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The fundamental test of this analysis of variance IS specified by the following 
assumptions: 
Ho : J.11 = J.12 = J.13 = J.1 
time effect) 
HI: Not all J.1i are equal 
effect) 
The test statistic is: 
(which is equivalent to: al = U2 = a3 = 0 , there is no 
(which is equivalent to some U 1 ":t: 0 , there is a time 
"F" - Ratio" which is a ratio of the between-group estimate to the within group 
estimate. Under the null hypothesis the test has an "F" distribution with (1-1), and 
, ( ~ J i ) - 1 'degrees of freedom. 
The between-group estimate is given by the variation explained by the difference 
between the means, divided by the correspondent degrees of freedom (the mean 
square between groups), this is: 
L J; * (X; -X Y 
; 
I-I 
The within-group estimate is given by the residual variation (non-explained 
variation), divided by the correspondent degrees of freedom (the mean square within 
groups), this is: 
~ ~ (x lj - ~y 
, J 
(~ J,)-I 
5.4.3. -MULTIPLE RANGE TESTS 
When the dimensions of the samples corresponding to each group are different, the 
confidence intervals for the difference between means are defined by the Scheffe 
Method and have the following presentation: 
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(X, -X, )± J(I -1)*Fm DF (a)within - group estimate *(_1_ + _1_] I l I l J J 
'1 '1 
Where: 
The within-group estimate is defined as above. 
"I" is the number of groups. 
F OF I,OF2 (a) : F (I-I) , (l:Ji-l) (a) is a tabulated value. 
Findings from the ANOV A Model with one factor are shown in tables 5.18 to 5.21. 
that are related with descriptive statistics, ANOV A table for profits by time, 
ANOVA table for R.O.A. by time and ANOVA table for R.O.E. by time, 
respecti vel y. 
TABLE 5.18 - Descriptive Statistics. One Way Analysis of Variance: factor "time" 
with three levels 
SUMMARY PROFITS(millions R.O.A(%) R.O.E.(%) 
escudos) TOTAL TOTAL 
TOTAL 
First Period: 
June 86 to December 88 
Count 144 144 144 
Sum 119246 101.0375 1405.183 
Average 828.0972 0.701649 9.758213 
Variance 4348355 0.731339 257.9692 
Standard Deviation 2085.271 0.8551836 16.06142 
Second Period: 
June 89 to December 92 
Count 192 192 192 
Sum 475060 144.4914 1513.003 
Average 2474.271 0.752559 7.880225 
Variance 17720053 0.756992 38.53359 
Standard Deviation 4209.52 0.8700529 6.207543 
Third period: 
June 93 to December 97 
Count 240 240 240 
Sum 835832 30.81879 833.4995 
Average 3482.633 0.128412 3.472915 
Variance 44224820 1.481465 57.26974 
Standard Deviation 6650.1744 1.2171545 7.56767 
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TABLE 5.19 ANOVA TABLE/or Profits by Time:/actor "time" with three levels 
Source of Sum of Of Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
variation Squares Square 
Between 6.34E+08 2 3.17E+0 12.46575 5.02E-06 3.011451 
groups 8 
Within 1.46E+I0 573 2543818 
groups 0 
Total 1.52E+1O 575 
TABLE 5.20 -ANOVA TABLE/or ROA by Time:/actor "time" with three levels 
Source of Sum of Of Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
variation Squares Square 
Between 51.00531 2 25.50266 24.22434 7.96E-II 3.011451 
groups 
Within 603.2372 573 1.05277 
groups 
Total 654.2425 575 
TABLE 5.21-ANOVA TABLEfor ROE by Time:factor "time" with three levels 
Source of Sum of Of Mean F-ratio P-value F crit 
variation Squares Square 
Between 4093.537 2 2046.768 20.24266 3.2E-09 3.011451 
groups 
Within 57936.98 573 101.1117 
groups 
Total 62030.51 575 
5.4.4. - THE RESULTS 
The facts shown in !he descriptive statistics table (table 5.18), are very similar to the 
empirical conclusions drawn from the descriptive statistics table (table 5.9), where a 
two factor fixed effects ANOV A Model, with time with three levels, was under 
scrutiny. These facts can be summarised as follows: 
a) When profitability is measured by net profits, both the average profitability and 
the profitability volatility have increased in the course of financial regulatory 
reform. 
b) When profitability is measured by R.O.A., profitability decreases substantially 
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after liberalisation, that is after 1993, and this big drop on average R.O.A. is 
followed by a very substantial increase in volatility. 
c) Average profitability measured by R.O.E. steady decreases with financial 
regulatory reform, but, while its volatility diminishes until 1993, from this date 
onwards R.O.E. suffers a substantial increase in volatility. 
Assuming that the residuals of the model are independent, and that they follow a 
normal distribution, findings from the ANOV A tables for Profits by time (table 
5.19), for RO.A by time (table 5.20) and for R.O.E. by time (table 5.21) are that 
there is a statistically significant difference between the mean of profits, RO.A. and 
R.O.E. from one level of time to another at the 95 % confidence level. The 
explanation follows. 
Each ANOVA table decomposes the variance of the response variable into two 
components: a between-group component and a within component. The "F-Ratio" 
(which equals 12.46 for profits, 24.22 for RO.A. and 20.24 for RO.E.) is a ratio of 
the between-group estimate to the within-group estimate. Since the probability value 
of each .oF-test" is !ess than 0.05, the conclusion from this analysis is that average 
profitability is statistically significant from one level of time to another at the above-
mentioned 95% confidence level. Furthermore, because the "P-value" of each test is 
less than 0.01, the tests' level of confidence raises to 99%. 
To determine which means are significantly different from which others, the study 
follows multiple range tests, the results of which are shown in tables 5.22, 5.23 and 
5.24 for profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E., respectively. 
TABLE 5.22 - Multiple Range Tests/or Profits by Time. 
Method ~ Scheffe (level 0/ confidence: 95%1 
Time Count Mean 
1 144 828.097 
2 192 2511.78 
3 240 3481.13 
Contrast Difference +/-Ilmlts 
1-2 *- 1683.68 1361.78 
1-3 *- 2653.04 1302.11 
2-3 - 969.352 1196.07 
.. 
*denotes a statistically Significant difference 
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TABLE 5.23 -Multiple Range Testsfor R.D.A. by Time. Method ofSheffe (level 
ofconjidence:95%) 
Time Count Mean 
1 144 0.701597 
2 192 0.752396 
3 240 0.128125 
Contrast Di[ference +/ limits 
1-2 -0.0507986 0.276856 
1-3 ·0.573472 0.264725 
2-3 ·0.624271 0.243165 
*denotes a statistically significant difference 
TABLE 5.24 - Multiple Range Tests for R.D.E. by Time. Method of Sheffe (level 
ofconjidence:95%) 
Time Count Mean 
I 144 9.18576 
2 192 7.87984 
3 240 3.47279 
Contrast Difference +/ limits 
1-2 1.30592 2.71774 
1-3 *5.71297 2.59865 
2-3 *4.40705 2.38702 
.. 
*denotes a statistically significant difference 
The confidence intervals for the difference between the means are constructed with 
the Scheffe Method because the number of observations differs from one time-based 
group to another. 
In accordance with the results from tables 5.22 to 5.24, profitability behaviour in the 
course of financial regulatory reform in Portugal presents the following patterns: 
a) Average profits are statistically significantly different from 1986/1988 to 
1989/1992 and from 1986/1988 to 1993/1997. Because the difference has a 
negative sign, the analysis concludes that the growth on average profits is 
statistically significant. Furthermore, average profits between 1989/1992 and 
1993/1997 are not statistically different. These findings allow the conclusion 
that growth in average profits was greater at the beginning of the process of 
liberalisation. It is worth mentioning that these results are the same as those 
obtained in the Two Factor ANOVA Model (with time with three levels) 
estimated in section 5.3.2 .. 
b) Average R.O.A. is statistically significantly different from 1986/1988 to 
1993/1997 and from 1989/1992 to 1993/1997. Because the difference has a 
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positive sIgn, it means that average R.O.A. fell in the course of financial 
regulatory reform. Since average R.O.A. is not statistically significantly 
different from 1986/1988 to 198911992, it is possible to conclude that the drop 
in average R.O.A. is greater at the end of the process of liberalisation. Again, it 
is worth mentioning that these results are the same as those obtained in the Two 
Factor ANOVA Model (with time with three levels) estimated in section 5.3.2 .. 
c) The same pattern of behaviour is found on the study of average R.O.E .. That is, 
average R.O.E. is statistically significantly different from 198611988 to 
199311997 and from 1989/1992 to 1993/1997, the difference showing a positive 
sign. The confidence interval for the difference between the mean of R.O.E. in 
1989/1992 and in 1986/1988 includes the value 0 (zero). Thus, the respective 
means are not significantly different. Hence, although average R.O.E. did not 
experience any substantial changes in the beginning of the process of 
liberalisation in the Portuguese financial system, average R.O.E. dropped 
substantially when the market became liberalised, that is, after 1993. As proven 
in b) this is the case with R.OA. as well. 
5.4.5. - TESTING FOR THE NORMALITY OF RESIDUALS ON THE 
ONE WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE. THE KRUSKAL-
WALLIS TEST 
The non-parametric Kolmogorv-Smirnov test for the goodness of fitting a normal 
distribution to the residuals is performed in this section and its results are shown in 
table 5.25. 
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Table 5.25 - The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. One Way Analysis of Variance: factor 
"time" with three levels. 
Profits R.O.A. R.OE. 
Data Variable Residuals Residuals Residuals 
576 values ranging/rom -13957.1 to 57463.9 -15.2781 to 4.0676 -71.7028 to 98.6642 
Filled Normal Distribution: 
Mean 0.00220934 -2.57448E-7 0.00000205035 
Standard Deviation 5037.86 1.02422 10.0542 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: 
Estimated Kolmogorv statistic 0.249464 0.154681 0.148946 DPLUS 
Estimated Kolmogorv statistic 0.195502 0.193006 0.146417 DMINUS 
Estimated overall statistic DN 0.249464 0.193006 0.148946 
Approximate P-Value 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Table 5.25 shows the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test run to determine 
whether residuals can be adequately modelled by a normal distribution. In the case of 
Profits, the maximum distance between the cumulative distribution of residuals and 
the CDF of the fitted normal distribution is 0.249464, this maximum distance is 
0.193006 for R.O.A. and 0.148946 for R.O.E .. Because the "P-value" for each test is 
less than 0.01, the idea those residuals comes from a normal distribution is rejected 
with a level of confidence of 99%. 
Again, one possible reason128 for this conclusion is the presence of outliers so 
common in financiai data. 
In the presence of outliers, the procedure performed to compare the mean values of 
profits, R.O.A and R.OE. for the three different levels of time, is the Kruskal-Wallis 
non-parametric test, which compares medians instead of means l29• The Kruskal-
Wallis Test is a non-parametric method that tests the assumption that the medians of 
samples are equal. With observations arranged in order from smallest to largest, the 
sample median, or 50th percentile, is the number halfway between the smallest and 
the largest observation. The 50th percentile is a measure of the central tendency of the 
data. 
128 The same reason as the one expressed in section 5.3.3, p.123. 
129 Kanji. GopaJ K. (1994). p.89. 
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The Kruskal-WalIis method consists of the following procedure. The results of the 
three samples are combined and arranged in order of increasing size and given a rank 
number. In cases where equal results occur, the mean of the available rank numbers 
is used. The rank sum for each of the K, that is, three samples in the current study, is 
calculated. 
The test statistic is: 
H {
12 3 R 
* L J 
= -N-(-N--+-l-)- j = I n j } - 3 (N + I ) 
Where: 
- Rj is the rank sum of the jth sample, 
- nj is the size of the jth sample, and 
- N is the size of the combined sample. 
The test statistic follows a X2 distribution with (K-l) degrees of freedom, 2 degrees 
of freedom in the current research. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected 
when "H" exceeds the critical value that is tabulated, the source for this table is 
Neave (1978) 130. 
The results from the performance of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for profits by time, for 
R.O.A. by time and for R.O.E. by time are depicted in tables 5.26, 5.27, and 5.28 
respectively. 
Table 5.26.-Kruskal-Wallis TestjjJr Profits by Time 
TIME SAMPLE SIZE A VERAGE RANK 
1 144 209.41 
2 192 325.333 
3 240 306.488 
Test Statistic = 44.7321 P-Value - 1.93444E-IO 
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Table 5.27 -Kruskal-Wallis Testfor ROA by Time 
TIME SAMPLES/ZE A VERAGE RANK 
1 144 318.472 
2 192 346.169 
3 240 224.38\ 
Test Statistic - 63.3597 P-Value = 0.0 
Table 5.28 -Kruskal-Wallis Testfor ROE by Time 
T/ME SAMPLES/lE A VERAGE RANK 
1 144 321.5 
2 192 342.396 
3 240 225.583 
Test Statistic - 60.1017 p-Value = 0.0 
Because the "P-values" are less than 0.01, the null hypothesis that the medians of the 
samples are equal is rejected at the 1 % level of significance. Therefore, it can be 
stated that there is a statistically significant difference between the medians of both 
the profits, the R.O.A. and the R.O.E., at the 99% confidence level. 
5.5. - CONCLUSION 
Although the disturbances for profits, R.O.A and R.O.E. are not normally distributed 
in each of the ANOV A Models estimated in this chapter, the Kruskal-WaIlis Test 
allows some findings concerning the hypotheses tested, namely that: 
1. "Average profitability is significantly different after regulatory reform", and 
2. "Average profitability is significantly higher after regulatory reform". 
Kruskal-Wallis assumes symmetry when he uses the median instead of the mean. 
Assuming symmetry of each sample distribution, profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E., the 
findings from table 5.22 (multiple range tests for profits by time), table 5.23 
(multiple range tests for R.O.A. by time) and table 5.24 (multiple range tests for 
R.O.E. by time) hold good. That is, these results are valid to test for the significant 
differences between means, although they are not valid for the estimated value of 
these differences. 
130 Kanji, Gopal K. (1994), p.193. 
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The main conclusion is that the study carried out in this chapter proves that average 
profitability, measured both by profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E., is statistically 
significantly different after financial regulatory reform in Portugal. 
The analysis carried out, also allows the conclusion that average profitability 
measured by profits has increased in the course of financial regulatory reform and 
that average profits are statistically significantly different during the first steps of 
liberalisation, that is between 1986 and 1992. These are the results of both the Fixed 
Effects One Factor ANOV A Model and the Fixed Effects Two Factor ANOV A 
Model (factors "banks" and "time" where "time" has three levels). 
In what concerns profitability measured by R.O.A., the study finds that average 
R.O.A. has decreased and that average R.O.A. is statistically significantly different 
during the final steps of liberalisation, that is between 1989 and 1997. Again, these 
are the results of both the Fixed Effects One Factor ANOVA Model and the Fixed 
Effects Two Factor ANOVA Model (factors "banks" and "time" where "time" has 
three levels). 
Finally, average R.O.E. has statistically significantly decreased from the beginning 
until the end of financial regulatory reform in Portugal. Even so, average R.O.E. is 
not statistically significantly different during the first steps of the reform, that is, 
from 1986 until 1992. These are the results of the Fixed Effects One Factor ANOV A 
Model. 
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CHAPTER 6.- THE STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
REGULATION ON BANKING PROFITABILITY. THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF OTHER PERFORMANCE 
DETERMINANTNS 
6.1. - INTRODUCTION: THE PROPOSITION TO BE TESTED 
The proposition to be tested in the model developed in this chapter is: 
"Regulation significantly affects banking profitability". 
This chapter tests the relationship between banking profitability determinants as 
defined below and the following banking performance measures: profits after taxes, 
R.O.A. and R.O.E .. 
Regulation is tested as an explanatory variable for banking profitability together with 
all the other banking profitability determinants: inflation rate, G.D.P. growth, interest 
rates, management quality, and ownership and market structure. The objective of this 
analysis is to test the significance of regulation for profitability. 
Empirical econometric tests of banking performance determinants have been, so far, 
partial, and have studied only one variable or group of variables that affect banking 
profitability. The effect of regulation on banking profitability has never been 
empirically tested, despite the common belief that profitability responds (or reacts) to 
changes in the regulatory framework. This widespread belief results from non-
statistical considerations, such as experience together with analyses of how banking 
strategies accommodate changes in regulatory rules. 
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In the 70's several studies, such as Jordan (1972) Tucillo (1973) and Edwards 
(1977), suggested that regulation had an impact on banking profitability. Bourke 
(1989) states that "the literature has never adequately examined the consequences of 
changes in the intensity of regulation"l3l. He argues that the most promising 
approach to access the consequences of changes in the intensity of regulation on 
banking profitability was a Delphi/Jury of Expert Opinion ranking of the intensity of 
regulation, but he proved unable to do this in a time series study extending over ten 
years. Thakor and Beltz (1994) make a strong contribution to the literature, using an 
explicit economic model to weigh the costs and benefits of seemingly unrelated bank 
regulations based on a "barter" idea. Meanwhile, Lucas (1994) contributed to the 
current policy debate over the net effect of regulation on profitability, extending the 
arguments underlined by Thakor and Beltz. Research on the impact of liberalisation 
on V.K. and German banking sectors was carried out by Hoggarth et al. (1998). 
Several papers have studied market structure and profitability. Heggestad and Mingo 
(1976), Kwast and Rose (1982), Gilbert (1984), Bourke (1989), Gup and Waiter 
(1989), Heffeman (1994), Hoggarth et al. (1998) are examples. 
Larry (1985), Claire (1987), Gup and Waiter (1989) and Miller and Noulas (1997) 
have approached management quality as a banking performance determinant. While 
Swamy et al. (1996) identify important determinants of the performance of 
commercial banks, such as: Construction Real Estate Loans-to-Assets, Family Real 
Estate Loans-to-Assets, Commercial Real Estate Loans-to-Assets, Commercial and 
Industrial Loans-to-Assets, Average Bank size in relation to Assets, and 
Unemployment rates and some location restrictions in the United States 
Hoggarth et al. (1998), in their examination of the key features that have contributed 
to the stability of VK and German banking systems, emphasised the impact of 
inflation, G.D.P. growth, monetary policy and ownership. This latest variable has 
also been analysed by Short (1979) and Bourke (1989). 
131 P.67 
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While testing for the statistical significance of regulation on banking profitability, the 
proposed unbalanced panel data model, developed in the current study, treats 
banking performance determinants together. This analysis is carried out in several 
stages, because the model aims at testing the effect of all banking performance 
determinants on banking profits on R.O.A. and on R.OE. Simultaneously, both bank 
specific omitted variables and the effect of time on profitability are tested. 
6.2. - THE MODEL 
The specification of the estimated empirical model is based upon the general notion 
that bank-specific variables and variables in general economic and market conditions 
all affect bank performance. There are, however, several issues that arise in 
specifying such a model. First, one has to decide upon an appropriate estimation 
technique. Second, one has to decide upon the specific variables to be included in the 
model. Third, one has to decide how to measure these variables. Each of these issues 
will be discussed in turn. 
An unbalanced panel data model has been chosen because it is a tool very well suited 
to the purpose of this study, as we proceed to explain 132. 
The reasons for using an unbalanced panel data are threefold: 
On the one hand, panel data is used to specify a model that will adequately allow for 
differences in behaviour over cross-sectional units as well as any differences in 
behaviour over time for a given cross-sectional unit. The first group of exogenous 
variables comprises management quality, ownership and market structure (when no 
collusion is involved). In the second group ranges inflation rate (that is, nominal 
stability), G.D.P. growth (that is, real stability) and regulation. 
On the other hand, an unbalanced panel data allows for an even number of 
observations in each period. Therefore it is the most suitable model given that several 
132 Besides the reasons considered in the current analysis, .. the analysis of panel or longitudinal data is 
the subject of one of the most active and innovative bodies of literature in econometrics ( ... ). The 
panel data literature rivals the received research on unit roots in econometrics in its rate of growth". 
Green( 1997), Econometric Analysis, p.613. 
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banks entered into the market once liberalisation began in the Portuguese Banking 
System in 1985. Because new banks have emerged in the market during the life span 
of this analysis, each bank specific variable is inserted in the model only after a 
period of six months has elapsed. 
Finally, the use of pooled data allows us better to control the effects of missing or 
omitted variables. 
The dependent variable in the empirical model will be a measure of bank 
performance. Since there is no single measure of performance found in the literature, 
three measures to capture performance will be employed in this study. These three 
measures, all of which have been used either individually or in different 
combinations in the literature, are profits after tax, the rate-of-return on assets and the 
rate-of-return on equity. 
6.3. - DESIGN OF THE MODEL 
6.3.1. - THE SAMPLE 
The data are a pooled time-series cross section. Parent banks and subsidiaries are 
both included in the data. The unconsolidated results from the parent banks are used 
to avoid duplication in the information collected. 
The data are based on the financial statements of 33 Portuguese banks (table 6.1). 
Accounting measurement of profitability have been reported twice in each year (in 
June and December), over the 13 years from the first half of 1985 to the second half 
of 1997, a period during which banks had significant time to adjust to the financial 
regulatory reform. Very gently at first, Portuguese Financial Regulatory Reform 
began in 1985 with the relaxation of some barriers to entry. After the removal of 
controls on interest ~es and capital movements, during the late 80's and early 90's, 
the Portuguese Fimmcial System became by the end of the century fully integrated 
with the European standard financial regulatory rules. 
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Table 6.1-Sample 0/ Banks/or the Unbalanced Panel Data Models 
BBV-Banco Bilba') Viscaya (Lloyds Bank until 1990): June 8S-December 97 
BBI-Banco Borges & Irmio : June SS-December 97 
BCA-Banco Comercial dos A~ores : June SS-December 97 
BFE-Banco de Fomento e Exterior: June SS-December 97 
BES-Banco Espirito Santo : June SS-December 97 
BFB-Banco Fonsecas & Burnay: June 8S-December 97 
BPSM-Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor: June SS-December 97 
BPA-Banco Portugues do AlIantico: June SS-December 97 
BT A-Banco ToUa & A~ores : June SS-December 97 
CGD-Caixa Geral de Dep6sitos: June SS-December 97 
CL-Credit Lyonnais : June 8S-December 97 
CPP-Credito Predial Portugues : June 8S-December 97 
Chemical-Banco Chemical (Manufacturers Hanover until 1992): June 8S-December 97 
MG-Montepio Geral : June SS-December 97 
B.Mello-BaDco Mello (Vniio de Bancos Potugueses until 1996) : June 8S-December 97 
BPI-Banco Portuguis de lnvestimentos : December 8S-December 97 
BarcJays-BarcJays Bank: June 86-December 97 
BNP-Banque Nationale de Paris: June 86-December 97 
Citi-Citibank : June 86-December 97 
BCP-Banco Comercial Portugu~s: December 86-December 97 
BCI-Banco Comercio e Industria: December 86-December 97 
BlC-Banco Internacional de Credito : December 86-December 97 
BANfF-Banco Internac:ional do Func:hal : December SS-December 97 
BNV-Banc:o Nacional Vltramarino : December 8S-December 97 
ABN-AMRO Bank N.V. : June 9Q-December 97 
DBI-Deutsche Bank de Investimento : December 90- December 97 
BMI-Banco Mello de Investimentos (Banco Mello until 1996): June 91-December 97 
BNCI-Banco Nacional de Cr~ito Imobilia\rio : June 91-December 97 
BII-Banco de Investimento Imobilia\rio : December 93-December 97 
Finantia-Banco Finantia : December 93-December 97 
CfSF- CISF-Banco de Investimento : December 93-December 97 
FINIBANCO: December 93-December 97 
BSN-Banc:o Santander de Neg6cios :June 94-December 97 
The banks included in the sample are every bank in the Portuguese banking system 
with assets worth 100 billions of escudos or more in December 1997. 
All balance sheet data are calculated as an average of beginning-of-the-year, mid-
year, and year-end financial statements figures. The reason lies in the fact that while 
semi-annual data are employed from 1985 until 1997, balance sheets itemise mid-
year and end-of-year stocks, while profits are a flow covering the entire semi-annual 
period. 
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6.3.2. -EXPLANATORY 
MEASUREMENT 
VARIABLES AND THEIR 
The regressors used in the model are those banking performance determinants more 
or less widely explored in the literature: real stability measured by G.D.P. growth, 
nominal stability measured by the inflation rate, and interest rates, studied through 
two mechanisms of influence on profitability, management quality, market structure, 
ownership, and regulation. With respect to the measurement of both the bank-
specific variables, such as management quality and market structure, and the 
dependent variables, all data are obtained from audit reports as explained earlier in 
chapter 4. The sources of data for general economic conditions, such as nominal 
stability, real stability and the effect of interest rates, are described together with the 
explanation of these variables. The sources of data for regulation and ownership are 
also given when these variables are introduced. 
In what concerns economies of scale, the American literature is reasonably clear that 
larger banks do not experience economies of scale [Benston, Hanweck and 
Humphrey (1982)]. Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the lack of information 
about economies of scale in European banks would be worth exploring. As will be 
explained, this study considers economies of scale as one of the omitted bank-
specific variables captured by the unbalanced panel data model. The presentation of 
the explanatory variables follows. 
G.D.P. growth 
The use of G.D.P. growth as a variable does not feature extensively in the literature. 
However, Hoggarth et al. (1998) conclude that the behaviour of real GDP fails to 
explain the greater variability of banking sector profits in Britain than in Germany. In 
the former country, average profitability is higher then in the latter. But they do not 
say that G.N.P. variability did not affect profits, only that they could not use it to 
explain different UK/German banks performance. If this variable is not statistically 
significant in explaining profitability, then the conclusions of Hoggart et al. are 
reinforced. Otherwise, the expected sign should be positive since higher growth 
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implies both lower probabilities of individual and corporate default and an easiest 
access to credit (in the sense that either individual or corporate credit ratings from 
banks are improved) 
Annual real G.D.P. growth rates, measured in June and December, are introduced in 
the model and their source is the National Statistics Institute (Quarterly National 
Accounts). 
Inflation rate 
Revell (1979) has suggested that inflation may be a factor causing variation in bank 
profitability. Bourke (1989) argues that this phenomenon is not widely discussed 
elsewhere in the literature. According to Hoggarth et al. (1998), nominal 
macroeconomic (in)stability appears to be more relevant to banking performance 
than real macroeconomic (in)stability. They argue that high and variable inflation has 
a major impact on bank earnings. When comparing banking profitability in UK and 
German they suggest that lower and more stable inflation is a reason why bank loan 
losses have been lower in German than in the UK. 
The annual growth in the consumer price index, measured twice a year (in June and 
December) is used as an independent variable in the model. The sign is expected to 
be positive. Economic intuition suggests that a higher rate of inflation, because it 
goes along with higher interest rates, favours the intermediation spread. Lower 
inflation rates, and the correspondent squeeze in interest margins, may deepen 
profits. This relation between inflation and profitability reinforces the findings of 
Hoggarth et a1. that a greater commitment to monetary discipline in Germany is the 
cause for lower but more stable profits in Germany than in the UK. 
The source for the Portuguese inflation rate is The Portuguese Central Bank 
Quarterly Bulletin since 1985 and the Monthly Statistical Bulletin from 1995 
onwards. 
147 
The mechanisms through which interest rates affect banking profitability 
Literature in which the effect of monetary policy on banking profitability is tested is 
scarce. Short (1979) found a positive relation between nominal interest rates and 
return on capital, interest rates being used as a proxy for capital scarcity (an analysis 
in terms of opportunity costs). Bourke (1989) assumed that interest rates had a direct 
influence on profitability and tested this influence in the context of return on assets 
as the dependent variable. He found a positive correlation between interest rates (the 
long-term bond rate) and the return on assets. Considering the interest rate alone as a 
banking performance determinant (that is, the use of an interest rate as an exogenous 
variable in the model) is a much too simple approach to the impact of monetary 
policy on banking performance. Monetary policy affects bank profitability in many 
ways, examining the effect of interest rates changes captures only one aspect of this 
issue. 
Although not impossible, it is very difficult to find an accurate measure or proxy for 
monetary policy. 
Facing the problem of measuring monetary policy, an option is to explore 
mechanisms through which movements in interest rates affect banking profitability. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the response of banking profitability to changes in 
monetary policy deserves further theoretical and empirical research. 
The above mechanisms that affect banking profitability can be divided into two 
types. One type, which is bank specific and affects each bank in a different way over 
each period, is called the "endowment effect". This effect captures the opportunity 
cost of holding reserves with the Central Bank and the benefits from having low 
interest cost deposits as a source of funding. The second type of mechanism relates to 
the spread, and is introduced in the model as a variable that affects all the banks in 
the same way over each period. The spread is considered as a general market and 
economic condition because it is measured in weighted aggregate terms. 
The "endowment effect" is based on the idea that, the more interest rates rise, the 
lower, in relative terms, becomes the cost of non-bearing interest rate funds and other 
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cheap banking resources. Hence, a rise in interest rates can be viewed as a "saving" 
for banks, enhancing profitability. That is, interest rates in the market rises but the 
cost of funding remains unchanged. 
In its most simple form, a bank's balance sheet can be represented as shown in figure 
6.1: 
Figure 6.1 - Simple Form of a Bank's Balance Sheet 
pH 
A 
pL 
Where: 
A stands for total assets. 
FH stands for high interest cost funding resources (such as wholesale deposits 
saving). 
FL stands for low interest cost funding resources (such as demand deposits, capital 
and reserves). 
The bank specific "endowment effect" depends on its ratio: 
FL 
A 
With FL = DD + C 
Where DD represents demand deposits and C represents capital and reserves. 
A is defined as above. 
Assuming constant interest costs of FL, that is assuming that demand deposits are a 
non-bearing interest rate resource and that there is no policy of dividend distribution, 
then the expected improvement (worsening) on profits- ne -from a rise (decrease) on 
interest rates can be measured as follows: 
ne = FL • j (6.1.) 
A 
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Where "i" is the nominal interest rate of higher costly resources of funds such as 
wholesale saving deposits _ FH . 
The expected sign of the "endowment effect" on banking profitability is positive 
since if nominal interest rates increase, everything else being equal, the bank has a 
relatively cheap source of funding in demand deposits and capital and reserves, 
therefore enhancing profitability. 
The "endowment ef:ect" on profitability must be adjusted to account for the effect of 
the opportunity cost arising from non-bearing interest reserves held at the Central 
Bank. As interest rates rise, the opportunity cost of holding reserves at the Central 
Bank rises as well and, "ceteri-paribus", it therefore deepens profitability. 
Although it is impossible to measure this opportunity cost in accounting terms 
(financial statements don't reflect these costs), it is possible to improve equation 6.1 
in order to capture the effect of opportunity costs. Thus we have equation 6.2: 
ne = FL _RN *i (6.2.) 
A 
Where RN stands for non-bearing interest reserves held at the Central Bank 
The mandatory reserve system in Portugal, and its changes through the life span of 
this study133, does not allowed for the inclusion of RN in the model. Therefore the 
unbalanced panel model developed in this chapter is built with equation 6.1. 
The proxy used for the nominal interest rate of higher costly sources of funds is the 
three months interbank money market interest rate 134. 
Concerning the second type of mechanism through which interest rates affect 
banking profitability, the spread is measured in aggregate terms because this analysis 
133 During a certain period pan of compulsory reserves bearded interests and other part didn't. 
Portuguese Banks' financial statements don't discriminate between these two kinds of reserves. 
134 From 1991 onwards. Between 1985 and 1990. since there was no efficient interbank money 
market, the proxy is the Central Bank's discount rate. 
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looks at banking profitability as a whole so far as stability is concerned. Assuming 
that the banks' credit policy reacts to the differential between lending interest rates 
and the cost of their funding (their refinancing sources being either the Central Bank 
or the interbank monetary market), we have a second approach to the way interest 
rates may affect banking profitability. It can be argued that banking profitability is 
positively correlated with the spread between lending rates and refinancing rates. 
The availability of data for aggregate lending and refinancing interest rates allows 
the insertion in the model of the spread as a general market and economic condition 
variable, which is assumed to affect all the banks over each period in the same way. 
The explanation of the spread measurement in aggregated terms follows. 
Variables and sources of data collection: 
Lending interest rates: lending operations with maturities ranging from 91 to 180 
days. From June 1985 (more precisely since 1965) until the first half of 1988, 
interest rates were administratively set by the Portuguese Central Bank in 
accordance with The Ministry of Finance monetary policy. Source of data 
collection: Banco de Portugal Long Time Series (1993). Since the second half of 
1988, the maximum interest rate on loans has been lifted (with exception of 
housing credit and loans granted under housing-saving accounts). 
The source of data collection is the "Banco de Portugal Quarterly Bulletin" 
replaced in 1995 by the "Monthly Statistical Bulletin". With the liberalisation of 
lending interest rates, the values presented are weighted averages for all the 
banking system. 
Refinancing interest rates: The Portuguese Central Bank discount rate between 
the first half of 1985 and the second half of 1990, plus the three months interbank 
money market interest rates from the first half of 1991 onwards (weighted 
average rates for all the banking system). 
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There are two reasons for choosing 1990 as a turning point and for using interbank 
money market rates instead of the re po rate: 
Firstly the smooth transition from direct money supply controls to an indirect control 
system of liquidity in the Portuguese economy took place between 1990 and 1992. 
During this period the rules for the interbank market were settled and the repo-rate 
replaced the discount rate as a tool of monetary policy. The repo-rate performs the 
role of an upper limit to interbank rates. Consequently, if banks price their lending to 
each other at higher levels, they simple cannot find a counterparty. When refinancing 
their liquidity defici:, banks prefer to go to the interbank market than to the Central 
Bank where they have to pay the repo rate. 
Secondly, the Portuguese Central Bank Annual Report (1991) states that "the 
economy faced during 1991 a growing and stronger interrelation between interbank 
money market and the banking credit market with its clients ( ... ) money market 
interest rates began their function (or began to act, or began to operate) as a lower 
limit to lending operations with banking best clients (the prime-rate),,135. 
For the central bank's discount rate the source of data collection IS "Banco de 
Portugal Long time series (1993)". 
For the three months interbank money market rates (operations with maturities 
between 86 and 96 days), the source of data collection is both the "Banco de Portugal 
Quarterly Bulletin" since 1991 up to 1994 and the "Monthly Statistical Bulletin" 
from 1995 onwards. 
These interest rates are weighted average rates according to the formula: 
LC*t*r 
LC*t 
Where: 
"C" stands, for capital 
"t" stands for maturity 
"r" stands for interest rate 
135 p.184 
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Regulation 
The statistical significance of regulation as a banking performance determinant has 
never been empirically tested. In the unbalanced panel data model herein developed, 
regulation is tested as a qualitative variable with three classes. These three mutually 
exclusive levels of regulation are: 
- The less liberalised banking market between 1985 and 1988; 
- The more liberalised banking market between 1989 and 1992; 
- The liberalised banking market between 1993 and 1997. 
These cut-off dates were chosen because between 1988 and 1989 further barriers to 
entry in the banking market were lifted, and between 1992 and 1993 a very important 
range of prudential rules were implemented together with the abolishment of the 
remaining barriers to entry and the remaining administrative controls: 
a) Until 1988 banks were required by the government to open a branch on a less 
desirable region for each opening request of a branch in a desirable one. 
b) In September 1988 the maximum interest rate on credit operations was lifted. 
c) The re-privatisation programme in the banking system began in 1989. 
d) From 1989 onwards the compulsory acquisition of bad loans from state owned 
banks as a legal requirement for new banks to enter the market was abolished. 
e) From 1989 onwards banks weren't anymore required to form a joint venture 
capital firm if they wanted to enter into the banking market. 
f) The minimum level of 8% for the solvency ratio was enforced in 1992. 
g) Credit ceilings were definitely abandoned by the end of 1991. 
h) Full capital movements' liberalisation became effective in 1992. 
i) Interest rates on deposits were liberalised in 1992 
j) Barriers to entry were definitely abolished in January 1993 
Following the rule that the number of dummies be one less than the number of 
categories of the variable, two dummies are introduce in the model to take care of the 
three levels of regulation. 
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The first dummy is REG and the second one is REG I, where: 
REG = I if the market is liberalised (that is between 1993 and 1997) 
REG = 0 otherwise 
And, 
REG I =1 if the market is more liberalised (that is between 1989 and 1992) 
REG I = 0 otherwise 
With the preceding assignment of the dummy variables the category of "less 
liberalised market" is treated as the base category, and its effect is captured by the 
intercept of the linear regression unbalance panel data. 
If regulation is statistically significant for the explanation of banking profitability, 
and the estimated coefficients show a positive sign, then the study allows for the 
conclusion that profitability has increased along with financial regulatory reform in 
Portugal. 
Next follows the analysis of management quality and of market structure as banking 
performance determinants. Studies of the impact of these variables on performance, 
are generally carried out to explain performance in differentiated groups of banks 
where banks are separated into different size categories. Nevertheless, some 
conclusions are us~ful in explaining the statistical significance of the above-
mentioned explanatory variables on profitability. First, prior research on quality 
management will be reviewed. Secondly, prior conclusions over the effect of market 
structure on profitability will be analysed .. 
Management Quality 
Hoggarth et al. (1998) suggest that differences in risk management, and especially in 
the proclivity to take risk, is one possible factor that affects bank performance. 
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Swamy et a1. (1996) identify important determinants of the performance of 
commercial banks. 136 
Gup and WaIter (1989), aiming at studying the determinants of high performance 
small banks, made a non-econometric study encompassing several measures of 
management quality: interest income to assets, interest expense to assets, noninterest 
income to assets, noninterest expense to assets, loan loss provision to assets, 
securities gains to assets, return on assets, loans to assets, securities to assets; equity 
to assets and total assets. 
Miller and Noulas (1997) conduct the most comprehensive econometric study related 
to the effect of management quality on banking profitability. The measures of 
management quality variables they have adopted and the respective results on 
performance response (R.O.A. = net income/total assets) are shown in table 6.2. The 
results shown relate to a fixed-effects model over banks and time. In the current 
research, Miller and Noulas's measurement of management quality will be followed 
and will be extended to explain profits and R.O.E. as well. Even so, some 
adjustments are required because audited and published Income Statements, on a 
semi-annual basis, are only available from June 1990. Therefore, using financial 
ratios that measure productivity and efficiency would bias the results of the study. It 
should be added that only after 1993 were banks allowed to grant real estate loans 
(until then only two banks were legally authorised to perform this kind of operation), 
which means that the ratio of real estate loans to total loans must be disregarded. The 
ratio net loan charge-offs to total loans will be disregarded as well, because 
information concerning loan charge-offs and recoveries is not available. The results 
obtained will be compared with the analysis of both Miller and Noulas and of Gup 
and WaIter. 
136 Bank-specific variables (ratios: construction real estate loans to assets; 1-4 family real estate loans 
to assets; multi-family real estate loans to assets; commercial real estate loans to assets; commercial 
and industrial loans to assets; consumer loans to assets; other loans to assets, equity capital to assets 
and average bank size). A general economic condition variable: unemployment rate. And, finally, 
locational restrictions such as Southeast Compact Member, National, National reciprocal, Regional 
reciprocal and statewide branching. 
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To conclude, the proposed unbalanced panel model measures management quality by 
means of the following ratios: total securities to total assets, Portuguese Government 
securities to total securities, total loans to total assets, total deposits to total assets, 
demand deposits to total deposits, time deposits to total deposits and provisions for 
loan losses to total loans. 
Table 6.2- Management Quality and Banking Performance 
Ratios Effect on R.OA. 
Financial ratios that measure asset management (lending and investing) 
Total securities/total assets Positive and significant at the 5% level 
U.S. Government securities/total securities Statistically non-significant 
Total loans/total assets Positive and significant at the 1% level 
Real estate loans/total loans Statistically non-significant 
Financial ratios that measure liability (funding) management 
Total deposits/total assets Positive and significant at the I % level 
Transaction deposits/total deposits Positive and significant at the I % level 
Large time deposits/total deposits Statistically non-significant 
Financial ratios that measure productivity and efficiency 
Total non-interest expenses/total expenses Negative and significant at the 1% level 
Total non-interest income/total income Positive and significant at the I % level 
Salaries and benefits/total employees Positive and significant at the I % level 
Financial ratios that measure quality of assets 
Provisions for loan losses/total loans Negative and significant at the 1% level 
Net loan charge-offs/totalloans Negative and significant at the 5% level 
Source: MIller and Noulas (1997) 
Knowledge of the Portuguese Banking System does not provide enough ground to 
anticipate the sign of this determinant. However, incipient asset/liability management 
techniques emerged during the life span of this study. Let it just be noticed that the 
first and simplest strategy (or technique) of risk management consists in 
securitisation. The existing void in the Portuguese legal framework prevented banks 
from applying this technique. It makes us believe either that variables are not 
statistically significant or that they will present either a negative or a positive sign. 
Market Structure 
Several studies pursued in the 80's, like Kwast and Rose (1982) Wall (1985) and 
Gup and Walter (1989), reached the conclusion that collusion was not an explanatory 
156 
variable for high profitability. K wast and Rose used the Herfindahl Index on deposits 
as a proxy of market concentration. So did Wall (1985). 
Although in these previous researches, market structure is considered with the aim of 
studying profitability behaviour among banks of different sizes, the results obtained 
by these authors will be compared with the results obtained with the unbalanced 
panel data model. 
Gilbert (1984) conducted a comprehensive survey on the evaluation of the structure-
performance relationship in the banking industry. He concluded that concentration in 
local market areas is the relevant measure of market structure. Thirty-two studies, out 
of the forty-four studies surveyed, report some evidence of significant association 
between market structure and measures of bank performance, with the direction of 
influence of market structure as indicated by the structure-performance hypothesis 137. 
In the banking literature, tests for competition typically look at only one of the 
markets, loans or deposits, where banks operate. The traditional approach has 
overlooked the fact that banks may exercise market power in both the deposits and 
loans markets. In fact, competition may increase in one market and decrease in the 
other. That is, ignoring one of the markets while analysing the other may induce 
misleading conclusions about the degree of competition within the industry. This is 
why the Herfindahl Index of market concentration is included in the unbalanced 
panel data model developed in this chapter as measuring both the degree of 
competition in the deposits market and in the loans market138. 
Barros and Leite (1998) assess the impact of liberalisation in the Portuguese banking 
market, testing for competition in both the deposits and loans markets. These authors 
focus on the pericd after interest rate liberalisation, showing that competition 
increased mainly as a result of the changes in the deposits market. Furthermore, they 
show that, in the loans market, bank conduct was significantly more collusive than 
Nash behaviour. 
137 A positive correlation between the measure of concentration in local markets and the interest paid 
on several categories ofretail deposits. 
138 For more evidence on the merits of this global approach see Barros and Leite (1998). 
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The shape of the market structure of the Portuguese Banking Industry results from 
the overlap of three distinct influences, namely barriers to entry, and banks' 
behaviour on both credit and deposit sides of the balance sheet. Barriers to entry 
were gradually lifted between 1985 and 1993. The effects of liberalisation on 
deposits and on credit were different. 
The abolishment of quantitative restrictions on deposits was more rapid then those on 
credit. Firstly deposits were never subject to a corset while restrictions on the 
quantities of credit granted to the economy remained in the system until 1991. 
Secondly, while from 1985 onwards credit institutions were authorised to fix interest 
rates on deposits (except on time deposits over 180 days), interest rate controls in 
credit operations were only lifted in 1988. 
With the abolishment of barriers to entry, the number of competitors in the market is 
expected to increase. Portugal had 50 credit institutions in 1997 compared with 17 at 
the end of 1984. That is, market concentration is expected to decline. But, because of 
the different behaviour on the credit and deposits sides of the balance sheet, as 
explained below, tests will be carried out for the Herfindahl Index as a measure of 
market structure on both the credit and on the deposits markets. It is expected that 
structure of the credit market will have a positive effect on profitability (the market 
was characterised by price liberalisation with quantities rationing). On the contrary, 
the market structure of the deposit side is expected to have a negative influence on 
banking profitability because competition was fiercer over deposits than over credit. 
Kwast and Rose (1982) and Wall (1985) included in their studies only the deposit 
market's Herfindhal Index of concentration. 
The sources of data, when computing the Herfindahl Index, are all balance sheet 
information concerning deposits and credit for the whole Portuguese banking system 
from the first half of 1985 until the second half of 199i 39 . The Herfindahl Index 
measures the banking market structure at the middle and the end of each year. 
139 See annexes I and 11 (Vol. 11) (Source: the author's research). 
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On the credit market, the Herfindhal Index of market concentration is based on gross 
loans instead of net loans. The reason is simple, market power arising from the 
amount of credit granted as a whole regardless whether it is in default or not. 
In the deposits market, total deposits are used to compute the Herfindhal Index. 
Again the reason for doing this is simple. The ability of banks to operate with this 
cheap source of funds derives from the global amount of liquidity they are able to 
attract (not only demand deposits but time deposits as well). In other words, the 
greater the amount of the deposits, the cheaper will be the bank's funding. 
Ownership 
There is a considerable debate and a voluminous academic literature on the 
implications of differing forms of ownership structure for corporate behaviour, both 
in relation to financial institutions and to companies in general. One implication of 
state ownership is that, in the absence of shareholders, an institution may place less 
emphasis on increasing profits and more on other goals such as the allocation of 
resources to less developed sectors of the economy. State-owned banks may also be 
more risk averse than profit-maximising banks. Short (1979) and Bourke (1989) both 
tested for the effects of ownership on banking profitability but they reached opposite 
results. While Short found that ownership was statistically significant and that 
government ownership presented an inverse relationship with profitability, Bourke's 
work concluded there was no statistical significance for the effect of ownership on 
banking profitability. 
In the current research, the effect of ownership on banking profitability is analysed 
assuming ownership is a binary variable where "1" stands for state-owned banks and 
o (zero) for private banks. In the Portuguese Financial System there are no co-
operative banks. Increased profitability with the re-privatisation process in Portugal, 
as it is commonly assumed, together with conventional wisdom that private banks are 
profit-maximising frms while state owned banks may pursue other goals, favours the 
conclusion that the expected sign of this explanatory variable will be negative. 
Methodology: The ownership of a bank is assumed to shift to the private sector when 
a stake of at least 51 % has been sold by the state. The qualitative explanatory 
159 
variable "ownership' assumes 0 (zero) only after an entire period of 6 months under 
private management took place. The moments of Portuguese Banks privatisations 
included in our sample is presented in table 6.3. 
Table 6.3- Privatisations in the Portuguese Banking System (50%+ J %) 
BANK DATE 
BBI AUG .. 1996 
BCA DEC .1996 
BFE AUG .. 1996 
BES FER .1992 
BFB AUG .. 1991 
BPSM NOV .. 1994 
BPA MAY 1992 
BTA JULY 1990 
CPP DEC. .1992 
BMELLO/UBP FER 1993 
When re-privatised, BES, BPSM, BPA, BT A, epp and UBP returned to the former 
owners. 
Sources of data collection: The schedule of the Portuguese Reprivatisation 
Programme for the Banking System has been obtained at the Ministry of Finance for 
reprivatisations occurred between 1989 and the first half of 1995. The source for the 
remaining dates is the Portuguese Central Bank. 
6.3.3. - DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The aim is to study banking stability from the profitability standpoint. Hence, 
banking performance measurement is related to profitability measurement. Profits 
after taxes, R.O.A. and R.O.E. are the measures inserted in the model as dependent 
variables. The significance of the effects of the determinants of banking 
performance, as explained above, will be tested first on profits after taxes and 
afterwards on R.O.A. and R.O.E. separately. 
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6.3.4. -FUNCTIONAL FORM OF THE EQUATIONS TO BE 
ESTIMATED 
Finding the best functional form for the equations to be estimated is a crucial step in 
the research process. Under a wrong model specification, results are less reliable and 
may provide evidence for less accurate conclusions. Bourke (1989), in respect of 
carrying out banking profitability tests, recognises that "the literature generally, in so 
far as it is discussed, comes to the conclusion that the appropriate functional form for 
testing is a linear function although there are dissenting opinions" 140. Swamy et al. 
(1996) identify important determinants of the performance of commercial banks. 
These authors suggest that it may be the case that the specific linear functional forms 
considered in previous studies might be false. They propose a class approach for the 
functional forms of the relationship between banking performance determinants and 
banking profitability. This class approach is adopted to estimate the significance of 
banking performance determinants on profitability in the model herein performed. To 
avoid the risk of misspecifying the functional form of the relationship, a wide class 
of functional forms is employed in order to embody the true functional form. The 
effects of excluded variables and of errors in measurement are also accounted for in 
the class approach. Although testing for linear regression unbalanced panel data, the 
class approach is used because modelling in this setting calls for some complex 
stochastic specification that the author proceeds to explain. 
Modelling the statistical significance of regulation on banking profitability, together 
with other banking performance determinants, is carried out in two stages, each of 
them with the correspondent stochastic specification. In the first stage, only bank-
specific explanatory variables are introduced into the model. In the second stage, 
general economic and market conditions are added to the model, replacing the effects 
of time on banking profitability. 
In the first stage the model has the following general functional relation: 
9 
Y;, = 'L{JjXji, + Pit (first stage) 
j .. l 
Where Yit are the three profitability regressants: profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E. 
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The explanatory variables of this general model are defined as follows: 
Xl - Total Securities /Total Assets (TSTA) 
X2 - Government Securities/Total Securities (GSTS) 
X3 - Total Loans (net)/Total Assets (TLT A) 
X4 - Total Deposits/Total Assets (TDTA) 
Xs - Demand Deposits/Total Deposits (DOTD) 
X6 - Time Deposits/Total Deposits (TOTO) 
X7 - Provisions for Loan Losses/Total Loans (gross) (PLLTL) 
Xg - Ownership as a dummy variable were: OWNER=] for state owned banks 
ONWER=O otherwise 
X9 - "Endowment Effect" (ENDOW), and 
flit is the stochastic term. 
Model 1 is the pooled regression defined by: 
With: 
E(Eit) = 0 
And: 
E(Eit Ejs):= r:i ifi = j and t = s 
E( Eit Ejs) = 0 otherwise 
Therefore the model is: 
9 
Y;, =a+ LP, Xjl, +&i/ 
j-I 
(Modell) 
Model 2 is the one way error component model, with the classical error component 
disturbance given by: 
jJi, =a, +&i/ 
162 
Therefore the specification of model 2 is: 
9 
Y,r = a, + LP/X/II + £11 (Model 2) 
)=1 
With ai capturing bank specific omitted variables (economies of scale among others). 
In this model, ai can be taken to be a group specific constant term in the regression 
model or it might be more appropriate to view individual specific constant terms as 
randomly distributed across cross-sectional units. In the first case the linear 
regression unbalanced panel model is a fixed effects model (Model 2.a) where the 
ai's are assumed to be parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances 
stochastic with Eit independent and identically distributed IID(0,02 E)' The XiI are 
assumed independent of the Eit for all i and t. In the second case the unbalanced 
panel data model is a Random Effects Model (Model 2.b), where a l - IID(a -, 0 2 a) , 
Eit - (0,02£) and the ai are independent of the Eit. In addition, the XiI are 
independent of the ai and Eit for all i and t. 
Model 3 is the Two Way Error Component Model. The disturbance captures both the 
bank specific omitted variables and the time effects, and is given by: 
Thus the specification of model 3 is: 
9 
Y,r = a; + Ar + LP,X,II +£11 (Model 3) 
J=I 
Where ai denotes the unobservable individual effect referred in model 2, At denotes 
the unobservable time effect and Eit is the remainder stochastic disturbance. 
As in Model 2, both ai and At can be either fixed or randomly distributed. If the Cli 
and At are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder 
disturbances stochastic with Eit - (0,0'2£), then model 3 represents a Two Way Fixed 
Effects Error Component Model (Model 3.a). The Xit are assumed independent of 
the Eit for all i and t. If ai - lID (a -,0'2 ex) , At - (A -,0'21.) and Eit - (0,0'2£) independent 
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of each other, then Model 3 is the Two Way Random Effects Model (Model 3.b). In 
addition, Xjt is independent of Uj , At and Ejt for all i and t. 
In the Two Way Error Component Models, At is bank-invariant and it accounts for 
any time-specific effect that is not included in the regression. 
The second stage of the analysis' model estimation differs from the previous one 
because, now, time is singled out by the general market and economic conditions: 
nominal stability, real stability, the spread between lending and refinancing interest 
rates, regulation, and market structure measured by the Herfindhal Index of 
concentration in both the deposit and the credit markets. 
Therefore, in the second stage of the analysis, the model's general functional relation 
IS: 
9 7 
Y 11 = L f3 ) X jit + L r P X pi + fJ 11 (second stage) 
1=1 P =1 
Where Yjt and Xj are defined as above and the general market and economic 
conditions are represented by: 
XIt- Inflation Rate (INFL) 
X2t- G.D.P. growth (GDP) 
X3t - Interest Spread between lending and refinancing rates (SPREAD) 
Xtt - Regulation as a dummy variable (REG), where: 
REG=1 for a liberalised market (since 1993 until 1997) 
REG=O otherwise 
Xs t - Regulation as a dummy variable (REG 1), where: 
REG 1 = 1 for a lesser liberalised market (since 1989 until 
1992) 
REG 1 =0 otherwise 
X6t- Herfindhal Index of concentration in the deposits market (HIDEP) 
X7t- Herfindhal Index of market concentration in the credit market (HICRE), and 
lJit is the stochastic term. 
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The Pooled Regression is defined by the following disturbance structure: 
In accordance, Model l' has the following specification: 
9 7 
Y it = a + L f3 J X }It + L r p X pi + 6 11 
} = 1 P ~ 1 
(Model 1 ') 
The One Way Error Component Model (Model 2'), but with time effects as 
described above instead of unrestricted time effects as in Models 3.a. and 3.b .. is 
given by the following shape of the disturbance: 
Jilt =a, +~I 
Therefore Model 2' has the following specification: 
9 7 
Y 11 = a I + 2: f3 J X jit + 2: y p X pi + e /1 (Model 2') 
j=1 p=1 
Accordingly to the behaviour assigned to (Xi , and earlier described, this model is 
estimated as a Fixed Effects Model (Model 2'a) and a Random Effects Model 
(ModeI2'b). 
The first stage estimation results are shown on tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 for profits, 
R.O.A and R.O.E. respectively. Tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 present the results of the 
second stage modelling estimation for the same regressants. 
6.3.5. - ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
The standard OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimation technique is used for the 
Pooled Regression estimators. The LSDV (Least Squares Dummy Variable) 
approach is the procedure employed to estimate the Fixed Effects Models, where, 
given the assumed properties of Eil , the OLS estimator is the best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE). In the Two Way Fixed Effects Model the Least Squares Dummy 
Variable approach is extended to include the time-specific effect as we1l 141 • For the 
Random Effects Models the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimation procedure 
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produces more efficient estimators then the OLS 142. The estimation of the Random 
Effects Models using GLS produces consistent and asymptotically unbiased 
estimators. 
6.3.6. - HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
The analysis encompasses two broad groups of hypothesis testing. The first group 
refers to testing for fixed effects, in both the one way and the two-way models, and 
allows for the non-rejection of the Pooled Regression (null hypothesis) as the best 
model specification. The second group relates to the Hausman' s specification test, 
which under the null hypothesis allows the non-rejection of the random effects 
model. This hypothesis testing is also applied to both the one way and the two-way 
models. In conclusion, performing a test for fixed effects permits the choice between 
the pooled regression and the fixed effects model as the best model's specification, 
while the Hausman's test gives the best model specification between the fixed effects 
and the random effects models. 
Testing for fixed effects: 
The objective is to test the joint significance of the dummy variables in the LSDV 
model. 
The null hypothesis is: 
Ho: UI=U2= ... ··.·· .=.U(N-I).=UN 
Where N is the number of banks that are observed and (N-I) is the number of 
dummies included in the regression. 
An F-test is performed and the "F" statistic, which under the null hypothesis has an F 
distribution with (N-I) and [N(T -I )-K] degrees of freedom, has the following form 
141 See, for instance, Green (1997) and Baltagi (1999). 
142 See Green (1997), p.625. 
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F = (RRSS - URSS ) /(N - I) 
URSS /( NT - N - K) 
Where: 
RRSS stands for restricted residual sums of squares, being that of OLS on the pooled 
model. 
URSS stands for unrestricted residual sums of squares, being that of the LSDV 
regression. 
N is the number of banks. 
T is the number of periods. 
K is the number of explanatory variables. 
As in the above One Way Error Component Model, a test for fixed effects can be 
performed for the Two-Way Error Component Model. In this case the test for the 
joint significance of the dummy variables has the following null hypothesis: 
Ho: UI=U2=·· .=U(N-l) =UN and "'1=1..2= ........... =A(T-I)= At = 0 
The "F -statistics" is given by the following form, which under the null hypothesis 
has an F distribution with (N+T-2) and [(N-I) (T-l)-K] degrees of freedom: 
F = (RRSS -URSS)/(N +T-2) 
URSS /(N -I)(T -1) - K 
Where the restricted residuals sums of squares (RRSS) is that of pooled OLS, and the 
unrestricted residual sums of squares (URSS) is the one from the extended LSDV 
regression. 
The Hausman's specification test 
A critical assumption in the error component regression model is that E (J!it / Xit)=O. 
Given that the disturbances contain individual effects (Ui) which are unobserved but 
may be correlated with the XiI> this assumption is very important because, with 
correlation between <Xi and Xit , the GLS estimators become biased and inconsistent. 
Hausman suggests comparing the GLS estimators with the within estimators l43, both 
143 Baltagi (1999), p.68 gives a detailed description of the Hausman's specification test. 
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of which are consistent under the null hypothesis, but which will have different 
probability limits if the null hypothesis is not true. 
The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is given by: 
Ho: Uj and Xj! are uncorrelated 
The Hausman test statistic is given by: 
m 1 = q'I' (var( q'I») - 1 q 1 
Where "q' 1 =~GLS-~Wjthin 
The Hausman statistic, m\, under the null hypothesis is asymptotically distributed as 
a t distribution with K (the number of explanatory variables) degrees of freedom. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected it is not possible to use the random effects model, 
because the idea that unobservable individual invariant effects contained in the 
disturbances are uncorrelated with individual specific explanatory variables is 
rejected. Thus, the best specification model is the fixed effects model. 
6.4. - THE RESULTS 
Findings on the empirical results of this study are reported on tables 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 
6.8, and 6.9. These results are interpreted as the results of a linear regression, despite 
the complexity of the methodology that is applied 144. 
For the reasons explained just below, of the various models' specification discussed 
the best is the Two Way Error Component Model with Fixed Effects in what 
concerns the first stage of the analysis. When the behaviour of time is less 
unrestricted, what happens in the second stage of the study where time effects are 
known, the One Way Fixed Effects Error Component Model is the best model's 
specification. As mentioned, the justification follows. 
In the first stage of the analysis, and when profits behaviour is explained, the test for 
fixed effects rejects the pooled regression specification. The Haussman' s 
specification test rejects the random effects model, which means that (Xi and Xi t are 
not uncorrelated. 
144 Annexes VI to XIII (Vo!. II) show the data files that feed the unbalanced panel data models. 
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MODEL 
constant 
Table 6.4 - Profitability Regressant: Profits. First Stage of Model Estimation 
I)Pooled 
- -_ " Recression -t~-~-~~ 
---+-- -------
1 
i 
3) BANK AND TIME 
a)Fixed 1 I b)Random 1 a)Fixed 1--' --t---- _--t-~~_s__ effects ----1-- eff§l~_~_ b)Random effects 
-97876,1 -- t -- -39856.53 ----~. -21538.5 (-O.53\) -- - - .. - (~0.315) ~-- --- (-O.170) I 
ltsta ; -.-_- 108.4801' . 49.33239'. -.-- 52.19151' 33.584! . ~ _ -. 51355' j 1-- ------.--=--- ._ _ (5.708) (2.835). (3.06~ (1.873) _ __(3.007) lISts i 3,61611 13.57206' 13.91714' t 5,395135 13.2424" 
T _(0.571) ---T_ - (2.671L I (2.784) (0.850) (2.389) 
Ilia 
-t---
11,30582 -5_164520. ___ ._ :5042338 8780859 __ -2 139965 
(0.831) (-0.410) - _ (-0.410) (0.664) (-O.ln) 
Idta 35.65542' -14.50585 -368637 -22.71134' 1572493 I '. =+ (3.767) (-1185) (-0.32~ (-1.693) (-0.136) 
ddld-+----~=-- _ 959,5123 3448875 _-= 4173842 --. -3296602 __ ~-= ~..:.~_ 2316574 
, (0.521) (0.273) ...i0.330L __ (-{J.256) (0.183) 
I
ldld 1_ ___ I 963,2454 _ 3413665 4122922 -322 968 ._. _ 2223116 
T (0.523) (0.270) (0.326) (-0.250) (0.175) 
plltl -t-.. _.-- . -I -60.645!! -21.67675. _ . -18.90436 -35.16883 _~_-= -21.60719 --I 
1-_________ L ____ =1-= (-1.531) (-0.641) _u_. _ (-O.572L_I-' (-1.030) _____ __ _ (-0656) 
owner ' - i' 1085.792" ·2482.551' .- -2099.023' -1448.814' -1908.819' 
1 (2_277) (-4.746). (-4.148) I , (-2.587) (-3.698) 
. ___ - .. It ·286.404" -78.7295 _+ _______ . j -110,1903 +503.1259. _-t..±2,27784 (-2.304) (-0832) _ _ (-\ 175) (3.055) (-0538) endow 
i 
IDF 1--- __ -- __ ---1---~5 65~_t---_~ __ -=~ -=-=------t= 627 
R-squared . + 010262 060859. _ _ _ __ U,O-'''YO _ __ 
I ,I . -t------- l Autogxr!:!. of ' _+ 0,145~89 0,145089 --r- 0~~.7~ 0.146374 
,"F"-statistics --:-~- 26379 - .=- --f~bill,--+----
d.f. I 32;654 57:628 
--' .. ---- -----t 
+--_._----
I~O.I411 ~ 
I Haussman test 
Iprob. Value =l 0,00000 =T 0,00000 +-__ 
df: Drob. Value 9 : 0 02793 19: 000000 
---. - - - i8:691' __ no '--r- ----r . 46.91 
-r 
Th< -"'" ..., ~ _01" ""~""'~ ... "" """""', -~ H_ - t---+----+------~ 
:.=.':.,::,,1,':.,= . .:J I i-=-i- -.----j---.--l--==-=.r=. 
;'~:~=la~~el~!.I~ _-1_____ --- ----- -- - --------', ---- - -i---- - -+ --
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Table 6.5 - Profitability Regressant: R.O.A. First Stage of Model 
MODEL I 11Pooled I 2) BANK ! 3) BANK AND TIME 
-=1 1--~=- =_ =:=~-=l----- Regression 
a)Fixed -1-------+\ -b-)R-an-do_m 1- -1-
effects effects 
'-=-=l=- b)Random 
a)Fixed I effects 
effects . 
conslant ----+--- I 35.96368!! . r-=_mm _____ I I 18.75287 1 12.4841 
(1.587) (0.901) (0.611) 
Isla 
----t------ 0.01598' I. . 0.00131 - ± . I 0.00599" 1 I 0.004217!! ! 0.007978' 
(6.837) ___ _ 1 (0.464) . _ __ _ _ (2.272) I (1.468) ~ (3.063) 
(0.213) (2.633) (1.666) (3.138) (2.379) 
IgSIS __ 0.0001658 : 0.00220r 0.001324! $03192' 0.002171" 
IIta -- -- -- 0.008418' I 0.006684' -. 0.00659' I 0.009759' 0.008725' 
----- -- - (5.029) ----~ (3.217) (3.468) 1 (4.604) (4.600) 
~. --- -- . --- -+--- -0.008854' . -+._-0.00314!! l= -0.0061' 1-0.00335!!. -I - -- __ 4_-.0·00693' 
.. ________ '_. __ . (-7.606) _____ ...!_i:.!.555) _. (-3.860) +-i:-'~O)_--l- _______ (-4.298) 
Iddtd : -0.362111 -0.12706 -0.1872 I -0.05969: -0.127545 
~-- -1-- (-1.598) T (-0.609) _ __ I (-0.900) .1 (-02~~ _____ [_ (-0.624) 
-0.36101!! i -0.129557 I -0.18842 1-0.05911 I -0.12576 
. (-1.593) (-0.620) 1= (-0.906) t- (-0.286). (-0.615) 
tp.u--- -- =-=,--'--:'-=_ -0.006398!! 4003689_ -0.002732 I O.O()()~ ---r=== 0.00039-
. (-1.314) (-0.662) (-0.532) (0.064)' (0.078) 
end_ 
--1 -0.028179 '_~~()582' :t.- -0.19504** ~44694* _____ ~__ -0.30396' 
(0.481) (-3.545) (-2.575) I (-4.981), (-3.907) 
___ . ____ . _ O.I;t:=::r --------f-()_'~~r---=-~ 0j!3:::; __ -----J~~~. -r-------- ~~ 
owner 
OF 685 -t-- 653 ----+-- -+ 627 
R-squared 0.28532 0.43927 
-+--. ---t 0.24254_-t- 0.57912 
e~.I) - --. • . • i . Esld.Autocorr.lationof --- ___ 0202781 0202781 ------=1 0215973 016634 
"F·-statislic;-· 5.602 ,--- -. 5.983 i- -
d.t. 32;654 I 57;628. 
prob. Value --- - 0.00000 I 0.00000 + 
Haussman test - ---"" - 34.63 I ----;- --
dt ; prob. Value 9;0.000069 --""---
The I-statistrc tests are reported in parentheses under each coeflicient estimates 
• Significant at t,!! 1 "'_ level 
··Significant at the 5'" 1eYe! 
! SignifICant at th.e 1.0'" 1eYe! +---___ _ 
!! Signiflcanl at'the -20'" 1eYe! 
--I- -+------~-
---------t-------t----- ""-------
----------t _________ -+- ______ J 
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_____ --" __ 0.2305 
___ ~_=_--~.175658--
·---·-------E-___ ~12 - '----
9:0000127--- - -- ---
--t-------
L 
----{------
._---1-- -----, 
MODEL 
Table 6.6 - Profitability Regressant: R.O.E. First Stage of Model Estimation 
1)pooIed 
Regressi~ 
~-- --j--
a)Fixed 
effects 
2) BANK 
b)Random 
effects 
--+-
a)Fixed 
effects 
3) BANK AND TIME 
b)Random 
effects 
--------4-------- 7;,;~~=-1-== f--- ---==i- -~:;' -= F~-=--=t~=~-- --t~~-~:~~---constant 
tsta 0.118- 0,02226 0,0418 0.083681 0.080951 
(2.976) (0.449) (0.917) (1.684) (1.793) 
gsls --- -0.024061 ___ :_~_ -0_1294 -0017 - __ ---- -0.003177 -0011711 
(-1_8201_____ _ __ ___ (-O_897) (-1244)_ _ (-O.181) (-O.739) 
Uta 0_0754- _ __ -0.01742 0,004643 -0.14935 0,0143 
(2.656) __ - :~ - ~~- ~~ _ - (-OA86) (O.141) _~ -_--- (-OA07) - (O.435)_ 
Idta 0.04378-- 0.07201- 0.0409!! 0.09142-- 0.03237 
- _.- - ._. - -. --'- - -
___ .~_)____ _ ____ I--_{2.067)_ (1.491) ______________ (2458) (1154L 
ddtd 4,6468 5.139111 5.08577!! 8.0278- 7.3075-
(1.209) (1.426) (1.417) (2.245) (2067) ~dtd---- 4,6676 51078!! 5.07666'1 8.0298- 7.3468-_. . ___ . (1_214) (IAI7) (IAI4) (2.245) (2.077) pIIII 0,04435 __ 0,01986 0,03813 0,08677 0,08453 
----- (0537) __ _ __ _=__ (0206) (04291._= _-=-=: --_.J.O~ (0970) 
1_ -3.2092- __ _ ___ _ -3.5302- -30419- ________ _ -70169- -5.396-
(-3_226) (-2.371) (-2.32) (-452) (-3995) 
endow 0.7476- 0.9356- I 0.88727" 0,16444 I 0.060171 
(2.883) (3.474) (3A) (0360) (1 682) 
IoF 
---- --- --------t-------- 653 627 
__ _ ___ 0.43895 =t 0.015251 ---6B5 _.--~~~ ____ 0,141 0,3122 0,024237 
-::t 0,385631 Estd. Autocorrelation of 
e(i,t) 
"F" -statistics 
df ~~~~ ---------;-
--1 0,385631 1----------1 0,392246 
0.00000 
J
. 3~~ --t-----. 
L " _ . -I------;j:.::~12,57-+-= __ . 
!he t-stabsbc tests are reported in parentheses LIlder each ~ e~llmates. =t _____ _ 
~au~~test~----------+_----------~-­
df . prob Value 
- S9>ifocant at the 1" level 1 
-Significant at the 5" level 
1 Significan at tte 10% level I 
11 Significant at the 20% level 
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--~--
- - - --- 0.35956 t---------\ 0.355997 
---- -- ~ .----.. -. ---
4.686 =t 
__ 57,626 _ _ __ _ __ _ 
0.00000 
--~~~ct~-=-
-- -- ----+---- I =t= 
--- -----+_. -- -----
Table 6.7- Profitability Regressant: Profits. Second Stage of Model Estimation 
MODEL 1')Pooled I R.g,,,,,,, ! 
constant -45934.45 
(-0249 ) 
2') BANK+ECONOMIC AND 
MARKET GENERAL CONDITIONS 
a)Flxed 
effects 
b)i{andom 
effects 
13669,44 
--(-0109)-
tsta 
----t--. __ 9_~_57_~ ~-~-~-'-. t--------- _ c-3(3
1 
~~j'--j 
- -=_ 3,4384-1 
35.2059" 
.L~c~!) __ 
3,4419 
tdta 
(0.592) 
3,2728 
(0 254) 
(05J8) 
2,2564 
(0 178) 
33.48759' -19.72811 -11.6195 
~~~~~----~-~~~--1 
1-:--0-,-------- _t-_--I_--:-':-(33 5 8) ______ -t-<:J..2~~--1 (-0_ 912 ) 
ddtd 424,5446 -173.949 1 -132.0489 
~td-'-_-=-------_=---~-_~---Ir-__ ---t--~_ iNN3~-~~=~ ~~r--~~~{~ J=- . ---~-j-/~~ 
(0.232) (-0.137) i (0.105) 
pUtl -72.971211 -34.35317 -31.5794 
- ------
._. 
(-1.~42) (~1030) 1 _(-09_6n 
owner 1617.606' -1597.675' -1357.46'. 
~~do;---
P,--I_45) (-2904) (-2519L 
c--.---- .-----.--- -- . 33,32362 392 188' 357.421.' 
'1 --(O~187)--- (2639) (2429) 
infl 
_-___ 8 9~.:.:.7:.:.4:,:1 ::-6.:3_ -t------t- - I 0 8 6J~-*-~~ IO~: ~~X~ 
(-I 177) (-2.022) (-I 972) 
.---. - - ----
~'!.!?----- .. 
reg 
--
-t--
____ J9 __ I}_590_1-_ _ __ J_~,23 96 37,5254 
J=-O"~g) ... ___ .____ _ __ (O~_~~)_ 1 (0332) 
._ 8.5_,?2 .. 568_ 47,775 . 46,7736 ~(104~~26l7=:~ ~1-I~o~iU~=-1 I ;~93:~~" 
(0.654) (1.346) (1.337) 
~r~e~g~I _______ t--_+--.:I-.:~:.:;~~63:-:·~:-:~~;:':'!':"'! -+-----+-=-1 ~I(-:-~ -=:;84';;~-;;~_:_~'-'-! 1 __ =~_=~~~:~ __ 1178.009!1 ----.----
__ ~Ji~ _ 
~ _________ --j ___ r_-3--;8-;:-7-;9~4;-:.5-:-1----t ____ . __ 1_2~?..'.~3. ____ _ 
I--ht.c-re.-------.-- (0.876) --t------ __ ~.Q~) - .,_ 
-33725.46!! -17367.44 i 
(-1.286) (0.958) 
1-=---------- --
DF r--------- -- -
---6-7-8-- t------- -1---646-- -t------
------. -- - ------ +---
R-squared 0, I 2622 --- - 0728J -5-; ---'-----~-.----r- - ----- t 
I--------:~--__::_lr_-t---.- ----'--- ----- ~- -.----.--~.--
Estd.Autocorrelalionof 0,113882 0,113882 
e(i,l) r----
I 
I------c---:------r----r--·--·-· -.- - --.- .. -
_ I.i~~~~ __ 
(04..~8 ) 
-18952.05 
(-1.048) 
0,116872 
"F"-statistics __27.25 
d'-r------- 32:647 ______ .... _. ___ ._. _. __ _ 
prob. Value 0,00000 ____ ~_ __ _. _________ _ 
.!:1au~~mantest: _ -__ ~_ _ _ -. :- ~_-___ ~ ______ ~ _ 15,32 __ _ 
..!!f,~!> __ yalue -----r-- ________________ f- ____ ,~_1013 ___ _ 
_ ______ _____ _ _ ______ '----c-_____________ L_____ _ _ _ _____ _ 
The 1-.,lalisUc tests are reported in parentheses under each coeffICIent estimates 
, Significant at the I % level 
"Significant at the S% level 
:rSi8ni!i~'-- at the 10% level 
!! Significant at the 20% level 
--t------- -f---._-.----f--- ----- ------.--
--1---- --- --- f-- -- ------ ----- -.- --- t-------.-.--. 
172 
Table 6.8 - Profitability Regressant: R.O.A. Second Stage of Model Estimation 
MODEL J')Pooled Regression 
2') BANK+ECONOMI(' AND MARKET 
GENERAL CONDITIONS 
I 
--~--. - - --- -~- , --Ti,)~8~dO';-
l a)F ,xed effects 
constant 19,7654 
1-------- _~---- _ (0.9]i~ 
tsta ! __ 0.01904' 
(8322 ) 
~ _____ . 0,001089 
(1255 ) 
tlta 0.009521' 
--_._- -- -- - -(5.804 ) 
tdta 
-.-~--~ -- -1-· --~------------. ---
0.004269 " 
I (1505) 
1000263-5 '+~'-:--
I (2809) 
0.008577' 
(41IJ) 
effects 
p~ltl __ .________ --r-..:.O.:Q.~~~~---t-------- __ Q.,0003~ _________ _. _.Q,~0_'__~?.4. _ 
1-______ -+-__ 1----'("-'-0.552) -~lL--r__---- ~~4~L __ 
~o:.:w.:..:n.:.:e::.r--------If----l--.-=-0:.:.1_:.5~8::8-·-- ____________ r-_-0.4~9· ___ t-_____ :(°_
4
.3.
7
7
0
8
9
°-).- _ 
1--____ . __ -1-_+---->-(--=.2.:..::..5.-"-'94) (-5431) ______ _ 
0.11724· 0.09807· - t-- O-iOO-91'---endow 
(0.261) (-0148) 
0~0_!.3.~4 _ 0,006672 
(-0023 ) 
---r- 0,00783 
(0408) 
_____ (~·~~~L t- (0345) 
0.4353·· 04445" 04389" 
(2.087) (2328) (2303) 
I-
r
-
eg-I--------:---l--=-0'"'.I=-=g'-='4=79-!:':-:-'-I------t---:-0==.3-:.0-:.4=-7·=----+--------1-- 0-2(;952-.-
r---------------+- ____ L!_398)__ _ ________ _ ....!1l.P.?1. --:-r- (2.227) --
~icI:E.___ ______ t-4,?911~___ 4,9717 5,0231 
• (0.909) ------ - ---(1.024j-- ,<I-,Q~.L __ 
hicre- - - ---'---r --1--12.3894'-- ---------- ---~OO~ 11.98463' 
(3.970) (4101) (4.124) 
f--·-·------+--I----::6:::7-:-S··--t------+---6:-:4--:'6--r---------·-
~ .. -----.----'-.-+-------t--- --.+------'----f-.------.-
R-squared 0,34837 0,55964 0,291611 
Estd. Autocorrelation of ~ 0,162082 
e(i,t) 0,162082 r---------
-t-------- ------ - --
0,171046 
--
;f:_·stat~_~i.:.~ _____ .;..___ ____ ____ ----t---- 51537_. -
d.f t-' 32;647 J.=.'---------- -~--------r__- 000000 --.-- ------ - -
Iprob. Value .----1---- --------1----'-------
._- -----
Haussman test 34,43 ~~~f~;_~ .. ~rr~~~~:_~~~_~7~~~.~-~_-.~-__ -.---~_~-1-_~-~_-~~~-~--_--_-_-__ -_---~-r-_-_-.--.--_---r----------t.1~6~;O~on04~7~5~-t-----------
The 1-"laIMic tests are reported in paren_theses under .cac_h_coeffic,ent estimates 
;, -Significant at th~ 1% level . 
~·Sil.:'l!~fica~tat .!h_e_5r~ level 
'S!J!lific_ant att"-e_~O"(o le~e! .. 
!! Significant at the 20% level 
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Table 6.9 - Profitability Regressant: R.D.E. Second Stage of Model Estiamtion 
ddtd 
E.!!tl 
8.1394·· 
(2224 ) 
8 1336·· 
(2348 ) 
8.2011·· 8.06·· 81651 •• 
-'.-. f := r' ~·(0-2.··12147-~.T.1 . --1
1 
.. --'=-~.' ·-·--0(2,_-0·38-:8[87)8-~ - - . J2 3 561. 
_._~-,-09_B!.-_ 
--- f-__ (1!8~) __ --=====-<0.9521.. __ ~~_== __ .~ __ JLI46L 
!-'o'--w;..;n_e_r ___ . ____ +._-+ __ -_6._2_7,..,B_·_+_ I -7.061' . __________ . __ ~~4~~~_ 
(-6.141) (-4.613) (-4701) 
endow 
-0 1755 0,2087 0,13777 
(-0.495) i (0.505) (0.350) 
intl -0.1163 1 ~ -0.18365 -0 17735 1=.- - .-- -.-... ~.- . ------. --~--- ----.+ '- - .. ---.-.--...... -.- .---_. 
1-,-' -----~.-_i:_(-0.768,L+-___ ... __ ...:.._ i:.!}28) .. r---.- __ (-1.205). 
Igdp _ -0.1864 ' --------1----- -0.2466 __ 1--- -0.2054 
1--____ .-- _t--i:.Q~+==-----~--L:0782)--.-t--.- (-Oc6J}~_ 
~ __ . __ ._ ....... _-+-_Jl,!~3_8! __ ..!- .. _. __ .-l-_Jl.~!.99.__ ___ __0~~4~L'!.. _ 
1--_'____ I (1.159) i .. ----- .. +-~~I-)--.t--.---. _ _5L~3_4_) __ 
reg 0,04348 1 1 0,2826 '_r_OJ_~_ 
~----. ~~50BI:i+'---' ---;-~~O~W--- . --.~Q~~~~.--
(0.265) (0508) (0.403) 
hidep 145.823! 172.259'· 160.752' 
(1.657) -2,06 (1932) 
hicre 1---- ! 116.15" 86.6765' --95453'--
-(2:22'9)1 (1719.) (1909) 
DF ; 678· t 646 ~""'~ :m~ -1:= [~~5~!j=-_-_~_--~~}4_~~~ 
Estd. Autocorrelation of ~ 0,331097 0,331097 I-------l 
e(I.I) 0,334348 
"F"-statistics 4,03. _____ ______ ____ . ____ _ 
~. --.-... ---- __ ~·_----·-i+--~3"-'2;c:.6-'-47~--+ _. _____ 1----__ . ---"--"-'. -_. ---
l.I!p:.:.lr:::;ob:.:._V:..:a:.:I:::UC=--___ + __ +-__ ·· _____ i--::.O-".O:.:O.:.O.::..OO"----+_._---_.. --- .---
~~a-n-t-e-st--- 1------- -1---- -.-1-.---- -'13:15- . - ---
df; ..£.rob. Value 16; 0.6614 
The I-.<lallsli(' tests are reported in parentheses under each coefficient estimates 
• Significant at the 1 % level I . ----+------t 1__ __ 
"Sisnificant at the 5% level I __ .. ___ ~_ .. ___ . ____ _ 
~jficant_~!!te_~O% leve_,r--_. . __ ._ ... "1 ..... ___ ...... _ .. , 
_._--
!! Significant at the 20% leveif I ' 
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Finally the goodness of tit is higher for the Two Way Error Component Model than 
for the One Way Error Component Model. Thus, the best model specification is the 
Two Way Fixed Effects Error Component Model and the estimated model is l4s 
(Model 3 a, table 6.4): 
PROFITS=33.584 TSTA+5.395GSTS+8.78ITLTA-22.711 TOTA -329.660 OOTO -322.968 TOTO 
(17.930) (6.3491) (13.233) (13.418) (1290) (1290.3) 
-35.169 PLLTL -1448.814 OWNER +503.126 ENDOW + J...l 
(34.138) (560.07) (164.69) 
Still in the first stage of the study but focusing attention on R.O.A. behaviour, the 
pooled regression is rejected, the random effects model is rejected at the 1 % level of 
significance, as before Uj and Xj t are not uncorrelated, and the R-squared is higher 
for the Two Way Error Component Model. The study concludes that the Two Way 
Fixed Effects Error Component Model (model 3 a, table 6.5) is the best model 
specification and the estimated model for R.O.A. is: 
R.O.A. = 0.004 TSTA + 0.003 GSTS + 0.010 TLTA - 0.003 TOTA - 0.060 OOTO - 0.059 TOTO 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.207) (0.207) 
+ 0.0004 PLLTL - 0.447 OWNER + 0.131 ENOOW + I.l 
(0.005) (0.090) (0.026) 
Finally, when R.O.E. is the regressant in the first stage (table 6.6), testing for fixed 
effects rejects the pooled regression. The Hausman's specification test does not reject 
the null hypothesis that Uj and Xj tare uncorrelated, pointing towards a random 
effects model as the best model specification. Nevertheless, the design of the 
unbalance panel data model suggests that the fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate specification. In fact, for several cross-sectional units the model does not 
have enough observations to assign a random distribution to both the omitted bank-
specific variables and the time effects across each cross sectional unit l46. In favour of 
the choice of a fixed effects model instead of a random effects model, lies the 
argument that the fixed effects model is an appropriate specification if the analysis is 
focussing on a specific set of banks not randomly drawn from a large population, as 
14S The standard errors are reported in parentheses under each coefficient estimates. 
146 The evidence for this suggestion is shown in annex (number of banks for the unbalanced panel 
data). 
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is the case with this research. Opting for a fixed effects model, the statistical 
inference in this study is conditional on the particular 33 banks and over the specific 
26 semi-annual time periods observed. In conclusion, the best model specification is 
the Two Way Fixed Effects Error Component Model and the estimated model is 
(Model 3 a, table 6.6): 
R.O.E. = 0.084 TSTA - 0.003 GSTS - 0.149 TLTA + 0.091 TDTA + 8.028 DDTD + 8.030 TDTD 
(0.0450) (0.018) (0.037) (0.037) (3.576) (3.577) 
+ 0.0.87 PLLTL -7.017 OWNER + 0.164 ENDOW + f.l 
(0.095) (1.553) (0.457) 
The justification for the best models' specification that follows apply to the second 
stage of the study (tables 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9) where profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E. are 
analysed respectively. 
The test for fixed effects rejects the pooled regression for profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E. 
In what concerns R.O.A. the Hausman's specification test is significant at the 1% 
level, which mean that ai and Xi t are not uncorrelated. Therefore the best model 
specification for ROA is the One Way Fixed Effects Error Component Model with 
known time effects and the estimated model is (Model 2' a, table 6.8): 
R.O.A. = 0.004 TSTA + 0.003 GSTS + 0.001 TLTA - 0.002 TOT A - 0.018 DOTO - 0.019 TOTO 
(0.003) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.202) (0.202) 
+ 0.0004 PLLTL - 0.483 OWNER + 0.098 ENDOW - 0.007 INF - 0.003 GOP + 0.007 SPREAD 
(0.005) (0.089) (0.024) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) 
+ 0.445 REG + 0.301 REG 1 + 4.972 HIDEP + 12.009 HICRE + f.l 
(0.191) (0.122) (4.856) (2.929) 
Table 6.10 shows the estimators for the bank-specific omitted variables ai'S. These 
estimators are estimated in each model together with the disturbances. 
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Table 6.10- R.O.A.-Estimated Fixed Effects-one Way Error Component Model 
with General Economic and Market Conditions 
Bank Number of Coefficient Bank Number of Coefficient 
observations observations 
BBV 26 -0.57199 BNP 24 -0.64346 
BBI 26 -0.21432 Citi 24 -0.02390 
BCA 26 0.00090 BCP 23 -0.31933 
BFE 26 0.16431 BCI 23 -0.62961 
BES 26 -0.20057 BIC 23 -0.55892 
BFB 26 -0.39839 BANIF 19 -0.76532 
BPSM 26 -0.30422 BNU 19 -0.39304 
BPA 26 -0.15553 ABN 16 -0.52502 
BTA 26 -0.26964 DBI 15 -0.07613 
CGn 26 0.13801 BMI 14 -0.28489 
CL 26 -0.76388 BNCI 12 -0.76183 
CPP 26 -0.51018 BII 9 -0.45794 
Chemical 26 0.51978 Finantia 9 0.62107 
MG 26 -0.56370 CISF 9 -0.01187 
B.MELL 26 -0.45622 Finibanco 9 -0.43510 
BPI 25 0.30976 BSN 8 0.12511 
Barclays 24 -0.69076 
In the case of measuring banking profitability by profits and R.O.E., Hausman's test 
null hypothesis that (Xi and Xi tare uncorrelated is not rejected. Nevertheless, due to 
the design of the data, the study does not have enough cross-sectional observations to 
make good estimation of (Xi - lID ( 0.,0'2 ex). Therefore, instead of a random effects 
model, the analysis uses a One Way Error Component Fixed Effects Model with 
known time effects. This is the best models' specification chosen both for profits and 
R.O.E., this is models 2'a in tables 6.7 and 6.9, respectively. The resulting estimated 
models are: 
PROFITS=33.l44 TSTA+3.4380STS+3.273TLTA-19.728 TDTA -173.949 DDTD -171.151 TDTD 
(17.547) (5.803) (12.886) (12.847) (1249.1) (1249.6) 
-34.353PLLTL-I 597.6750WNER+392. 188ENOOW-108.69 INF + 50.240 GDP + 47.775 SPREAD 
(33.337) (550.24) (148.60) (53.759) (113.30) (119.71) 
+ 1590.229 REG + 1118.645 REO 1 + 12287.63 HIDEP - 17367.44 HICRE + ~ 
(1181.6) (752.1) (30049) (18121) 
R.O.E.= 0.083 TSTA - 0.001 GSTS - 0.018 TLTA + 0.080 TDTA + 8.050 DDTD + 8.060 TOTO 
(0.049) (0.016) (0.036) (0.036) (3.475) (3.477) 
+ 0.089 PLLTL -7.061 OWNER + 0.209 ENDOW - 0.184 INF - 0.247 GDP + 0.320 SPREAD 
(0.093) (1.531) (0.041) (0.150) (0.315) (0.333) 
+ 0.283 REO + 1.064 REO 1 + 172.259 HlDEP + 86.677 HICRE + ~ 
(3.288) (2.093) (83.602) (50.415) 
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The bank-specific omitted variables' estimators are shown in tables 6.11 and 6.12 for 
profits and R.O.E., respectively. 
Table 6.11- PROFITS-Estimated Fixed Effects-One Way Error Component Model 
with General Economic and Market Conditions 
Bank Number of Coefficient Bank Number of Coefficient 
observations observations 
BBY 26 16365 BNP 24 16128 
BBI 26 19296 Citi 24 15869 
BCA 26 18071 BCP 23 20645 
BFE 26 21388 BCI 23 15745 
BES 26 23669 BIC 23 16540 
BFB 26 18816 BANIF 19 16705 
BPSM 26 19778 BNU 19 17291 
BPA 26 23407 ABN 16 15823 
BTA 26 22249 DBI 15 16595 
CGD 26 35787 BMI 14 15414 
CL 26 15704 BNCI 12 15345 
CPP 26 18932 BII 9 16244 
Chemical 26 15976 Finantia 9 15507 
MG 26 18539 CISF 9 15220 
B.MELL 26 18442 Finibanco 9 15319 
BPI 25 16736 BSN 8 15834 
Barclays 24 15738 
Table 6.12- R.O.E.-Estimated Fixed Effects-one Way Error Component Model 
with General Economic and Market Conditions 
Bank Number of Coefficient Bank Number of Coefficient 
observations observations 
BBY 26 -832 BNP 24 -833 
BBI 26 -832 Citi 24 -829 
BCA 26 -827 BCP 23 -833 
BFE 26 -826 BCI 23 -835 
BES 26 -826 BIC 23 -831 
BFB 26 -834 BANIF 19 -835 
BPSM 26 -833 BNU 19 -832 
BPA 26 -827 ABN 16 -828 
BTA 26 -832 DBI 15 -829 
CGD 26 -825 BMI 14 -831 
CL 26 -835 BNCI 12 -833 
CPP 26 -831 BII 9 -818 
Chemical 26 -827 Finantia 9 -827 
MG 26 -818 CISF 9 -825 
B.MELL 26 -834 Finibanco 9 -832 
BPI 25 -829 BSN 8 -825 
Barclays 24 -835 
It is worthwhile mentioning the conclusion of the analysis that the shape assigned to 
time effects on banking profitability in the second stage of the study seems to explain 
time effects very closely. In fact, comparing models 3 a) with models 2'a) for each 
banking profitability measure, the explanatory capacity of the adjustment perfonned 
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Table 6.13 - First Stage - Bank Specific Variables 
Effect on Banking Profitability Variables 
Profits R.O.A R.OE. 
Total Securities / Total Positive and significant at Positive and significant at Positive and significant at 
Assets the 10% level the 20% level the 10% level 
Government Securities/ Statistically non-significant Positive and significant at Statistically non-sign i ficant Total Securities the 1% level ~ 
Positive and significant at ~ Total LoansITota1 Statistically non-significant 1:1 Assets the 1% level Statistically non-significant 
= fIl e ... Total Deposits/ Total Negative and significant at Negative and significant at Positive and significant at 
... 1:1 
'f: .5 Assets the 10% level the 20% level the 5% level Demand DepositslTotal Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant Positive and significant at ~ e Deposits the 5% level 
=- ... b'I~ Time DepositslTotal Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant Positive and significant at 1:I't Deposits the 5% level :i!Q 
1:1 Provisions Loan Losses/ Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant 
= Total Loans CC Negative and significant at Negative and significant at Negative and significant at Ownership the 1% level the 1% level the 1% level 
"Endowment Effect" Positive and significant at Positive and significant at Statistically non-significant the 1% level the 1% level 
Table 6.14 - Second Stage - Bank Specific and Time Variables 
Effect on Banking Profitability Variables 
Profits R.O.A R.OE. 
Total Securities / Total Positive and significant at Positive and significant at Positive and significant at 
Assets the 10% level the 20% level the 10% level 
Government Securities/ Statistically non-significant Positive and significant at Statistically non-significant Tolal Securities the 1% level 
Total Loansrrotal Assets Statistically non-significant 
Positive and significant at Statistically non-significant 
the 1% level 
Total Deposits/ Total Negative and significant at Statistically non-significant Positive and significant at 
fIl AsselS the 20% level the 5% level 
... 
Positive and 1:1 Demand Deposils/Tolal Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant 
significant at 
= Deposits the 5% level 1:1 
... 
Deposils/T olal Positive and significant Ei Time Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant at 
... Deposits the 5% level ~ 
t; Provisions Loan Losses/ Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant Q Total Loans 
~ Negative and significant at Negative and significant at Negative and significant at ~ Ownership 1:1 the 1% level the 1% level the 1% level 
= Positive and significant at Positive and significant at E "Endowment Effect" the 1% level the 1% level Statistically non-significant 
'f: Inflation Negative and significant at Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant ~ the 5% level 
=- Statistically non-significant b'I GDP Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant 
:! Spread Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant Statistically non-significant 
=  Positive and significant at Positive and significant at CC Statistically non-significant Regulation the 20% level the 5% level 
Positive and significant at Positive and significant at Statistically non-significant Regulation J the 20% level the 1% level 
Herfindahl Index Positive and significant at 
(deposits) Statistically non-significant 
Statistically non-significant the 5% level 
Positive and significant at Positive and significant at 
Herfindahllndex (credit) Statistically non-significant the 1% level the 10% level 
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changes very slightly: 63.896% versus 62.815% for profits, 57.912% versus 55.964% 
for R.O.A. and 43.895% versus 42.934% for R.O.E .. 
The results of the Two Way Fixed Effects Error Component Models are summarised 
in table 6.13, while a synthesis of the One Way Fixed Effects Models with known 
time effects is shown in table 6.14. 
The analysis discloses some main features that are worth highlighting immediately, 
namely, the strong evidence about the effect of ownership and the "endowment 
effect" on banking profitability (always with the expected sign). This clearly 
reinforces the idea that banks that act as profit maximising firms are more profitable 
than banks that fulfil other goals like the implementation of macroeconomic controls 
and/or allocative controls, which was the case of Portuguese state owned banks. The 
study also allows the conclusion that the downward trend in the Portuguese interest 
rates from 1985 onwards had a negative impact on Portuguese banking profitability, 
which explains the emphasis on raising income from the second margin (net non-
interest income) as described in chapter 3147• 
Another important conclusion is the inability of the model to prove the statistically 
significant importance of the relationship between real stability and banking 
profitability. This fact, together with the results obtained with nominal stability, 
reinforces the idea expressed by Hoggarth et al (1998) that nominal macroeconomic 
stability appears to be more relevant to banking performance than real 
macroeconomic staLility. The negative sign of the inflation rate as a determinant of 
banking profits in the Portuguese system is unexpected and difficult to explain, since 
a greater commitment to monetary discipline should have lowered banking 
profitability . 
In what concerns management quality, Miller and Noulas (1997) researched the 
impact of several ratios on R.O.A.. As depicted in tables 6.13 and 6.14, these 
authors' results are confirmed to the following ratios: total loans to total assets and 
total securities to total assets. The ratio of Government securities to total securities is 
147 P. 62. 
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found statistically ~ignificant while Miller and Noulas, on the contrary found it 
statistically non-significant. This ratio's significance and positive sign can be 
explained by the fact that until 1995 Portuguese debt held by banks was out of the 
legal provisioning rules. 
Miller and Noulas studied the determinants of the banking performance measure 
R.O.A .. The model developed in this chapter extends the statistical significance of 
several management quality ratios studied by Miller and Noulas to the other 
measures of banking profitability profits and R.O.E .. That is, in respect of: total 
securities over total assets, total deposits to total assets and demand deposits to total 
deposits. The ratio total securities to total assets is statistically significant and 
positive to explain profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E., which can suggest that, during the life 
span of the study, Portuguese banks were coping well with risk in capital markets, 
that is market risk. 
According to the study'S results, market concentration is only statistically significant 
in explaining RO.E and with the expected positive sign in the credit market but with 
an unexpected positive sign in de deposits market. Unexpected because, during the 
life span of the study, competition has been fiercer on deposits than on credit. R.O.A. 
is also significantly affected statistically by concentration but only in the credit 
market, with the expected positive sign as well, while market structure is not 
statistically significant on explaining profits' behaviour. These conclusions suggest 
that entry in the banking market follov.ed by increasing competition on deposits 
hasn't jeopardised the soundness and stability of the Portuguese Banking System. 
Finally, under the assumption that average profitability has increased with financial 
regulatory reform in Portugal, not only regulation is statistically significant in 
explaining banking profitability when measured by profits and RO.A., as regulation 
shows the expected positive sign. The study also finds that regulation is not 
statistically significant in explaining RO.E. Models 2'a (table 6.7) and 2'a (table 6.8) 
allow some conclusions to be drawn concerning the behaviour of the average 
profitability as a cor.sequence of changes on financial rules: 
a) The average profitability estimation measured both by profits and by R.O.A. has 
increased with financial regulatory reform in Portugal. 
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b) Comparing periods 1985-1988 with 1993- J 997, the average profits' estimation 
has increased by 1,590 millions of escudos. 
c) The comparison between 1985-1988 and 1989-1992 concludes that estimated 
average profits have increased 1,119 millions of escudos. 
d) Between 1989-1992 and 1993-1997 the estimation of the average profits has 
increased by 471 millions of escudos (l ,590 millions less 1,119 millions) 
e) Average R.O.A. estimation has increased by 0.4445 percentage points between 
1985-1988 and 1993-1997. 
f) Comparing the period 1985-1988 with the period 1989-1992, the study allows the 
conclusion that average R.O.A. estimation has increased by 0.3047 percentage 
points. 
g) Between periods 1989-1992 and 1993-1997 the average R.O.A. estimation has 
increased by 0.1398 percentage points. 
Returning to the proposition to be tested in this chapter that "Regulation significantly 
affects banking profitability", the analysis concludes that this is not a false 
proposition in what concerns profits and R.O.A.. Furthermore the study carried out in 
this chapter suggests that average profitability has increased with financial regulatory 
reform in Portugal. 
To conclude, differences in the profitability (and R.O.A.) across time and across 
banks are due to a number of "balance sheet" factors, notably the ratio of securities 
to total assets. The ratio of loans to total assets and the ratio of government securities 
to total assets also explain R.O.A. behaviour, while the ratio of total deposits to total 
assets explains profitability measured by ?rofits. In addition, dummies for periods of 
greater liberalisation show that in these periods profits and R.D.A. were higher than 
they would otherwise have been, given the structure of banks balance sheets. The net 
effect of liberalisation is, however, hard to gauge. Some of the regulatory changes 
stimulated changes in the structure of banks balance sheets so the coefficients on Reg 
and Reg 1 do not capture all the effects. 
The information contained in tables 6.14 is used to build what may be call a Regime 
Switching Model of Risk for the Banking System and this will be explained and 
developed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7. - A REGIME SWITCHING MODEL OF RISK FOR 
THE BANKING SYSTEM 
7.1. - INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter two models are developed which may be broadly termed a Regime 
Switching Model of Risk for the Banking System. These models derive their 
structure from finance theory and from econometric modelling and test the 
hypothesis that changes in profitability after liberalisation may have been 
accompanied by changes (increases) in risk. Risk is measured for each time period 
(half year) by the ratio of the standard de· ... iation of profits to expected profits and by 
the ratio of the standard deviation of R.O.A. to expected R.O.A. These are the 
selected banking profitability variables used in this chapter, since as was proved in 
the preceding chapter, the effect of regulation on R.O.E. is not statistically 
significant. However, using the ratio of the standard deviation of the R.O.A. to the 
expected R.O.A. presents a limitation since the R.O.A. is already a percentage, and is 
potentially zero when the ratio would be infinite. Expected profits and expected 
R.O.A. are measured by the fitted values for each period from regressions on pages 
172 and 173 of chapter 6, respectively. Similarly, the standard deviation in each 
period is measured ;y the standard deviation of the profits of each bank from this 
expected value and by the standard deviation of the R.O.A. of each bank from this 
expected value. An important limitation of this is that it measures differences across 
banks, rather than the likely volatility of profits and R.O.A. facing an individual 
bank. Therefore, there is an implicit assumption that all banks face similar risks 
(when this cross-sectional estimator would be valid). 
The model based on finance theory is applied in section 7.2. and aims at testing the 
changes in risk resulting from changes in the banking performance determinants and 
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In regulation between 1985 and 1997. In this model, banking performance 
determinants are aggregated in a composite index and regulation is an index number 
as well. It must be stressed that the effect of these explanatory variables on risk is 
evaluated in relative terms. That means that the model presented is a model with 
restrictions on the coefficients. Thus, the model to be estimated is subject to the 
restriction that the sum of the coefficients is one. 
The econometric concept of a multiplicative dummy variable is used in section 7.3., 
where a model that evaluates risk response to regulatory changes is proposed. In 
effect, values 1 and 0 are assigned to regulation in the model to be estimated 
allowing the question whether risk has increase or not with financial regulatory 
reform to be answered. The above composite indexes are multiplied, each in turn l48 , 
by this dummy variable. In this way, it is possible to test the statistical significance of 
changes in banking performance determinants on risk, in the course of financial 
regulatory reform. Inferences are then made about risk behaviour in the industry 
resulting from t~e way banks have accommodated regulatory changes. 
7.2. - THE EFFECTS ON RISK OF 
PERFORMANCE DETERMINA~TS AND 
RELATIVE TERMS 
7.2.1. - THE MODEL 
BOTH BANKING 
REGULA TION, IN 
A model that derives its structure from finance theory can estimate the relative 
effects on risk arising from both the banking performance determinants and from 
regulation. Bekaert and Harvey (1995), assessing the degree of integration or 
segmentation of capital markets, estimate a regime switching model of expected 
returns that allows returns to be determined at different times by domestic factors or 
by world factors markets. On one hand, the model presented herein replaces expected 
returns by a measure of risk from uncertainty theory - returns volatility/expected 
returns. On the other hand, risk is allowed to be determined by the banking 
148 The first model inserts the composite index relating to performance measured by profits and, 
afterwards. the model is built with the composite index for R.O.A. significant determinants. 
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performance determinants that are statistically significant 149 and by regulation. The 
only constrain in this model's specification is that it does not allow the coefficients to 
be time varying 1SO• Nevertheless, this constrain is overcome in section 7.3. where the 
introduction of a multiplicative dummy allows assessing risk response in relation to 
changes on regulatory rules. 
As mentioned before, banking performance determinants are aggregated in a 
composite index while regulation is measured by means of an index number. All the 
required information to build these indexes, whose explanation follows. is obtained 
from the unbalanceri panel data models estimated in chapter 6. 
Adapting Baekert and Harvey's model to the current research leads to a model with 
the following general form: 
Subject to: P =1-a 
Where: 
Yt is a measure of risk coming from uncertainty theory. YI will be replaced by 
"profits volatility/expected profits" i.l the first model and by "R.O.A. 
volatility/expected R.O.A." in the second model. For estimation purposes the first 
dependent variable is termed RISKPROF and the second one RISKROA. The 
observed values of risk, obtained from unbalanced panel data models 2'a table 6.7 151 
and 2' a table 6.8 1 S2 are presented in table 7.1. 
Xt is the composite index that encompasses all banking performance determinants for 
profits (first model) and for R.O.A. (second model), and Dl is regulation measured by 
an index number. 
149 Obtained from unbalanced panel models that are estimated in chapter 6. 
150 Time varying coefficients would enable the study of the effect of regulation on risk through time. 
151 Chapter 6, page 172, for profits. 
1'2 Chapter 6, page 173, for R.O.A. 
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Table 7.1-0bserved values of risk in the banking system. 
r--
Period Time RISKPROF RISKROA 
June 85 1 2.964734 1.554933 
Dec 85 2 1.914772 1.517316 
June 86 3 3.229609 1.347774 
Dec 86 4 4.116963 1.729481 
June 87 S 2.834150 1.081112 
Dec 87 6 1.810701 0.955126 
June 88 7 2.003789 0.908316 
Dec 88 8 2.466033 3.004976 
June 89 9 2.205727 1.026907 
Dec 89 10 0.934524 1.035072 
June 90 11 1.717593 0.932729 
Dec 90 12 1.302731 0.948118 
June 91 13 1.746238 0.938487 
Dec 91 14 1.364969 0.856723 
June 92 15 1.831480 1.143981 
Dec 92 16 2.752197 1.744205 
June 93 17 1.944763 0.968384 
Dec 93 18 1.616748 1.595028 
June 94 19 2.139778 1.049316 
Dec 94 20 2.499336 6.194474 
June 95 21 1.983943 1.305405 
Dec 95 22 1.991582 1.032183 
June 96 23 1.666897 1.154005 
Dec96 24 1.953676 1.978003 
June 97 2S 1.380262 0.876966 
Dec 97 26 2.803286 1.069654 
Source: Annex XIV (Vol. 11) 
Explanations of both Xtand Dt are provided below. 
X is a composite index built with all the statistically significant banking performance 
determinants given by the unbalanced panel data models previously estimated. In this 
composite index, each variable's weight is the correspondent coefficient estimated in 
the above models and is presented in table 7.2 where XPROF is the composite index 
for profits and XROA is the composite index for R.O.A.. Table 7.2 also shows the 
banking performance determinants that integrate each index. 
Table 7.2- Importance of banking peiformance determinants on risk. The 
C . 1 cl omposlte n ex structure. 
XPROF XROA 
Significant explanatory variables weights weights 
Total Securities / Total Assets 33.144 0.004269 
Government Securities / Total Securities --------------_.-.------- 0.002635 
Total Loans / Total Assets -------------------_._-.- 0.008577 
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Total Deposits / Total Assets -19.728 -_ ............ _- .... _ ............ -.... 
-1 
Ownership -1597.675 -0.4829 
"Endowment Effect" 392.188 0.09807 
--
Inflation -108.69 ... _-_ ........ ----...... __ .............. -
HerfindhalIndex of Concentration (Credit) --------- .. ---------------- 12.009 
Source: Unbalanced Panel Models 2'a table 6.7 for profits and 2'a table 6.8 for R.O.A. (chapter 6) 
For the general market and economic conditions, each variable is the same for all 
cross-sectional units in each period (time affects the whole banking system in the 
same way in each period). Thus, there is no question of neutralising the cross-
sectional effects for this kind of variables that are period individual invariant. 
The problem of cross-sectional effects in the current model's specification. and more 
precisely related to the structure of the composite index, arises from the significant 
bank specific explc.natory variables that are period individual variant variables. 
Aiming at neutralising the cross-sectional effects of these variables, the study of risk 
relative determinants uses the method of computing an average of these bank speci fic 
variables for the whole banking system in each period. The explanation for this 
choice lies in the fact that what is under research is the behaviour of banking stability 
and soundness in the context of changes in financial regulatory reform. I S3 
Under these circumstances, the composite index has the following structure: 
x = t 
With: 
t = 1,2 ....... 26 
n L Xjlt 
1=1 
n 
i = number of cross-sectional individuals (banks) in each period. 
And: 
Xji stands for the bank specific explanatory variable "j" for unit "i". 
\S3 See annexes XV and XVI (Vo!. I1) for a detailed computation of each composite index XPROF and 
XROA, respectively. 
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! 
Xp represents a proxy for time effects on profitability, that arc period individual 
invariant variables, that is to say general economic and market conditions. 
Since this composite index is a weighted variable, the weights assigned to each 
banking performance determinant are the coefficients estimated in chapter 6. It is 
therefore assumed tl:.at the relative importance of various balance sheet and economic 
factors remains unchanged. 
The number of bank specific explanatory variables is the same as in the unbalanced 
panel data models developed in chapter 6, that is nine. In contrast, the number of 
general market and economic conditions is reduced to five (as against seven included 
in the unbalanced panel data models). In other words, the two missing general market 
and economic conditions are the two classes of regulation whose effect is captured in 
the second component part of the right hand side in equation 7.1. 
The above composite index is adjusted to each banking profitability measure, profits 
and R.O.A., with regard to the correspondent statistically significant explanatory 
variables. With information collected from the unbalanced panel data models 
estimated in chapter 6, the composite index for profits, XPROF, is detailed next, 
followed by the examination of the composite index for R.O.A., XROA. 
Variables selected to built XPROF are: 
XIit- Total Securities/Total Assets (TSTA) 
X4it- Total Deposits/Total Assets (TDTA) 
XSit- Ownership (OWNER) 
X9it- "Endowment Effect" (ENDOW) 
X. r Inflation Rate (INFL) 
XROA encompasses the following variables: 
Xlit- Total SecuritieslTotal Assets (TSTA) 
X2it- Government SecuritieslTotal Securities (OSTS) 
X3ir Total LoanslTotal Assets (TLTA) 
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XSil- Ownership (OWNER) 
X9it- "Endowment Effect" (ENDOW) 
XSt- Herfindhal Index of Market Concentration in the Credit Market (HICRE)I~4 
After the above explanation of the composite index, it follows the structure of the 
index number that captures the effect of regulation on risk. 
Firstly, the analysis focuses on risk as measured by profits volatility over expected 
profits. Secondly, the index number relates to regulation when the explanation of risk 
utilises the profitability measure R.O.A.. In both cases the structure of the index 
numbers, DPROF and DROA, have their foundations on the coefficients of 
regulation obtained in the estimated unbalanced panel data models. (2' a table 6.7 for 
profits and 2'a table 6.8 for R.O.A. in chapter 6) 
At this point it is necessary to recall the three categories assigned to regulation as a 
dummy variable in the above models because these categories are crucial to the 
construction of the index number. 
The three considered levels of regulation are: 
- The less liberalised banking market between 1985 and 1988; 
- The more liberalised banking market between 1989 and 1992; 
- The liberalised banking market between 1993 and 1997. 
The first dummy is REO and the second one is REO 1. The qualitative variable REO 
assumes the value 1 if the market is liberalised and zero otherwise, while the binary 
variable REO 1 is 1 if the market is more liberalised and zero otherwise. Hence the 
category of "less liberalised market" is treated as the base category. In the 
construction of each index number the assumed value for both profits and R.O.A. in 
this base category is the correspondent mean obtained from models 2' a table 6.7 and 
2'a table 6.8. 
154 To which it was assigned the subscript seven in the unbalanced panel data models. 
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The time cut-off explained above is apptied not only in the study of the effect of 
regulation on profitability (chapter 6) but also on the one way analysis of variance 
where average profitability behaviour in the course of financial regulatory reform is 
studied (chapter 5). 
As mentioned, the index number value in the base category is the mean of profits and 
the mean of R.O.A. Each index number is built adding to this value the coefficient 
estimates for REG and REGl from models 2'a table 6.7 and 2'a table 6.815~. and 
their explanation proceeds. 
The coefficient estimates for REG I and R EG in mode 2' a table 6.7 is 11 19 and 1590, 
respectively. This means that regulatory changes caused an average growth on profits 
of 1,119 millions escudos from 1985/1988 to 198911992 and of 1,590 millions of 
escudos from 1985/1988 to 199311997. These values are added to the mean of profits 
for the whole period, 2,185 millions of escudos, and the correspondent index that 
captures the effect of regulation on risk measured by profits is given in table 7.3 by 
the name of DPROF. 
The same method is utilised to form the index number that allows computing the 
weight of the influence of regulation on risk when risk is based on R.O.A. behaviour, 
and may be summarised as follows. 
Coefficients estimates for REG 1 and REG in model 2'a table 6.8 are 0.305 and 
0.445, respectively. For this reason R.O.A., as a result of financial regulatory reform, 
grew on average 0.305 percentage points from 1985/1988 to 1989/1992 and 0.445 
percentage points from 1985/1988 to 1993/1997. Since the index number assigned to 
the base category is 0.464, that is the mean of R.O.A. for the whole period, the 
coefficient estimate is added in each subsequent period to obtain the correspondent 
index number shown in table 7.3 as DROA. 
U5 Chapter 6. 
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Tabl e 7.3 - Importance ofreeulation on risk. Regulation as an Index Nu mber. 
Index Number 
Period Time DPROF DROA 
June 85 I 2,185 0.464 
Dec. 85 2 2,185 0.464 
June 86 3 2,185 0.464 
Dec 86 4 2,185 0.464 
June 87 5 2,185 0.464 
Dec 87 6 2,185 0.464 
June 88 7 2,185 0.464 
Dec 88 8 2,185 0.464 
June 89 9 3,304 0.769 
Dec. 89 10 3,304 0.769 
June 90 11 3,304 0.769 
Dec. 90 12 3,304 0.769 
June 91 13 3,304 0.769 
Dec 91 14 3,304 0.769 
June 92 15 3,304 0.769 
Dec 92 16 3,304 0.769 
June 93 17 3,775 0.909 
Dec 93 18 3,775 0.909 
June 94 19 3,775 0.909 
Dec. 94 20 3,775 0.909 
June 95 21 3,775 0.909 
Dec 95 22 3,775 0.909 
June 96 23 3,775 0.909 
Dec.96 24 3,775 0.909 
June 97 25 3,775 0.909 
Dec.97 26 3,775 0.909 
Once both the dependent variables (RISKPROF and RISKROA) and the explanatory 
variables (XPROF,DPROF and XROA,DROA) have been explained. the study 
proceeds with the models' estimation along with the correspondent results' analysis. 
7.2.2. -ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The specification of the first model, the model based on profits, is: 
RISKPROFt= a * XPROFt+ (I-a) * DPROFt + ~t (7.2) 
With 
J.Lt-N(O,cr) 
E(~t ~'t)=O 
While the parametric form of the second model, the model that relates to R.O.A., is: 
RISKROAt= ~ * XROAt + (I-~) * DROAt + ~t (7.3) 
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With 
~t"·'N(O,cr) 
E(~t ~'t)=O 
With RISKPROF, XPROF, DPROF, RISKROA, XROS and DROA defined as 
above. 
Estimation of models 7.2 and 7.3 leads to equations 7.4 and 7.5 156 for profits and 
R.O.A. respectively. 
A 
RISKPROF I = 0.801537* XPROF, +(1-0.801537)*OPROF, (7.4) (22.479) 
1\ 
RlSKROA I = 0.688615 * XROA I + (1- 0.688615)* OROA I (7.5) (2.826) 
The robustness of these models is based on the fact that both a" and P" are 
statistically different from zero at the 1 % significance level. Therefore. from 
equations 7.4 and 7.5 the study concludes that both the composite indexes and 
regulation are significant in explaining risk in the Portuguese banking system, which 
is in accordance with findings from the unbalanced panel data models estimated in 
chapter 6. 
Finally, it is import2...'1t to draw two further conclusions. 
On the one hand, in both equations 7.4 and 7.5 bank specific and general market and 
economic conditions inserted in the composite index are more important than 
regulation to explain risk in the banking sector. 
On the other hand, this study allows the conclusion that the relative impact of the 
composite index on risk measured by profits behaviour is greater than the same 
relative impact when risk is evaluated by R.O.A. behaviour. That is to say that the 
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impact of financial regulatory reform on risk measured by R.O.A. is greater than the 
impact of financial rules changes on the stability of the system using protits as a 
measure of risk. 
7.3. - CHANGES ON THE EFFECT OF BANKING 
PERFORMANCE DETERMINANTS ON ruSK PROMOTED BY 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REfORM 
7.3.1. -INTRODUCTION: HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED 
The hypothesis to be tested is: 
"Risk in the banking system has increased in the course of financial regulatory 
reform" 
The analysis developed in this subsection overcomes the difficulty of assigning a 
time varying structure to the coefficients in the previous model. The use of a 
multiplicative dummy variable enables the study of the effect of regulation on risk of 
the banking system. More particularly, with multiplicative dummies, this effect arises 
from the response of the significant banking determinants to regulatory rules 
changes. This is an adequate modelling approach when the hypothesis to be tested is 
that the way banks have accommodated their management strategies to financial 
regulatory reform has increase risk in the banking system 157. The accommodative 
banking strategies have their expression in the significant banking determinants of 
profits and R.O.A. 's performance. In other words, the model studies the evolution of 
risk in the Portuguese banking system between 1985 and 1997 resulting from the 
way banks have reacted to financial regt'latory reform. The assumption is that this 
reaction function is modelled by the composite index behaviour through time, 
because this index is built with all the significant banking performance determinants 
obtained from the unbalanced panel data models that are estimated in chapter 6. 
156 The "t" statistic tests are reported in parentheses under each coefficient estimates. 
157 This assumption is explained in chapter 1.- the research proposition 
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As in the preceding subsection, the measure of risk remains the ratio bctwcen returns 
volatility and expected returns, and returns are represented both by profits and 
R.D.A. These are the two measure of profitability used in this chapter. 
Next, the diagrammatic approach to the structure of the model is explained, followed 
by the model specification and hypothesis testing. 
7.3.2. - MODEL SPECIFICATION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
Three yardstick periods have already been identified in the process of financial 
regulatory reform in the Portuguese Banking System. These periods are 198511 988, 
1989/1992 and 1992/1997, the same time split being applied in the unbalanced Panel 
Data Models developed in chapter 6, as well as in the one way analysis of variance 
model estimated in chapter 5. These periods can be labelled as a less liberalised 
market (1985/1988), a more liberalised market (1989/1992) and a liberalised market 
(1993/1997). The aim of the model presented in this subchapter is to analyse changes 
in the influence of the significant banking performance determinants on risk in the 
course of financial regulatory reform. Regulation is presented as a multiplicative 
dummy variable. In other words, the objective is to test whether risk has increased 
from the first period to the second period and from the second period to the third 
period, which means comparing the first period with the second period and the third 
period with the second period. Hence, the base category of the dummy variable is the 
second period. The adequate codification of this problem's nature is presented in 
table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 - Codification of regulation as a dummy variable 
DUMl DUM3 
1 st period - June85IDecember88 1 0 
2nd period - June89lDecember92 0 0 
3ro period - June93IDecember97 0 1 
Adopting a diagrammatic approach, the structure of the model has the following 
presentation: 
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Figure 7.1- Structure of the model with multiplicative dummies 
Coefficient 
Dummy variable 
Explanatory variable 
1st period 
DUM) 
Composite Index 
2nd period 
Cl 
Base 
Composite Index 
3rd period 
DUM3 
Composite Index 
As it is explained later in this subsection l58, if C2 is not statistically different from 
zero the conclusion ;s that the impact of the composite index on risk is unchangeable 
with changes in financial rules from period one to period two. In the same way, if C3 
is not statistically different from zero then risk has not altered with the 
accommodation of banking performance determinants to changes in financial rules 
from period two to period three. 
The general parametric form of the model is: 
~ = Cl * XI +c2 *(X* DUMl)I +c3 *(X* DUM3)1 + J.i, (7.6) 
With 
~t-N(O,cr) 
E(J..lt ~'t)=O 
Where: 
Yt is the measure of risk defined in subsection 7.2.1, and 
Xt is the composite index built with the significant banking performance 
determinants obtained in chapter 6, and earlier explained in this chapter. 
Table 7.4 together with figure 7.1 and equation 7.6. allows the following 
conclusions: 
a) For the 1 st period, the value of estimated Yt in this category is given by: 
y,(DUMI = I, DUM3 = 0)= (;1 +;2 )*x, 
!S8 p. 195. 
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b) For the second period, the value of estimated Yt in this category is given by: 
Y,(DUMl= 0,DUM3= 0)= Cl '" x/ 
c) For the third period, the value of estimated Yt in this category is given by: 
Y,(DUMI = 0, DUM3 = 1)= (;1 +c'J} x, 
Since following economic intuition alone, it is impossible to anticipate the sign of 
each coefficient (X is a composite index), the hypotheses tests are two two-tailed 
tests to the significance of the coefficients, their statistics being the "t statistics", 
The first null hypothesis, that C2 equals zero, is tested against the hypothesis that C2 is 
statistically different from zero. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the influence 
of X on risk changes with regulatory reform from 1985/1988 to 1989/1992. 
The second hypothesis test refers to the significance of c). If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, C3 is statistically different from zero, which means that risk has changed 
with X because of financial regulatory reform, that is between 1989/1992 and 
1993/1997. 
To conclude, this model enables the testing of the direct influence of X on risk, 
followed by the discussion whether this influence of X on risk varies in the course of 
financial regulatory reform, and if so, the direction of this variation. 
Next follows the application of the model discussed above, first on risk measured 
from profits standpoint and afterwards on risk measured from R.O.A. standpoint. 
7.3.2. I.-REGULATION AND RISK WHEN BANKING 
PERFORMANCE IS MEASURED BY PROFITS 
The theoretical structure of the model depicted in equation 7.6. changes to equation 
7.7. when the measure of banking performance is profits. 
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RISKPROf=al *XPRO~+a2 *(XPROF*DUM~, +a3(XPROF*DUMt +£, 
(7.7) 
Where: 
RISKPROF = PROFITS VOLATILITY 
EXPECTED PROFITS 
This is the measure of risk arising from uncertainty theory. 
"XPROF" is the composite index built with all the banking performance 
determinants that are significant in the explanation of profits behaviour l59 . 
Regulation is the dummy variable (DUMI and DUM3) whose values are presented 
in table 7.4. 
In addition, combining this model with ::lformation from table 7.4, the changes on 
the effect ofXPROF on risk promoted by financial regulatory reform are: 
a) For the first period 1985/1988, 
/\ [A A) RlSKPROF,(DUMI = 1, DUM3 = 0)= a l +a2 *XPROF; 
b) For the second period 198911992, 
/\ A 
RlSKPROF,(DUMO= I,DUM3 = O)=a,*XPROF, 
c) For the third period 1993/1997, 
/\ [A A) RlSKPROF,(DUMI = 0, DUM3 = 1)= a l +a) *XPROF, 
7.3.2.2.- REGULATION AND RISK WHEN BANKING 
PERFORMANCE IS MEASURED BY R.O.A. 
The study of risk on the R.O.A standpoint is carried out by equation 7.8. that results 
from equation 7.6. 
159 This composite index is explained in detail in this chapter, page 186. 
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RlSKROA = fJl * XRO~ + fJ2 * (XROA* DUM 1)/ + fJ3 (XROA* DUM3)/ + c, 
(7.8) 
Where: 
RISKROA = ROA VO] ,A TILITY 
EXPECTED ROA 
Which, as in the precedent model, is a measure of risk arising from uncertainty 
theory. 
"XROA" is the composite index built with all the banking performance determinants 
that are significant in the explanation of R.D.A. behaviour l6o . 
Regulation is defined as above. 
Using the codificat~on of regulation as a dummy variable (table 7.4), this model 
means that: 
a) For the first period 1985/1988, 
/\ [" ") RISKROA,(DUM] = 1, DUM3 = 0)= PI + P2 *XROA, 
b) For the second period 1989/1992, 
/\ /\ 
RISKROA,(DUMO = I, DUM3 = 0)= PI*XROA, 
c) For the third period 1993/1997, 
/\ [/\ /\) 
RISKROA, (DUMI = 0, DUM3 = I) = PI + Pl * XROA, 
Data for the above models are presented in table 7.5. 
160 This composite index is also explained in detail in this chapter, page 186. 
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Table 7.5- Datafor the Model that explains the effect of regulation on risk in the 
course of financial regulatory reform 
Profits R.O.A. 
Period Dependent Variable Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable Explanatory Variable 
RISKPROF XPROF RISKROA XROA 
June 85 2.964734 -2974.414 1.554933 1.761180 
Dec 85 1.914772 
-2593.231 1.517316 1.690934 
June 86 3.229609 
-1877.667 1.347774 1.702608 
Dec 86 4.116963 -1127.145 1.729481 1.840863 
June 87 2.834150 -1014.364 1.081112 1.836327 
Dec 87 1.810701 -767.3427 0.955126 1.954304 
June 88 2.003789 -763.3561 0.908316 1.940229 
Dec 88 2.466033 -858.5806 3.004976 1.758394 
June 89 2.205727 -1054.012 1.026907 1.852045 
Dec 89 0.934524 -1092.256 1.035072 1.875767 
June 90 1.717593 -993.2757 0.932729 1.711078 
Dec 90 1.302731 -919.0107 0.948118 1.653028 
June 91 1.746238 -406.5086 0.938487 1.666218 
Dec 91 1.364969 -248.1782 0.856723 1.627238 
June 92 1.831480 -149.5560 1.143981 1.609655 
Dec 92 2.752197 -169.0646 1.744205 1.443616 
June 93 1.944763 -273.7471 0.968384 1.298065 
Dec 93 1.616748 -301.2101 1.595028 1.213687 
June 94 2.139778 -100.0255 1.049316 1.242383 
Dec 94 2.499336 -169.6808 6.194474 1.164847 
June 95 1.983943 -143.6914 1.305405 1.169788 
Dec 95 1.991582 -198.0837 1.032183 1.144658 
June 96 1.666897 -286.6822 1.154005 1.091294 
Dec 96 1.953676 -228.1007 1.978003 1.067221 
June 97 1.380262 -138.5407 0.876966 1.087369 
Dec97 2.803286 -179.2549 1.069654 1.089175 
, Source: Models 2'a table 6.7 and 2 a table 6.8 estlmated 10 chapter 6 
7.3.3. - THE RESULTS 
7.3.3.1.- INTRODUCTION 
Estimation results from equations 7.7. and 7.8. are presented in equations 7.9. and 
7.10. respectively. These estimated models study risk evolution in the banking 
system when profitability is measured by profits behaviour (equation 7.9) and when 
the measure of banking profitability behaviour is R.O.A.(equation 7.10.)161 
1\ 
RISKPROF, = - 0.001821* XPROF, + 0.000431* ~XPROF* DUM 1)/ - 0.006968* (XPROF * DUM3), (-3.122) (0.677) (-3.634) 
(7.9) 
161 The "tn-statistic tests are reported in parentheses under each coefficient estimates. 
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/\ 
RISKROA I = 0.630783 * XROA 1 + 0.193692 * (XROA * DUM 1)1 + 0.85\ 075 * (XROA * DUM3) (2.734) (0.615) (2.249) 1 
(7.10) 
The diagrammatic illustration of above models follows. 
Figure 7.2 - Changes on the effect of the composite index on risk promoted by 
financial regulatory reform (the case of profits) 
Coefficient estimates 
Dummy variable 
Explanatory variable 
1st period 
- 0.001821 +0.0004321 
DUMI 
Composite Index 
2nd period 
- 0.001821 
base 
Composite 
Index 
3rd period 
(-0.001821 )+( -0.006968) 
DUM3 
Composite Index 
Figure 7.3 - Changes on the effect of the composite index on risk promoted by 
financial regulatory reform (the case of R.D.A.) 
1st period 2nd period 3rd period 
Coefficient estimates 0.630783+0.193692 0.630783 0.630783+0.851075 
Dummy variable DUMI Base DUM3 
Explanatory variable Composite Index Composite Index Composite Index 
The analysis of this study's results is co::ducted with two guidelines as orientation. 
One guideline is the variation on the effect of the composite index on risk resulting 
from financial regulatory reform. This analysis makes it possible to draw some 
conclusions about how risk has evolved from 1985 to 1997 as a result from the way 
banks have accommodate their strategies to changes in regulatory rules. The other 
guideline is the analysis of the estimated coefficients' sign, which reveals the 
orientation of the effect on risk promoted by variations on the composite index 
because of financial regulatory reform. 
Above approaches are followed firstly on the measure of risk arising from 
uncertainty theory when the profitability measure is profits (that is profits volatility 
over expected profits), and afterwards on the same risk measure but based on R.O.A. 
behaviour. 
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7.3.3.2.- RESUL'fS FROM THE STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF 
REGULATORY CHANGES ON RISK (THE CASE OF 
PROFITS) 
From both equations 7.7. and 7.9., combined with information from figure 7.2, the 
conclusion is that the effect of XPROF on risk is not significantly different when 
comparing the period of a less liberalised market (that is, the first period 198511988) 
with the period of a more liberalised market (that is, the second period 198911992), 
Clearly, looking at the statistical significance of the coefficients' estimates, with a 
probability value of 0.5048 the null hypothesis of a2 equal to zero is not rejected and 
with a probability value of 0.0048 the null hypothesis that a I equals zero is rejected. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that there is no difference between the second and the 
first period in what concerns the influence of XPROF on risk. In addition a3 is 
statistically different from zero at the significance level of 1 %. This statistical 
evidence means that there is a statistically significant difference between the second 
and the third period referring to the influence of XPROF on risk. Being these 
influences on risk promoted by regulatory reform. 
To conclude the study as to whether risk has increased or not in the course of 
financial regulatory reform it is sufficient to look at the sign of a"3. In this case the 
sign is negative. Because the composite index for profits (XPROF) has an upward 
trend from 1989 onwards (as shown in tlble 7.5), under this circumstance risk has 
decreased with the complete liberalisation of the market. Based upon this model the 
hypothesis that risk has increased in the course of financial regulatory reform does 
not hold good. 
7.3.3.3.-RESULTS FROM THE STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF 
REGULATORY CHANGES ON RISK (THE CASE OF 
R.O.A.) 
Results from the analysis of risk evolution based on the effect of the composite index 
(XROA) on R.O.A. behaviour are very SImilar to the preceding conclusions. These 
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results can be analysed using both equations 7.8. and 7.10 .. Having also as reference 
figure 7.3, the study concludes that the effect of the significant banking performance 
determinants on risk has not changed due to the transition from a less liberalised 
market (1985/1988) to a more liberalisd market (1989/1992). Again, risk in the 
banking system has statistically changed with the fully liberalisation of the banking 
market (that is, transition from the period 1989/1992 to the period 199311997). 
In reality, looking at the hypothesis tests, P2 with a probability value of 0.5445 is not 
statistically different from zero. While the null hypothesis concerning P2 is not 
rejected, the null hypothesis that p3 equals zero is rejected at the I % level of 
significance. 
Next follows the st.ldy whether risk has increased or decreased with the complete 
financial liberalisation of the market. 
Because pt'3 is greater than zero, the composite index and risk vary in the same 
direction. As it is shown in table 7.5, the tendency of XROA is to decrease between 
1989 and 1997, which means that risk in the banking system has decreased in the 
course of the last steps of financial regulatory reform. This is the same conclusion as 
in the study of risk based on profits behaviour. It follows that the hypothesis tested 
by these models that risk in the banking system has increase with financial regulatory 
reform is false. 
To conclude, the idea that financial liberalisation, as well as the new rules that 
followed, may have induced banks to act in their business dealings against the 
stability of the system does not hold good when the approach is stability from the 
profitability standpoint l62. 
162 Another possible study of banking stability is the incidence of banks failure approach. 
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CHAPTER 8.- CONCLUSION 
This research investigates how the Portuguese banking system has reacted to changes 
in its regulatory framework. The lifespan of the empirical study begins in 1986 (the 
year of EEC adherence), when very timid changes are implemented, and ends in 
1997, when the system was fully in line with E.U. financial rules. 
The methodology encompasses models that study average profitability behaviour, the 
importance of banking performance determinants to explain the behaviour of 
profitability and, finally, the evolution of risk from the profitability standpoint. These 
models may be useful to monitor the evolution in the banking performance of those 
countries that have applied for E. U. membership, such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, Turkey and Slovakia. 
The abolition of macroeconomic, allocative and structural controls and the adoption 
of prudential, organisational and protective controls are viewed as a process of 
financial regulatory reform. Based on the abovementioned methodology the research 
finds that the adoption of new financial rules in Portugal has contributed to 
strengthen its banking system. These results refute the general idea that financial 
systems became unstable after liberalisation. 
8.1. - ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
Economic growth and fluctuations in Portugal were characterised by four distinct 
periods as outlined in table 8.1, while figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 show the behaviour of 
output, the inflation rate and the Balance of Payments' deficits as a percentage of 
O.D.P .. 
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Figure 8.2 - Inflation Behaviour 
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Despite slight economic recoveries in 1975 and 1978, Portugal went through a 
recession between 1974 and 1984 as a consequence of both th oil shock and the 
"Carnation Revolution" (dated April 1974). Economic weakn se during this 
period were high levels of inflation, attaining peaks in 1977 and 1984 of 27,30% and 
28,50% respectively, and huge deficits in the Balance of Payments, for example 
9.40% ofG,D,P. in 1977 and 13.50% in 1982. These internal and external economic 
imbalances forced Portugal to submit two Letters of Intention to the International 
Monetary Fund. The first agreement with the International Monetary und was 
signed on May 1978 and the second agreement was dated July 1983. 
After a three-year boom (198411987) driven in part by E intlow of capital 
(Portugal joined the Community in 1986) signs of a slowdown in the Portugue e 
economy appeared in 1988. From then recession hit Portugal until) 993 , when the 
upturn was achieved after a increase of only 0.30% of G.D.P. This slump in 
economic growth went along with an international environment of decreasing 
property and share prices. 
After the 1993 trough, Portuguese out):·]t recovered and it expanded until 1997, 
supported mainly by E.U. cohesion funds, by the liberalisation of credit to 
consumption and by the excellent international momentum. It goes without saying 
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that led by a strict nominal convergence discipline l63 thc inflation rate was already 
contained in 1997 at the level of 2. 1 0%. 
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning the exchange rate regimes the ~ scudo was 
submitted to. The behaviour of the escudo exchange rate is summarised in figure 
8.4 164• 
Figure 8.4 - Exchange Rates Behaviour 
550,0 ~ 525,0 
500,0 , 
475,0 
450,0 I 
1~5 :g ~ 375,0 -
350,0 -.\--------
325,0 -- .-.\------
300,0 
275,0 ~. 
250,0 
225,0 
200,0 
175,0 
150,0 
125,0 . 
100,0 . 
L 75,0..,. (0 co 0 50,0 -Si Si Si ~ ~ ~ 
'- . 
Source: The author 's research: Annex XX (Vol. IJ ) 
P 
E 
o 
UK 
Portuguese exchange rate regimes between 1974 and 1997 were characterised by 
several patterns. 
During 1974 and 1975, in the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution, the Portuguese 
economic authorities resisted the devaluation of the Escudo anchored in the long 
held principle of the Estado Novo's policy of a stable currency. Nevertheless. 
rallying inflation rates (much higher than European average levels) and accelerating 
labour costs increased the unsustainability of such a exchange rate policy. Therefore 
the floatation of the Escudo was decided in 1976 and its depreciation attained 7% 
during this year which was clearly insufficient prevent the loss of competitiveness of 
the Portuguese Economy in external markets. As a consequence two discrete 
depreciation were decided, the first in the magnitude of 15% in February 1977 and 
the second in August 1977 when the Escudo lost 4% of its value. The latter was 
163 The Portuguese Escudo joined the Euro on January 1999. 
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accompanied by a radical transformation in the exchange rate policy. Flexible 
exchange rates were definitively abandoned in 1977 and replaced by a crawling peg 
at a monthly pre-determined devaluation. Hence, between 1977 and 1989, the 
Escudo was pegged to a basket of 13 currencies l65 and the rhythm of its devaluation 
was established in accordance with the differentials between Portuguese and 
European average inflation rates. 
The crawling peg was not enough to halt macroeconomic imbalances and discrete 
devaluations followed the continuous deterioration in both the terms of exchange and 
the Balance of Payments deficits. These discrete devaluations attained 6% in May 
1978 (after the IMF Agreement), 9.4% in June 1982,2% in March 1983 and another 
devaluation of 12% in July 1983 as a consequence of the Second Agreement with the 
IMF. 
Besides this discretionary exchange rate policy, the monthly devaluation of the 
Escudo was initially 1% and was reduced to 0.5% in 1980166 and increased to 0.75% 
in December 1981, accelerating to 1% per month in June 1983. Between 1987 and 
1989 (the final phase of the crawling peg regime), and due to improvements in the 
Balance of Payments and in the domestic inflation behaviour, the monthly 
depreciation of the Escudo slowed to 0.5% in 1987 and 0.4% in 1988. 
The year 1990 was a time of switching monetary and exchange rates policies with 
regard to the future :ldherence of the Escudo to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the 
European Monetary System, which occurred on April 1992. Step by step, the 
required mechanisms of indirect control of monetary aggregates were put in place. 
First a shadow mechanism was established between 1990 and 1992, aiming at testing 
the adjustment reaction of the Portuguese economy. Then, from 1992 onwards the 
Portuguese Escudo joined the large band (6%) of the ERM, band that was widened to 
15% in August 1993. Meanwhile several adjustments have occurred motivated by 
exchange markets turmoil during the 90s. Since Spain became the most important 
164 Nominal effective exchange rates. Performance relative to 21 industrial countries: double export 
weights. 
165 USD, JPY, ESP, GBP, DEM, ITL, FRF, BEF, NLG, DKK, NKK, SKK, CHF. 
166 The Minister of Finance Cavaco Silva, arguing that previious devaluations went too far, also 
decided a 6% ad-hoc appreciation of the Escudo in 1980. 
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commercial partner of Portugal, the adjustment of the Escudo central exchange rate 
was fuelled by the devaluation of the Peseta. 
Finally, and due to strict macroeconomic policies enforced by the discipline of the 
nominal convergence criteria 167, short term interest rates dropped from 17.8% in 
1991 168 to 5.1 % in 1997169, long term interest rates l70 from 9.0% in 1993 to 5.7% in 
1997, and the general Government overall balance, as a percentage of GDP, from -
6.4 in 1991 to-2.5 in 1997. 
8.2. - DEREGULATION OR FINANCIAL REGULA TORY REFORM? 
The process that has gone on in financial markets in western economies people 
described it as deregulation but, for the following reasons, the expression regulatory 
reform is more appropriate. 
a) Definitions of regulation, for instance tile Webster Dictionary and Llewellyn: 
Webster's dictionary defines regulation as "the act of reducing to order, of disposing 
in accordance with rule or established custom". Llewellyn (1986) defines regulation 
as "a body of specific rules or agreed behaviour, either imposed by some government 
or other external agency or self imposed by explicit or implicit agreement within the 
industry, that limits the activities and business operations of financial institutions". 
b) Because of the rationales for regulation (asymmetric information, externalities and 
market power) banking systems are at present much more regulated then they were 
before the 1980s. 
c) The term "deregulation" suggests the dismantling or at least diminution of rules in 
the financial system, but what followed cannot be characterised as a laissez-faire 
financial market. 
167 Portugal was entitled to join the single currency by 1999. 
168 Treasury Bills, 91 days (primary market). 
169 LISBOR.3 months interest rate. 
170 Treasury Bond 10 year fixed rate yield 
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These are the reasons why the expression "financial regulatory reform" is 
consistently employed throughout this thesis, rather than the more widely used term, 
"financial deregulation". 
In Portugal the most important new financial rules were implemented, gradually, 
from 1985 to 1993, when the full liberalisation of the market was enforced. Since 
then, the Portuguese Financial System ha:; been fully in line with European standard 
financial requirements. 
8.3. - THE BEHAVIOUR OF BANKING PROFITABILITY IN THE 
COURSE OF FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 
The analysis of variance developed in chapter five doesn't allow any conclusions 
about the effect of regulation on banking profitability. Instead, it allows us to draw 
some conclusions about the behaviour of average profitability through time. The time 
that is considered is the time during which financial regulatory reform occurred in 
Portugal. This analysis is complemented and enriched by empirical tests based on 
unbalanced panel data models carried out in chapter six. These models allow us to 
distinguish the effect of regulation on banking profitability as well as the effects of 
the other banking profitability determinants. The responses of profitability measures 
to changes in regulatory rules are different. 
The different behaviour of profits, R.O.A. and R.O.E. during the period of the study, 
when the main changes in the regulatory rules took place, are summarised as follows: 
The effect of time is very clear on profits, and the analysis of variance shows that 
liberalisation in the Portuguese Banking System was followed not only by higher 
average profits, in absolute terms, but also by greater volatility. Average profitability 
measured by R.O.A. and R.O.E. is statistically significantly different at the end of the 
process of liberalisation when compared with what it was at the beginning. Average 
profitability measured by R.O.A. and R.O.E. fell during this period. 
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The unbalanced panel data models tested demonstrate the statistical significance of 
regulation on profits and on R.O.A., these results indicating that average profitability 
(measured by profits in escudos terms) has increased in the course of financial 
regulatory reform in Portugal. In the analysis of variance models average R.O.A. has 
decreased in the course of financial regulatory reform. Changes in regulation may 
however not have been responsible for this behaviour. For in fact regulation is 
statistically significant to explain R.O.A. behaviour but the coefficient estimates have 
a positive sign. This fact means that, given the codification assigned to regulation as 
a binary variable, regulation appears to have produced an increase in average R.O.A. 
These results suggest that other banking performance determinants, such as the ratio 
total deposits to total assets and increasing competition on the credit market. have 
outweighed this effect. 
R.O.E displayed peculiar behaviour during regulatory changes. Average R.O.E. fell 
while also becoming more stable. These moves were in the opposite direction to 
those of profits as measured in escudos and of RO.A.. Tests carried out in chapter 
six show that regulation is not statistically significant in explaining the behaviour of 
R.O.E .. 
The difficulty in explaining RO.E. behaviour using the method adopted in the study 
suggests the importance of capital markets and market prices data instead of 
accounting data in studying RO.E. behaviour. This suggestion is reinforced by the 
fact that shareholders are concerned with this measure of profitability. Nevertheless, 
as this thesis is about banking stability and soundness, the data are examined so as to 
illuminate these issues rather than some which may concern bank shareholders. 
8.4. - THE EVOLUTION OF RISK IN THE COURSE OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 
This thesis has considered whether financial regulatory reform in Portugal 
contributed to reducing risk and increasing stability of credit institutions. 
The conclusion was that changes in financial regulation did have that effect. 
Empirical work showed that: risk remained statistically unchanged between the first 
period of liberalisation (1985-1988) and the second one (1989-1992), and risk 
decreased with the full liberalisation of the banking industry, that is during 1993-
1997. 
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